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This research demonstrates that rebel groups use international norms in their discourse and 
echo patterns in the discourse of states and that they do so to promote their own legitimacy at key 
turning points in their conflicts.  Which international norms rebel groups use most frequently is 
partially determined by the congruence of those norms with their local norms and beliefs and the 
degree to which a group’s internal structure has become more hierarchical and specialized.  Two 
rebel groups are examined in this study over the course of their conflicts: the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The international norms under 
analysis are human rights, international humanitarian law, genocide, and norms against 
terrorism.  
Rebel groups echo the broad pattern of change in discourse and behavior exhibited by states: 
as states increasingly turned to human rights discourse and focused on the protection of civilians 
in conflict during the 1990s, rebel groups did so as well in their discourse.  These non-state 
actors, however, are not merely echoing the discourse from the international level as passive 
recipients: they adopt international norms into their discourse for strategic reasons, namely to 
increase their legitimacy with local and international audiences.  By tracing the patterns of norm 




the ground, this research demonstrates that rebel groups increase the frequency of their use of 
international norms at key turning points in the conflict, such as during negotiations for ceasefire 
or peace agreements, and do so to boost their legitimacy.  The research examines the effect of 
two additional variables on the changes in the discourse of the groups: the normative culture of 
the groups and the internal hierarchical structure.  Findings demonstrate that the normative 
culture of a rebel group partially determines which international norms are adopted by the group 
and that a precondition of a high level of internal hierarchy is necessary before a group echoes 
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Over the course of the 1990s, the polarizing Cold War debates that dominated global 
thinking were supplanted by increased attention to the importance of human rights, the protection 
of civilians in conflict, and the redefinition of human rights violators as threats to international 
peace and security. Parallel to the increasing use of human rights language and human rights-
influenced behavior on the part of states, this period saw a marked increase in the use of such 
language on the part of armed opposition groups—actors not bound by international conventions 
governing human rights law and responsible for a great deal of the human rights law violations 
during times of conflict. How did international norms that were intended to change the behavior 
of states come to have such an effect on the discourse of such non-state actors? 
Over the last twenty years, we have seen evidence across the globe of the beginning of 
the incorporation of international norms in the discourse of armed opposition groups. For 
example, in January 1994, in the jungles of Chiapas, the Zapatistas launched a global campaign 
to draw attention to human rights violations in Mexico; in Burundi in February 1995, Jerome 
Ndiho of the Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD) framed the 
organization’s struggle in terms of human rights violations; in Kosovo in 1998, the spokesman 
for the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) publicized the KLA’s struggle by claiming human rights 
violations had been perpetrated by the Yugoslav state in Kosovo and Bosnia; and the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, after years of claiming human rights violations as a 
motivating factor for their struggle, formed a human rights organization themselves in 2005 to 
document human rights violations.
1
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 See, for example, “Rebels Determined ‘to Build Socialism’ in Mexico,” January 4, 1994, New York Times 
(front page);  Jerome Ndiho on Radio France International, Broadcast February 23, 1995; Jakup Krasniqi, quoted 




While a great deal of scholarly attention has been focused on how and why states shift 
their discourse and respond to international norms, very little scholarly attention has been paid to 
how these norms affect the discourse and behavior of non-state actors.  This dissertation 
addresses this gap by focusing on the changes in discourse of rebel groups, with the KLA as the 
primary case. A second case, the LTTE, is also explored to test the generalizability of the 
hypotheses developed and to provide a limited comparison between the two groups.  
The norms under examination are human rights, behaviors during armed conflict (which 
fall broadly but not exclusively under international humanitarian law), and the use of certain 
types of violence (which may be termed terrorism). These groups of norms taken together 
address the types of behavior parties might exhibit during violent contestations of power and, 
between them, produce expectations of which sorts of behavior are condemned and which sorts 
of behavior are legitimate—or at least, not prohibited. 
The argument  
 Norms change over time at the state level, and these changes are reflected in the 
discourse and behavior of states.  International norms also have an effect on the discourse of 
rebel groups. Drawing on constructivist theories, which suggest that state interests may be 
shaped by norms and cultural factors, this dissertation offers explanations for the changes in the 
discourse of rebel groups, suggesting that these actors may equally find their interests shaped by 
international norms and change their use of language accordingly.   
Are the changes in international norms at the state level recognized and mimicked at the 
non-state level among rebel groups and, if so, why? Not all groups adopt international norms in 




groups adopt these norms and which norms are adopted?  The following hypotheses examine 
these questions. 
First, I hypothesize that rebel groups pay attention to the changes in the hegemonic 
discourse and change their discourse to match the changes at the state level. When states 
incorporate a specific norm into their language, armed groups do so as well. In this regard, they 
can be considered norm echoers. I tested this hypothesis by comparing the mention of 
international norms in the discourse of two groups, the KLA and the LTTE, over the course of 
each of their conflicts and comparing the patterns observed with changes at the international 
level.   
A further hypothesis is that rebel groups decide to change their discourse in response to 
changes at the state level for strategic reasons, which suggests that the armed groups are not 
passive recipients of these norms but are active participants who engage with these norms when 
it is in their interest to do so. Thus, adopting international norms into their discourse is a strategy 
to increase their legitimacy.  This hypothesis can be operationalized by examining in detail when 
in the course of the conflict the groups chose to incorporate these norms into their discourse. If 
groups increase the frequency of the use of international norms at key turning points when the 
groups’ legitimacy is most under scrutiny, it is more likely that the adoption of the norm is 
undertaken to boost that legitimacy. Key turning points include:  stepping into the public eye for 
the first time and announcing their goals to domestic and international audiences; being 
monitored by outside observers, such as during ceasefire agreements; negotiating agreements 
with the host state when third parties are involved; and seeking significant outside support.  
The evidence from the discourse of the two rebel groups under study shows that, broadly 




evidence further shows much higher levels of use of international norms during key turning 
points in the conflict, indicating that the norm usage was intentional, and therefore of a strategic 
nature. However, the patterns observed in the discourse of the two groups do not mirror the 
changes at the international level exactly, and, further, the patterns vary among norms and 
between cases indicating that other variables are also at play.   
Drawing on research with rebel groups, such as Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy 
Weinstein’s work in Seirra Leone and Marie Joelle Zahar’s work in Bosnia and Lebanon, which 
shows that the internal structure of a group has an effect on the behavior of the group, this 
research examines the evolving structure of the rebel groups over time and compares the changes 
in structure with the observed changes in the discourse (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Zahar 
1999). Thus, the internal structures are investigated to determine if greater hierarchy within the 
group is a precondition for the group’s ability to reliably incorporate international norms into the 
discourse.  This leads to a third hypothesis: that groups with a high level of hierarchy will more 
likely be able to see value in following international norm usage by states and  more likely be 
able to do so. Groups whose structure is more diffuse are less likely to incorporate international 
norms into their discourse.    
Structure may affect discourse in two ways. The first is through the mechanism of 
control—a more hierarchal group will be able to exert more control over the public 
pronouncements made by its members and will have greater ability to shape the discourse. The 
second mechanism by which structure may affect discourse is through increased specialized 
knowledge: as an organization grows more hierarchical and complex, individuals within the 
organization are able to specialize and grow more competent in one area (or alternatively, the 




suggests that armed groups do require a certain level of hierarchical structure before international 
norms enter their discourse in a significant way.  The evidence in the case of the KLA (the case 
in which the structure evolved significantly over the conflict) points to the second mechanism 
having the greatest effect on the discourse. The evidence for the first mechanism of control was 
much weaker. 
Finally, drawing on previous literature, such as Jeffery Checkel’s work on Eurpean norms 
on national membership, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s work on transnational actors, 
and Jeffrey Legro’s study of military culture, which argues that the congruence of a norm with 
the local culture is a vital component in determining whether a state (or organization) adopts a 
norm, I hypothesize that the internal normative culture of a rebel group determines which 
international norms are adopted by the group (Checkel 1999; Keck and Sikkink 1998; and Legro 
1997). If certain features of an international norm are reflected in some way in the internal 
culture of the rebel group or the culture within which the group operates, the international norm 
will more likely be adopted by the group. Conversely, if the international norm is not congruent 
with the local norms, it is unlikely to be adopted, or adopted with any frequency, into the 
discourse of the group.  Thus, we can expect that groups with widely divergent cultural norms 
will exhibit widely divergent patterns of adoption of international norms.  
Significance 
Why do we care about armed resistance groups adopting human rights norms or 
international norms at all? 
If we can identify a pattern of adoption of the language of human rights, international 
humanitarian law norms, or the norms against terror by rebel groups, a number of avenues 




rights violations in conflict, in general. It will be useful, for example, to have evidence of 
incentives to which a rebel group may respond that will move it toward more acceptable 
behavior. Offering legitimacy in negotiations is standard, but knowing more about what a group 
might consider to be true measures of legitimacy and under what conditions they might pursue 
them could lead to greater success.   
Given that armed resistance groups are major perpetrators of human rights and 
international humanitarian law violations, setting aside the issues of legitimacy for the moment, 
the findings in this study suggest opportunities for encouraging these groups to reduce their 
violations. A better understanding of why groups do adopt these norms points to levers that could 
be applied by monitors, watch dogs, and others: for example, looking for congruence with local 
norms; and highlighting the payoffs others have gained when strategic turning points proved 
positive as a result of norm adoption.  In addition, recognizing the central role rebel groups have 
in human rights and international humanitarian law violations, there has been a trend in recent 
years to prod rebel groups to acknowledge officially treaties and human rights norms, by 
encouraging the signing of unilateral statements, treaties such as the Mine Ban Treaty, and 
bilateral agreements with, for example, bodies such as the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) to end the use of child soldiers.
2
 Knowing why some groups may engage with certain 
international norms (and not others), and when they might be amenable to negotiations of this 
sort, will aid groups seeking to bring non-state actors into the international human rights regimes.  
                                                          
2
 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines 
and on Their Destruction (known as the Mine Ban Treaty) was open for signature in December 1997 and went into 
force in March 1999.  In addition to having state parties sign the Mine Ban Treaty, the International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines (ICBL), the force behind the Mine Ban Treaty, sought out negotiations with groups such as the 
LTTE in Sri Lanka and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines, to encourage their signing of a 




A significant problem may be that by using the language of international norms to boost 
their legitimacy while not necessarily abiding by those norms, rebel groups may be contributing 
to the tarnishing of the human rights discourse itself and the diminishment of the value of those 
norms in the public sphere.  
Finally, this study contributes to the literatures on both international norms and rebel 
groups. The literature on norms has only just begun to address the effect of international norms 
on non-state actors and this research helps open up this area of investigation.  The research on 
rebel groups is rich, but it is limited mainly due to the difficulties and the dangers researchers 
face in accessing these groups during a conflict and immediately thereafter.   By approaching the 
study of rebel groups through a previously under-explored area—that of the discourse of these 
groups during conflict—this research sheds more light on rebel groups’ strategies during 
conflicts and points to a path of fruitful research in the future.  
The first chapter, Chapter 1, “Theoretical Framework and Methodology,” provides the 
theoretical underpinnings using literature from four different areas: international norms, 
legitimacy, social movements, and civil wars. The literature provides a guide for how the norms 
may come to affect the actions and discourse of rebel groups, offers insight into the potentially 
strategic thinking and cost-benefit analysis behind the adoption of certain norms in the discourse, 
and suggests why rebel groups may adopt the language of international norms to frame their 
struggle.  Chapter 1 also outlines the methodology employed in this study.  
Chapter 2, titled “Background on the Kosovo and Sri Lanka cases,” offers the reader an 
overview of the conflicts in the two cases with details of the origins of each of the two groups 




examination of the structure of each organization and the normative environments of each group, 
and looks at the congruence of international norms with local culture in each case.  
Chapter 3, “Patterns of change: A state to non-state level comparison,” reviews evidence 
that armed resistance groups follow changes in the hegemonic discourse and behavior and 
change their discourse to echo the changes at the state level. It compares the patterns in the 
changes in the discourse of these groups with the changes observed at the state level over the 
course of the 1990s and throughout the period during which the two groups were active.  The 
international norms analyzed are human rights, international humanitarian law, humanitarian 
intervention, genocide, and the norm against the use of terrorism. It further examines the 
evidence for the effect that changes in structure have on a group’s use of international norms in 
its discourse.   
Chapter 4, “Human rights and international humanitarian law: Evidence of incorporation 
of norms into the discourse of rebel groups,” looks more closely at the changes in the discourse 
related to two particular groups of norms—human rights and international humanitarian law—
comparing the changes between the use of these norms in each group, and between the two 
groups.  This chapter focuses on the micro-patterns observed in the discourse and ties these 
patterns to events on the ground. It also examines evidence for how the international norms may 
resonate with local norms.  
Chapter 5, “’We were fighting a clean war’: Rebel groups and the norm against the 
practice of terrorism,” examines how rebel groups talk about terror and terrorism and when they 
are most likely to do so. It explores how groups contest the label of terrorist and try to label their 




rebel group’s discourse after the events of September 11, 2001. Finally, Chapter 6, 





Chapter 1: Theoretical framework and methodology 
 
How and why do non-state actors, in particular rebel groups, use international norms in their 
discourse? What are the patterns of that usage? These are the main questions under examination 
in this study, which lies at the nexus of several fields of research, drawing its concepts and 
theories from each of these. The four sets of literature that provide the theoretical framework for 
this research are: international norms, legitimacy, social movements, and civil wars. There has 
been some scholarship looking at non-state actors and international norms, but very little which 
looks specifically at rebel groups and those norms. This chapter draws together these four bodies 
of work in a new way to cast light on how norms might affect the discourse of rebel groups, how 
the incorporation of norms changes over time, what factors might instigate this change, and 
finally, whether rebel groups’ adoption of norms is strategic in nature.   
Before examining the literature, the following section reviews definitions.  
1.1 Definitions 
The definitions for core concepts used in this study—rebel groups, international norms, 
human rights, and international humanitarian law—are contested and often ambiguous, so 
clarifying these terms is necessary.  
Rebel groups  
Throughout this research, the terms rebel groups, insurgencies, and armed opposition groups 
are used interchangeably to refer to groups that are armed, not under state control, and use force 
as part of their strategy to challenge the state. These groups act in opposition to the government 
or state in control of the territory, or, where there is no government to oppose (like Somalia), use 




describe the groups in question:  militias, a broader term that includes all armed groups, 
including those working alongside the state, or under loose control of the state, such as 
paramilitary groups; guerrillas, a subset of rebel groups more indicative of their preferred tactics; 
and freedom fighters and terrorists, which denote a certain political bias.  The name or label 
applied to a group can threaten or bolster its legitimacy as naming and labeling are connected to 
power—those with power can change how others perceive groups by labeling them a certain way 
(Bhatia 2005). This study tries to choose the more neutral terms.   
Norms and international norms  
How and why non-state actors use international norms in their discourse, and the patterns of 
usage, are the main questions under examination in this study. What, exactly, are international 
norms? Using a constructivist approach, I consider international norms to be an understanding of 
standards of behavior appropriate for international actors shared by states and international 
organizations. Constructivists have defined a norm to be a “shared understanding of standards of 
behavior” (Klotz 1995) and “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891).  A core feature of a norm is that it has legitimacy—meaning 
it is widely accepted and viewed as appropriate.    
Norms also change over time, and it is the pattern of change to which scholars have drawn 
much attention, as will be discussed below.  International norms include prohibitions against 
such diverse behaviors by states as slavery, colonialism, and the use of certain weaponry or 
tactics during war, such as chemical weapons or attacks on civilians. All of these forms of 
behavior were deemed legitimate at one time. States once considered trafficking in slaves, for 




The norms under particular examination in this study deal with human rights, behaviors 
during armed conflict (which fall broadly but not exclusively under international humanitarian 
law), and the use of certain types of violence (which may be termed terrorism). These groups of 
norms taken together address the types of behavior parties might exhibit during violent 
contestations of power and, between them, produce expectations of which sorts of behavior are 
condemned and which sorts of behavior are legitimate – or at least, not prohibited.  
Human rights 
Human rights are the basic freedoms to which all humans are entitled regardless of their race, 
gender, nationality, age or ethnicity.  Alyson Brysk summarizes, “human rights may be 
conceived as a set of entitlements to the social prerequisites to human development: protection, 
security, freedom, and community” (Brysk 2004: 23). While the modern concept of human rights 
has its roots in the writings of Western political philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
John Locke, and Immanuel Kant, our understanding of human rights today is derived from 
international human rights conventions and declarations that have been in force since the 1940s. 
The central agreement from which other human rights conventions flow is the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly 
on December 10, 1948, which declares that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity” 
(Article 1);  and stipulates that everyone “has the right to life, liberty and security of person” 
(Article 2) and further has the right to be free of slavery, torture, and arbitrary arrest and 
detention, among other rights. 
Human rights, as defined by the UDHR, thus provide us with the template for conceiving of 
how an individual has rights vis-à-vis the state.  Human rights serve in some way as a power 




addition to the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)—which together are 
considered the international bill of rights—and a host of other conventions and treaties, such as 
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT), and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Genocide Convention), further clarify the internationally protected rights of 
individuals and, concomitantly, the responsibilities of states. Nine international treaties together 
make up the core of human rights treaties.3 As treaties, they carry more weight than norms or 
rules and have international committees that monitor state compliance (Finnemore 1996). An 
individual’s human rights can only be violated by a state, while similar actions by individuals are 
deemed to be crimes. For example, if a state kills an individual, it deprives that individual of his 
or her right to life—a human rights violation—while if an individual kills another, that is a 
crime—murder.  While human rights law does not traditionally apply to non-state actors, the 
norms embodied in the laws have begun to be applied to non-state actors such as rebel groups 
and multinational corporations (MNCs).   
International humanitarian law  
International humanitarian law (IHL) is the branch of international law that provides the 
rules that regulate conduct during times of war. Also called jus in bello, it has a long history of 
development, building on centuries of interaction between states at war. IHL delineates the 
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 The nine core human rights treaties are the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW), the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED), and the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). The treaty texts, as well as their classification as core treaties, may be 
found at the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 




acceptable behavior of all parties in a conflict (including both states and non-state armed actors) 
and circumscribes how these parties may conduct war with each other. While the laws provide 
for the protection of individuals not actively involved in the fighting of war, such as civilians or 
wounded soldiers, from the worst effects of war itself, they do have modest aims: merely to 
restrain the parties of an armed conflict from “wanton cruelty and ruthlessness” (Kalshoven and 
Zegveld 2011). International humanitarian law can be divided into two related but conceptually 
distinct areas of law: the law of The Hague (based primarily on two international treaties signed 
in the Hague in 1899 and 1907), which deals primarily with the conduct of war and with 
permissible means and methods of war; and the law of Geneva (based on the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions,  their two 1977 Additional Protocols, and a third 2005 Additional Protocol) which 
is primarily concerned with the protection of civilians and those who are no longer able to fight. 
The Geneva Conventions spell out the commitments of states for the protection of civilians, the 
security of belligerent populations, the treatment of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, and the 
treatment of prisoners of war during armed conflict. In contrast to human rights law, IHL does 
directly address non-state armed groups, spelling out their rights and obligations. Rules 
applicable in non-international armed conflicts include Common Article 3 to the four Geneva 
Conventions, and the 1977 Protocol II relating to the protections of vicitims of non-international 
armed conflict..4,5 
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 A non-international armed conflict is an armed conflict which takes place within a state, and may involve the 
forces of the state and a non-state actor, or two or more armed groups.  Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions includes requirements that the non-state actors have an organized military force and an authority 
responsible for its acts, act within a determinate territory, and have the means of respecting and ensuring respect for 
the Convention. The conflict must also reach a certain intensity and be of a certain duration, which distinguishes the 
conflict from events such as riots.  
5
 The laws which apply in non-international armed conflict are the following: Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions; Additional Protocols II of 1977; Article 19 of the 1954 Cultural Property Convention (relating to 
respect for cultural property); the 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention on Cultural Property; the 
1977 United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 




Human rights vs. International humanitarian law   
Despite the clear-cut distinctions between human rights law and international 
humanitarian law, there exists a significant confusion between the two bodies of law in practice,  
and the question of which applies during times of conflict is still not adequately resolved.  
Several reasons for why this might be the case have been suggested by scholars and include: the 
nature of modern warfare, which has blurred the demarcation of the battlefield and the soldier 
(Kennedy 2006); the difficulty in agreeing on when the threshold of conflict has been reached 
and the resultant confusion over which body of law to apply (Tomuschat 2010); and the tendency 
of recent treaties to draw from both human rights law and international humanitarian law 
(Droege 2007).   
The confusion also exists at the sub-state level. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International, do most of the human rights 
law violation monitoring and their reports are relied upon by states and the media to inform both  
policy toward and the framing of specific conflicts (Lutz 2006: 25). These groups have extended 
their mandate from pure human rights investigations to researching IHL violations as well.  In 
addition, individual actors involved directly in conflicts themselves play a great role in how the 
framing of the conflict is perceived by outsiders (Bob 2005). Thus, how non-state actors 
understand and use these terms may have an effect on how the events are perceived by other 
actors such as states, NGOs, or the media.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
concerning landmines; the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention; and the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.  In addition, the 
statute of the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) gives the Court jurisdiction over violations of 






What constitutes terrorism is continually debated in political and academic circles.  As a 
term, terrorism has eluded a concrete definition. This is due in part to the way the word has 
evolved since it was first introduced during the French Revolution in 1793-4, and in part to a 
debate over the politics of self-determination, where terrorist and freedom fighter can be used to 
describe the same individual (Hoffman 1998).  Academics have struggled to clarify the concept 
of terrorism in different ways: some mapped the consensus among researchers (Weinberg, 
Pedahzur, and Hirsch-Hoefler 2010); some identified commonalities of those using violence 
(Tilly 2004); and some identified the goal of the actors involved (Hoffman 1998).  Governments 
also have difficulty with defining terrorism. One researcher, for example, determined that the US 
Government uses 22 different definitions of terrorism (Perry 2004).   There is currently no 
consensus over the definition of terrorist or terrorism, but the debate over the term has moved 
from the center stage of international politics (where it had produced a deadlock at the United 
Nations) to the wings, and one scholar has argued that there now appears to be a loose agreement 
that a particular act of violence can be described as terrorism whenever a large group of states 
regard that act as illegitimate (Keohane 2002).  
While there is no broad consensus, it is still useful to identify what may be called 
terrorism for the purposes of this study. One widely used definition of terrorism which offers 
some basic parameters of what is meant by the term “terrorism” is Bruce Hoffman’s: “Terrorism 
is violence—or, equally important, the threat of violence—used and directed in pursuit of, or in 
service of, a political aim…it is a planned, calculated, and indeed systematic act” (Hoffman 
1998: 15). This definition does not specify the types of violence included in the definition 




terrorism can only be committed by non-state actors, or whether state actors may commit 
terrorism as well), and leaves out acts which serve no political agenda.  
1.2 Theoretical framework 
There are four areas of literature most relevant to this study: international norms, 
legitimacy, social movements, and civil wars.  
International norms  
Explanations for why armed resistance groups may adopt the discourse of human rights and 
other international norms can be drawn from two different traditions: the constructivist tradition, 
which emphasizes the importance of ideas, norms, and social actors, and the rational-materialist 
tradition, which emphasizes power and self-interest. Both approaches offer explanations 
primarily for the behavior of states, but we can assume that some aspirations and pressures faced 
by states, such as the desire for legitimacy or prestige or fear of sanctions, may also be faced by 
non-state actors, allowing us at least to find a theoretical foundation for the behavior of armed 
resistance groups. The explanations they offer are also not mutually exclusive and can both be 
applied to gain a better understanding of the behavior and discourse of non-state actors. As 
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink argue, “rationality cannot be separated from any 
politically significant episode of normative influence or normative change, just as the normative 
context conditions any episode of rational choice” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 888). 
Early works on international law and institutions posed the question of why states abide by 
international norms.   Scholars provided a variety of answers including a reduction of transaction 
costs (Keohane 1984), the resolution of coordination problems (Martin 1992), and the provision 
of a language for international politics (Kratochwil 1989). Following on from these original 




neoliberal institutional approaches by seeking explanations for the behavior of states that draw 
on non-material factors, such as ideas and culture. Constructivism is about “human 
consciousness and its role in international life” (Ruggie 1998).  
Both realist and neoliberal theories explain state behavior based on the fixed, material 
interests of states.  Constructivist theories challenge these approaches by suggesting that the 
interests themselves are not simply a given, but may be shaped by norms, ideas, and/or cultural 
factors (Ruggie 1998; Kratochwil 1989). Scholars first began to focus beyond the state on non-
state actors, norms, transnational networks, and transnational relations starting in the mid-1990s.  
The literature has explored: how norms might be transmitted from state to state by looking at 
how states adopt certain new bureaucratic structures after other states have done so (Finnemore 
1996); how specific norms such as nuclear deterrence and the taboo against the use of chemical 
weapons alter states’ use of weapons in war  (Price and Tannenwald 1996; Price 2008); the 
change in the norms of opposition to slavery, decolonization and apartheid (Klotz 1995; 
Crawford 1993); how norms may shape US foreign policy, for example, the use of bilateral 
agreements to enforce human rights norms in Latin America (Sikkink 2004); and the adaptation 
of norms to new situations, such as the evolution of the norm for humanitarian intervention 
(Finnemore 2003).  Scholars have also argued that international norms affect state behavior via 
domestic political processes (see for example, Cortell and Davis 1996). More recently Risse, 
Ropp, and Sikkink examined under which conditions actors move from commitment to 
international norms to compliance with them (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 2013). 
The question of how to explain the variation in the level of adoption of different international 
norms among states has been answered in a number of different ways. Cortell and Davis argue 




processes: first, the domestic salience or legitimacy of the norm; and second, the structural 
context within which domestic policy debate occurs (Cortell and Davis Jr. 2000).  They define 
salience in this way: “salient norms give rise to feelings of obligation by social actors and, when 
violated, engender regret or a feeling that deviation or violation requires justification” (Cortell 
and Davis Jr. 2000: 69). At a state level, the measures of salience of a norm to a particular state 
include an examination of: first, changes in national discourse; second, changes in the state’s 
institutions; and finally, changes in the state’s policies, with the changes in the discourse being 
the most important.  As they state, “paradoxically, the most salient norms will be most evident 
when they are violated, as actors will feel a strong need to justify or apologize for 
noncompliance” (2000: 71).  Theorists suggest that the examination of how international norms 
may become salient domestically should take into account at least four different factors: the level 
of cultural match or congruence between the international norm and domestic norms; the rhetoric 
of leaders; domestic interests; and domestic institutional structure.  In terms of the cultural 
match, Jeffrey Checkel argues that preexisting domestic understandings or social conditions alter 
the effect that international norms can have domestically (Checkel 1999).  He argues that 
international norms need to resonate with local culture—widely held domestic beliefs, 
understandings, and obligations—in order to gain traction at the local level. When there is a so-
called cultural match, local actors are much more likely to take the international norm as a given, 
recognizing obligations associated therewith and speaking and acting accordingly. When there is 
no cultural match, the adoption of an international norm will be much more difficult.   Margaret 
Keck and Kathryn Sikkink reach a similar conclusion: they argue that transnational advocacy 
networks “are more likely to be influential if they fit well with existing ideas and ideologies in a 




The salience of a norm may also be affected by rhetoric. If leaders repeatedly use the 
language of certain norms in speeches, statements, or pronouncements, the cumulative weight of 
those pronouncements may shift public sentiment towards acceptance of the norm (Cortell and 
Davis Jr. 2000). Even if the use of the norms in the discourse is in a cynical bid to add legitimacy 
to the speaker, that usage may alter the discourse around the norm from questioning its 
legitimacy to a discussion about its applicability in particular cases (Risse 1998).  In addition to 
government leaders, societal leaders may also increase the rate of rhetoric around a norm, 
thereby altering its salience in political debates (Boli and Thomas 1997). 
In their search for explanations for variations between states, some scholars have also 
examined differences in domestic structures.  Jeffrey Legro explains variations in different 
countries’ continued adherence to international norms during the Second World War (drawn 
from international humanitarian law), such as the prohibition against the use of chemical 
weapons and the use of submarines to attack civilian shipping, with differences in the political 
cultures and structures of the militaries in each of three countries—Great Britain, Germany, and 
the Soviet Union (Legro 1997).  In addition, some scholars have found that if a norm is not 
present in existing domestic structures, it will be much harder for that norm to gain salience 
domestically. For example, Kevin Hartigan found that the domestic laws of Mexico and 
Honduras have no concept of a refugee, resulting in the weak enforcement of international norms 
regarding the protection of refugees (Hartigan 1992).  
Non-state actors are prominent in this literature mainly as advocates or norm entrepreneurs 
promoting new norms, often through transnational networks of NGOs, to affect state behavior 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998). Keck and Sikkink argue in  Activists Beyond Borders that domestic 




which have activists at the international level who can lobby international organizations (IOs) 
and other powerful states, and which in turn put pressure on the host state, a process Margaret 
Keck terms the “boomerang effect.” They study these transnational networks through an analysis 
of the evolution of the adoption of human rights norms and environmental protection norms in 
particular countries (Keck and Sikkink 1998). An alternative approach is to observe the impact 
of one non-state actor: Ann Marie Clark’s study of Amnesty International’s work since 1961 
traces this organization over time and finds that Amnesty International has had a significant 
impact on the discourse surrounding human rights (Clark 2001).  Some scholars are beginning to 
look beyond the effect of non-state actors on the behavior of states and are analyzing the 
interaction of norms on non-state actors themselves.  Giovanni Mantilla, for example, examines 
how transnational corporations have begun to comply with international human rights norms 
through a variety of mechanisms including voluntary standards of behavior (Mantilla 2009).   
There are two dominant theoretical models in this body of literature which propose to explain 
norm development and internalization at the state level: the norm cascade model (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998; Sikkink 2011) and the spiral model (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).
6
 Other 
models, such as the evolutionary model suggested by Ann Forini comparing norms to genes, 
appear to have been less persuasive (Florini 1996: 363).  Recent studies have added additional 
models for norms that do not seem to fit these dominant models—for example, a diffuse 
signaling model for the spread of the norm of election monitoring (Hyde 2011), or suggestions of 
alternative ways the spiral model may work—for example, arguing for the importance of 
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 These are in addition to theories which stressed the institutional cooperative aspect of norms and argued that 
norms are embedded in international institutions and are generated along with them usually as a result of demand for 
interstate cooperation (Keohane 1984; Axelrod 1986; Keohane 1986). This study is not engaging with this literature 
as the mechanisms of cooperation within international institutions are too distant from the world of non-state actors 





contestation in the establishment of the norm of the responsibility to protect (R2P) (Badescu and 
Weiss 2010).   
The norm cascade, introduced by Finnemore and Sikkink, suggests a model to explain the 
change of norms over time. Finnemore and Sikkink argue that norms have a life-cycle, and while 
each norm may follow its own trajectory, broadly speaking, norms cycle through stages from 
emergence to internalization. The first stage is “norm emergence”; the second stage is the period 
of broad norm acceptance, which they term “a norm cascade”; and the third stage involves 
internalization (1998: 869).   
During the first stage, norm entrepreneurs are very active, seeking to convince states to adopt 
or embrace a new norm. These individuals, such as Henry Dunant and his campaign for more 
humanity during conflict which led to the establishment of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) and the adoption of the Geneva Conventions, act through organizational 
platforms to convince states to embrace a new norm.  
The second stage, or the norm cascade, is characterized by a period in which early adopting 
states attempt to socialize other states to become norm followers. Once a “tipping point” of a 
critical number of states has been reached, the norm goes from being something adopted by a 
few to something adopted by the majority of states. The process from going from a norm adopted 
by few to one adopted by many is termed the “norm cascade” (1998: 901). After the tipping 
point has been reached, states need very little pressure to adopt the norms, socialization itself the 
dominant mechanism that causes states to adopt new norms. For Finnemore and Sikkink, 
socialization is an active process of international pressure brought to bear on non-conforming 
states by other states or non-state actors, which may involve diplomatic praise or criticism, either 




third and final stage is the norm internalization where the states internalize the norms through 
domestic legislation and they acquire a “taken-for-granted quality” (1998: 895).  Finnemore and 
Sikkink argue that the motive for actors engaged in adopting a norm (in their model this is states, 
international organizations, and transnational networks) is primarily international and domestic 
legitimation. They also argue that desire for esteem (which is related to legitimacy) can explain 
norm following in some actors.   
In Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink’s The Power of Human Rights (1999), the authors introduce a 
different theoretical model, the norm spiral, which outlines the relationship between international 
norms and domestic human rights practices. They trace the shift in a state’s behavior from non-
compliance with human rights norms to internalization of the norm through the ratification of 
human rights treaties and institutionalization of human rights norms in domestic practices and 
laws. The spiral model suggests there are five stages in this process. In the first stage, the human 
rights violations of a state are brought to the attention of other states and international 
organizations by transnational advocacy networks, such as Amnesty International or Human 
Rights Watch. Under pressure from these reports, states enter into the second stage, denial, and 
invoke counter-claims of sovereignty and nonintervention. In the third stage, violating states 
begin to make concessions or “cosmetic changes to pacify international criticism” (1999: 25) and 
as part of the process begin to undergo some degree of socialization into the global human rights 
regime. Even though these concessions may be merely window-dressing, the state, by offering 
any concessions at all, acknowledges the validity of the human rights norm itself, and begins the 
process of socialization. The fourth and fifth stages, Risse et al. argue, are the final stages of 




incorporate the language of human rights norms into its domestic discourse and legal 
frameworks, and finally, adopt rule-consistent behavior.   
This model does have some shortcomings, for example, by suggesting that once states 
embark on this route there is no turning back. However, it does offer a starting point for 
examining how non-state actors might be affected by human rights norms, passing through 
similar stages of violation, denial, concessions, socialization, and eventual internalization. It is 
necessary to look for indicators other than ratification of treaties and incorporation of human 
rights legislation into domestic law to determine to what extent these non-state actors might have 
progressed along the spiral. In this study, the analysis of a group’s discourse offers insight into 
the progress, if any, along the spiral, and when situated in the context of the events surrounding 
the group’s activity, provides a deeper understanding of how norms may affect such a non-state 
actor’s behavior.   
Scholarship in this area has also identified imitation as a mechanism which influences states 
in certain areas. For example, research has shown that a state will ratify treaties in the areas of 
children’s rights, civil and political rights, and freedom from torture if their neighbors have done 
so. However, this imitation appears to be issue specific, as it does not extend to other areas, such 
as economic, social, and cultural rights or outlawing of discrimination against racial minorities or 
rights of women (Simmons 2009).  
A second group of scholars tackling international norms comes from the rational-materialist 
tradition, which emphasizes power and self-interest.  In general, interest-based approaches offer 
explanations for changes in behaviors, such as the adoption of a particular discourse or the 
emergence of a new norm or code of behavior, based on the assumption that target actors act 




new behavior. They act in order to maximize their utility in view of their stated or assumed 
preferences. Scholars have analyzed why states adopt certain treaties based on the “anticipated 
positive and negative effects of international laws on states” (Hathaway 2007, 588-621).  In this 
line of thinking, states conduct cost-benefit analyses in order to determine whether or not to sign 
up to international treaties, such as human rights treaties (see for example, Goodliffe and 
Hawkins 2006; Cole 2005; Vreeland 2008; Simmons 2000; Smith-Cannoy 2012). Beth Simmons 
argues that states follow a logic of consequences: states commit to norms in order to establish 
credibility or legitimacy in a certain area (Simmons 2000). Once established, the credibility 
allows the state to access benefits from other states or non-state actors such as multinational 
corporations (MNCs) or NGOs in the form of investments, trade, aid, or close political ties. 
Looking more specifically at human rights treaties, Jay Goodliffe and Darren Hawkins (2006) 
identify three main costs governments incur for ratifying one human rights treaty, the 
Convention Against Torture (CAT): policy change, unintended consequences, and limited 
flexibility. These costs are balanced against the benefits of norm conformity.  Oona Hathaway 
(2007) argues that states commit to human rights treaties based on a cost-benefit analysis without 
a real commitment to the norms themselves—states may, she says, join human rights regimes as 
a panacea to relieve pressure for real change by offering a signature on a treaty as a concession to 
domestic groups lobbying for change without any accompanying behavioral changes. Heather 
Smith-Cannoy (2012) similarly argues that many commitments made by states to human rights 
treaties are insincere, but that those commitments may backfire if local groups are able to hold 
their governments accountable for treaty violations.  
Using this approach for understanding the adoption of international norms, particularly 




adopt these norms in their language when it is in their interest to do so, with or without 
commitment to the norms themselves.  Thus, calculating that the adoption of human rights 
discourse, for example, would bring benefits such as increased legitimacy and support from 
international actors—greater than costs, such as increased pressure to live up to international 
norms of behavior and a curtailing of military tactics—armed groups would similarly begin to 
use such language and reference treaties.  
From the literature on international norms, we have both a model of how norms may come to 
affect the actions and discourse of non-state actors from outside of the group, through the norm 
spiral, and an insight into the possibly strategic thinking and cost-benefit analysis behind the 
adoption of certain norms in the discourse from within groups.  Increased legitimacy is a major 
benefit driving many states’ behavior and discourse and we can assume that this is a significant 
factor for rebel groups as well. In addition, the literature addresses the question of which norms 
get accepted pointing to the need for salience of the norm locally and congruence of the norm 
with the local normative environment. 
Legitimacy 
One problem rebel groups struggle with is that of legitimation—how can they make the use 
of political violence acceptable and become a legitimate actor?  As Inis Claude reminds us, a 
struggle over legitimacy is an essential part of a political struggle: “politics is not merely a 
struggle for power but also a contest over legitimacy, a competition in which the conferment or 
denial, the confirmation or revocation, of legitimacy is an important stake” (Claude 1966: 368). 
David Beetham argues that an understanding of legitimacy “helps to explain the erosion of 




revolts and revolutions” (Beetham 1991).  The concept of legitimacy remains slightly slippery, 
however, partly due to its subjective nature (Luck 2001).  
Most discussions of legitimacy tackle two areas in which legitimacy is of primary 
importance—the rightfulness of rulers or of a state to rule, and the strength of institutions and 
norms. The question of legitimacy has been at the heart of philosophical debate for centuries. 
Niccolo Machiavelli argues in Discourses and The Prince that pure power is impotent and that 
the stability of a government rests not on its power, but on the voluntary acceptance of that 
power.  The voluntary acceptance is predicated on perceived legitimacy. Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
similarly argues in The Social Contract that a stable order rests on consent, which is a direct 
function of the legitimacy of the government (Zelditch 2001). In more recent times, Max 
Weber’s typology of social authority—rational-legal; traditional; and charismatic—is based on 
different types of legitimacy. And we need look no further than Weber’s famous definition of the 
state to understand what he considers to be the central role of legitimacy to the state: “[The state 
is] the human community which (successfully) claims the monopoly of legitimate coercion” 
(Weber 1948: 78).  As some scholars have argued, with the use of the term legitimacy Weber 
was not referring to an abstract quality, but to the very act of legitimation itself (Barker 2001).  
As Rodney Barker points out, “what characterizes government, in other words, is not the 
possession of a quality defined as legitimacy, but the claiming, the activity of legitimation” 
(2001: 12). All rulers, thus, engage in acts of legitimation, hoping to cloak themselves with the 
mantle of authority.  The process of this legitimation requires “defensible criteria for 
legitimacy,” which Beetham argues must identify a rightful source of authority and rightful ends 




In terms of the rightfulness of rulers, Barker also provides the following definition of 
legitimacy:  it is “the belief in the rightness of a state…so that commands are obeyed not simply 
out of fear or self-interest [but] because subjects believe that they ought to obey” (Barker 1990: 
11).  Thus, just having the power over subjects is not enough—the power must be considered to 
be legitimate. Again, Claude argues that “among statesmen, the lovers of naked power are far 
less typical than those who aspire to clothe themselves in the mantle of legitimate authority; 
emperors may be nude, but they do not like to be so, to think themselves so, or to be so 
regarded” (1966: 368).  Ian Hurd argues that states act strategically in their pursuit of legitimacy, 
but they act within a socially constructed context (Hurd 2008). Legitimacy, Hurd states, is “a 
socially constructed phenomenon, [which] affects the strategic calculations and self-conceptions 
of [states]. The payoffs sought by actors through strategic behavior might be material or 
symbolic and in either case they depend significantly on sociological processes related to 
legitimation” (2008:16).   
Theo Van Leewen argues that there are four main strategies for legitimation: authorization 
(legitimation by reference to the authority of tradition, custom or law); rationalization 
(legitimation by reference to the utility of institutionalized action); moral evaluation 
(legitimation by reference to value systems), and mythopoesis (legitimation conveyed through 
narrative) (Van Leewen and Wodak 1999). These different forms of legitimation may be 
analyzed through discourse analysis (Fairclough 2003). 
On the question of the legitimacy of institutions and norms, Alexander Wendt places the 
level at which legitimacy is created at the individual level—each actor within a specified 
community determines whether the norm is legitimate or not and each of these individual acts 




is legitimate is to say that an actor fully accepts its claim on itself” (Wendt 1999: 272). Thus, the 
consent of individual actors makes a norm legitimate.  Others, such as Thomas Franck, offer a 
more legalistic interpretation, arguing that “legitimacy is that attribute of a norm which conduces 
the belief that it is fair because it was made and applied in accordance with right process” 
(Franck 1995: 26). Thus, the process by which the norm is applied can make the norm legitimate, 
not an attribute of the norm itself or the level of acceptance of the norm by the community.  
While Adam Przeworski argues that legitimacy is reducible to fear or self-interest (Przeworski 
1986), others, such as Hurd, argue that legitimacy is a theoretically distinct mechanism that 
induces compliance because complying is considered to be the appropriate thing to do (Hurd 
1999).  
As this study examines insurgent groups, which are by definition non-state actors, a final area 
in the literature on legitimacy that is relevant looks beyond the legitimacy of the state to the 
legitimacy of organizations. Legitimacy is essential to most organizations and most particularly 
to organizations with international reach (Suchman 1995; Suddaby and Greenwood 2005). 
Recent work on the legitimacy of transnational groups provides some insights. For example, 
David L. Brown argues that transnational organizations such as NGOs may have a credibility 
gap and thus need to make strategic choices to enhance their own legitimacy and accountability 
(Brown 2008). To do so, they engage in certain activities, among them complying with 
regulations, associating with other legitimate actors, embodying key values and norms, and 
associating themselves with practices and actors to confer legitimacy (2008: 11). In particular, 
such organizations may try to establish six different types of legitimacy: regulatory, 
associational, performance, political, normative, and cognitive, and will perform different acts to 





From the social movements literature, there are two areas most helpful for thinking about the 
discourse of armed opposition groups: the literature on framing and the literature on the 
mechanisms which groups may employ, particularly in the process of legitimation.  
The concept of framing is pivotal in research on social interaction among sociologists, 
anthropologists, psychologists, linguists, and political scientists.  It features prominently in the 
social movement literature and is here described as a process by which meaning is assigned to 
objects, events, and experiences by groups or individuals in an interactive manner. It is an 
“active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality 
construction” (Benford and Snow 2000: 614). The literature on social movements (which also 
include violent groups) suggests that these movements use framing to position themselves with 
multiple audiences: “they frame, or assign meaning to and interpret relevant events and 
conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner 
bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists” (Snow and Benford 1988:198).  According to 
David Snow and Robert Benford, frames have three core framing tasks: “diagnostic framing” 
(identification of the problem); “prognostic framing” (what can be done about the problem); and 
“motivational framing” (encouraging action on the problem). Benford further determines that 
frames employed by groups vary across many dimensions including problem identification, the 
flexibility or rigidity of the frame, the interpretive scope, and the degree of resonance (Benford 
and Snow 2000). The success of the framing depends on three attributes: frame consistency, 
empirical credibility of the frame, and the credibility of the frame articulators (2000: 620). For 
the frame to have empirical credibility, it need not be believable by everyone, but it does need to 




credibility has a subjective quality (Jasper and Poulsen 1995).  James Jasper and Jane Poulsen 
further argue that “moral shocks” serve as essential moments in the time of the recruitment to a 
movement and that these shocks may be actual events or generated by the movements 
themselves—in either case, these shocks need to be reflected in the framing activities (1995).  
Movements also may try to extend the framing of the issue to appeal to a wider audience (Snow 
and Benford 1992).  Examples of the latter are armed opposition groups that tailor their message 
to appeal to international actors (Bob 2005) or rights groups which shift their frames from local 
to international issues such as women’s rights (Tsutsui 2006).  Kiyoteru Tsutsui argues that the 
movement to assist former “comfort women” in Asia who had suffered abuse at the hands of the 
Imperial Japanese army was able to make headway more than 40 years after the end of the 
Second World War by adopting the frame of international human rights and women’s rights in 
the mid-1990s.  
How do the processes of framing work in the context of rebel groups? Again, drawing from 
the social movement literature, I argue that the processes of contention can be broken down into 
mechanisms such as boundary-making, claims making, and strategic self-representation, which 
may be linked together in various complex combinations (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; 
Tarrow and Tilly 2006).  Charles Demetriou’s study of the National Organization of Cypriot 
Fighters (EOKA) draws on the work of Doug McAdam et al., and argues that the process of 
legitimation requires the mechanisms of boundary-making (identification of the “in-group”) and 
certification (validation by outside parties) and suggests that an additional mechanism, which he 
terms valorization, is needed to legitimize political violence (Demetriou 2007). Valorization, or 




violent movements seeking legitimacy.  Thus, an essential part of legitimization of rebel groups 
is their own use of positive stories about their own actions.  
Rebel groups and civil war  
The fourth group of relevant literature concerns civil war and armed opposition groups. 
This literature addresses issues such as insurgent recruitment (Gates 2002; Weinstein 2007; 
Humphreys and Weinstein 2008), violence against civilians (Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas 2003; 
Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Zahar 2001), and rebel governance (Mampilly 2011; Mampilly 
2007). It offers different theories on how armed opposition groups develop their strategies and 
identifies the goals of opposition groups, the structure of the groups, and the environments in 
which they arise as the most important variable in determining the variation among the different 
techniques employed by armed opposition groups. For example, a group with a more structured 
hierarchy is more likely to have greater control over its members than one without.   
Whether the goal of the opposition groups is secession, outright replacement of the state, 
or resource accumulation, the goal has been identified as likely to determine the development of 
the groups’ strategy (Weinstein 2007; Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 
2006).   However, Marie-Joelle Zahar argues that strategies change over time—the 
institutionalization of armed groups (the gradual increase of their internal structures) over the 
course of the conflict, undertaken to increase their legitimacy, leads to a change in their 
strategies (Zahar 1999). 
Based on this literature, I theorize that groups struggling to increase their legitimacy in the 
face of international prohibition will need to show that they can take on responsibilities of states 
(including an awareness of international norms and an understanding of how these norms should 




actors. Further, a group with a more hierarchical structure will have more control over its 
discourse, and therefore be able to use discourse strategically.   
The subset of literature on the effect of the involvement of international actors on armed 
opposition groups suggests that international actors have an effect on these groups and that 
different types of actors have different effects (Nordstrom 2004). Carolyn Nordstrom argues that 
extra-state actors, ranging in her account from international arms dealers to international 
organizations and humanitarian NGOs, may be the causal agents of conflict or the agents of its 
continuation. Jean-Francois Bayart argues that in Africa, state elites seek to increase their power 
by interacting with international agencies or transnational actors (Bayart 1993).  Interactions 
with the UN and the World Bank shape the strategies of armed groups (Barnett 2001) as groups 
may seek to boost their legitimacy by their association with international actors (Zahar 2001).  
Additionally, armed groups may actively seek to market themselves to NGOs or non-state actors 
(Bob 2005). NGOs may also act as witnesses, pressuring armed opposition groups to abide by 
human rights or humanitarian laws (Zahar 2001). Arguments in the literature on transnational 
actors suggest that the engine of transmission of norms is not states, but the networks of 
transnational actors (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Thomas 2001; Smith, Chatfield, and 
Pagnucco 1997). Thus, the degree to which these outside actors have engaged directly with the 
insurgents will affect the degree to which these groups may alter their behavior.  
The study of the presence of human rights language or international norms in the discourse or 
action of resistance groups has been somewhat limited. Some scholars have found the effect of 
international norms on discourse and behavior to be less significant than expected. Two cases 
from Africa point in this direction. For example, Mariane Ferme and Danny Hoffman suggest 




discourse to the Kamajors, or civil defense forces. However, they found that the spread of human 
rights discourse was limited to areas where there was considerable overlap between the 
international norms and discourse and the local ethical codes (Ferme and Hoffman 2004).  Claire 
Metelits found in Southern Sudan that the supposed pressure of international norms on the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) pushing it towards democratization actually inhibited the 
state-building efforts of the organization (Metelits 2004). Metelits argues that the need to unify 
the diverse populations of southern Sudan against northern Sudan in order to create a state was in 
opposition to the pressures to build democratic institutions, which fostered differences, rather 
than unity. In order to successfully build a state, Metelits contends that the SPLA needed to pass 
through a unifying authoritarian stage, which was at odds with the effects of the 
contemporaneous democratization efforts.  Other scholars have found the effect to be significant. 
For example, Deepa Prakash has found that the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka responded to the 
international sea change in the application of the term “terrorism” after September 11, 2001 
(Prakash 2008). In the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo, Alan Kuperman argues that the emergence 
of the norm of humanitarian intervention created a moral hazard by encouraging rebels to place 
civilians at risk in order to increase the likelihood of an intervention by outside actors on the 
rebels’ behalf (Kuperman 2006).  However, others have argued that attacks by the state on 
civilians, which can enhance a rebel group’s standing with local communities, may have long 
been part of rebel groups’ strategies to mobilize the population in favor of the rebels 
(Andreopoulos 1994).   
Some have argued that international norms form an integral part of rebel groups’ identity. 
For example, Kimberly Jones argues that the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Egyptian Muslim 




national identity by defining and reinforcing in-group and out-group boundaries (Jones 2010). 
More recently, Dale Walton argues that insurgent groups increasingly have an advantage over 
government forces in their ability to harness modern media techniques to spread war crimes 
accusations more widely than before in their efforts to delegitimize the state they are fighting 
(Walton 2012). 
1.3 Methodology 
This study is both theory-testing, in that it tests theories created to answer questions about 
states in order to answer questions about non-state actors, and theory-proposing, in that there are 
new hypotheses generated to explain the behavior of these non-state actors. Case studies are the 
preferred methodology when testing to see why a hypothesis holds, rather than a large-N study, 
which would test if a hypothesis holds (Van Evera 1997).  This research uses primarily one case 
study, that of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in Kosovo, using a process-tracing 
methodology. However, a second case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri 
Lanka is also explored, showing that the hypotheses developed in this research have 
generalizability to other rebel groups, and allowing for a limited comparison between the two 
groups.   
Case selection  
The primary case was used to allow the in-depth study of the changing patterns of norm 
usage of one case, the KLA and Kosovo from 1995 to 1999. This case provides a good test case 
for this research for several reasons. First, the KLA adopted numerous international norms in 
their discourse, each of which shows a different pattern of use over time, which differences need 




during the period in which the KLA was active, thus allowing for the examination of the role of 
these actors, if any, in affecting change in KLA’s discourse. Third, knowledge about human 
rights and its discourse was already present in Kosovo at the time of the conflict, which suggests 
the adoption of such language by the KLA was less a matter of discovering this language than a 
strategic decision to use it.
7
 Fourth, the conflict in Kosovo was broadly framed by the outside 
world as being about the violation of the international norms of human rights.
8
 Examining KLA 
discourse may reveal to what extent, if any, that framing was being driven by the KLA’s 
portrayal of the conflict.  Finally, the study of the KLA’s discourse is possible because of the 
practice of the KLA to issue press releases at intervals throughout the conflict, even before the 
organization was widely known, allowing a longitudinal study as well.   
Data from the secondary case were used to test the correlation between the norm usage of the 
rebel groups, on the one hand, with the changes in norm discourse at the state level, on the other. 
The LTTE’s  long history (founded in 1976, the LTTE was defeated militarily by the Sri Lankan 
government in May 2009 after 33 years of struggle) offers a chance to analyze the transmission 
of the effect of norm change from the international to the non-state level over a long period of 
time.  Second, the LTTE was able to establish a form of governance over the territory it held in 
the north and east of Sri Lanka, functioning more like a state with its own bureaucracy and 
providing public services.  Third, the different internal normative environments between the 
KLA and the LTTE allow for a comparison to be made between the two and their different 
                                                          
7
 The two Kosovar human rights organizations operating throughout the 1990s were The Council for the 
Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms, headed by Adem Demaci, and the Kosova Helsinki Committee for Human 
Rights, headed by Gazmend Pula. Both had grass-roots networks throughout the region for discussion of human 
rights and for the collecting of information about human rights violations.  
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Council Resolutions 1160, 1199, and 1203, which state the UN is “deeply concerned by the reports of increasing 




patterns of discourse. And finally, the LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakharan made annual 
speeches on Hero’s Day, November 27, which allows for a systematic discourse analysis at 
regular intervals.  
Research design 
The methodology combines discourse analysis of existing documents from the period with 
interviews with KLA members and other individuals, such as human rights activists and 
journalists who were present and active in Kosovo during the period of study.  
While discourse analysis has been questioned by some IR theorists as not an appropriate 
method for international relations research (see for example, Keohane 1988), it has begun to be 
more widely embraced by the discipline (Milliken 1999). For this project on the spread of norms 
in language, it presents itself as an excellent method of study.  Discourse analysis serves to 
“illustrate how… textual and social processes are intrinsically connected and to describe, in 
specific contexts, the implications of this connection for the way we think and act in the 
contemporary world” (George 1994: 191).  Discourse constructs social realities as people 
construct meaning using sign systems, which are predominantly linguistic (Milliken 1999).  
For the primary case, the research examines the period between June 1, 1995 (the date of the 
first press release of the KLA
9
) and June 12, 1999, when Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops entered 
Kosovo with authorization from the UN.
10
 This is the period in which the KLA was actively 
framing their struggle in the public arena. While the KLA was in existence beginning in 
December 1993  (when it chose “Kosovo Liberation Army” as its name), between 1993 and June 
1995 it had not yet begun to announce itself as an entity and was yet to publicly put forward 
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 The first publicly released press release was numbered Communiqué No. 13. Communiqués No. 1 – 12 were 
not published but circulated among KLA members themselves.  
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 KFOR consisted of troops from NATO countries, partner countries, and other non-NATO countries under 




reasons for resistance or an agenda (Judah 2000: 115). June 12, 1999 marks the end of the period 
of study with the arrival of KFOR ground troops on this date, following the adoption of UN 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 on June 10, 1999. While the KLA remained in 
existence until disbanding or re-forming as the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) on September 
21, 1999 (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007: 562), after June 12, the KLA can no longer be classified as 
an opposition group because Yugoslav  troops no longer had authority to act in the region and 
had begun withdrawing. The Yugoslav withdrawal of troops was complete by June 20.  
For the secondary case, the research examines the period from 1992 (the year the first Hero’s 
Day speech was made) until 2007, the last year the speech was made. The LTTE was founded in 
1976, and its first large scale attack was in 1983. However, the speeches available from the 
earlier years are sporadic, and some have a particular focus, such as women’s day, or address a 
particular military campaign. It is not until Prabhakaran began issuing regular speeches 
addressing the overall position of the LTTE in 1992 that there is a regular, repeated speech 
available for analysis.  
Discourse analysis   
Documents (press releases, political declarations, speeches, and interviews) were obtained 
from each of the rebel groups under study.  Each of the documents was coded for its use of 
international norms—both the mention of the norms themselves and the context within which the 
norms were mentioned.
11
 The norms under study were human rights, international humanitarian 
law, humanitarian intervention, and the norm against terrorism. Some of these norms were 
analyzed in greater detail. For example, under the human rights coding, the mention of the 
following specific references were tracked:  human rights conventions, the right to life, torture, 
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arbitrary arrest and detention, genocide, and social/cultural/economic rights. Thus, a statement 
referring to killings committed by, or deaths at the hands of, members of the state apparatus, 
such as the police force, was coded as a human rights reference, and specifically as a violation of 
the right to life.  Statements referring to killings by the army were coded as humanitarian law 
references.   In each case, coding was determined by the words of the speaker, i.e., the speaker’s 
representation of the situation, which is necessarily a subjective perspective, rather than trying to 
code based on the historical record or an objective perspective.  For example, if the speaker 
mentioned that a civilian was killed, it was coded according to the context and frame given by 
the speaker, rather than investigating whether the killing had actually occurred or who might 
have been responsible.  
Given the broader confusion regarding human rights vs. humanitarian law violations, I took 
particular care when determining to code a loss of life as a human rights event (violation of right 
to life) using a human rights framework, or a humanitarian law event (harm of civilians) using a 
humanitarian law framework. For the purposes of this research, it was assumed that human rights 
law and IHL might be in effect during the conflict for the periods under study.
12
  If the death of 
an individual was mentioned within the context of military action, it was coded as the harm of a 
civilian, which invokes humanitarian law. If a death was attributed to troops, or any military 
action in the sentence or the context of the sentence, it was also coded as a humanitarian law 
violation. However, if the death of an individual was mentioned separatly from any military 
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 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has addressed the issue of which body of law may take precedence on 
two occasions, in 1996, with its Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, and in 2004, with its opinion on the Wall in 
Occupied Palestinian Territory. While the ICJ does say that both may apply at one time, in neither case does it 
specify what rights fall into what categories in what contexts. Two states, Israel and the United States, have long 
maintained that human rights law does not apply in times of war (Hampson 2008).  These persistant objections not 
withstanding, however, most states have accepted the ICJ proposition that international humanitarian law and human 




action or discussion of troops, or was attributed to the actions of the civilian police force, it was 
coded as a human rights law violation invoking human rights law.
13
  
To test for coding bias, a possibility because the same researcher both created the coding 
methods and completed the coding, a random sample of the documents was recoded afresh. The 
result of the coding test was an overlap of 92 percent, which is a high degree of overlap, allowing 
for confidence in the coding methods.  
For the main case study, the KLA,  three types of documents were analyzed: press releases 
and political declarations issued by the armed opposition group; print and radio interviews given 
by its members; and radio broadcasts by the KLA.  Included in this study are 66 press releases, 
dating from June 1, 1995 to May 26, 1999, 11 political declarations dating from March 22, 1998 
to February 27, 1999, five other statements and speeches, 77 interviews or interview segments in 
the local media, and five months of radio broadcasts.
14
 These data were primarily collected from 
archives in Kosovo, although some material had been published in book form. All of these 
materials contain words spoken by or written by a member of the KLA. No articles written by 
non-KLA journalists about the KLA, without direct quotes from KLA members, are included. 
Articles written by KLA members, however, are included. By ensuring that only words spoken 
by KLA members are subjected to analysis, this safeguards that the material analyzed contained 
the actual discourse of the group’s members, rather than words or motives attributed to them.  
The data collection in the KLA case was exclusively from Albanian language media, rather 
than including all international press material. This sampling method was chosen to avert any 
potential contamination of the discourse by international journalists who might be more likely to 
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 The state is the only party able to violate an individual’s human rights, while a resistance group such as the 
KLA may conduct human rights abuses.  
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frame the interview with terms from international discourse, including international norms. In 
addition, there is a risk that an international journalist might have adopted a particular normative 
framework external to the norms in current use by the interviewees and shape the interview 
accordingly.  
Local newspapers used for this research are four Pristina-based newspapers: Kosova Sot, 
Koha Ditore, Bujku, and Rilindja, and an Albanian language newspaper published by the 
diaspora community and available underground in Kosovo, Zeri I Kosoves, as well as Kosova 
Press, a KLA-sponsored news-service, available online, founded on January 4, 1999. The radio 
broadcasts were collected from the archives of Radio Kosova e Lire (RKL), a radio station 
sponsored by the KLA, which was broadcast from KLA-controlled territory from January 4, 
1999 and continued for many months after the end of the conflict in June 1999. The broadcasts 
included in this study are up until June 12, 1999.  
For the secondary case, the LTTE, 19 speeches and two interviews by Thiruvenkadam 
Velupillai Prabhakaran, the founder and leader of the Tamil Tigers, were analyzed. These 
speeches spanned the period from March 1992 to November 2007 and were given at regular 
annual intervals allowing for a longitudinal study with evenly spaced data points. Each speech 
was considered to be a significant document summarizing the LTTE’s position and views on 
important issues and provided a policy statement for the upcoming year (Manoharan 2003). The 




In addition to document analysis, interviews were conducted with 26 people, 17 former 
members of the KLA, including four members of the central command, four Kosovar human 
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rights activists who were active during the war, and two Kosovar journalists who covered the 
war.  There were also supplemental interviews with non-Kosovar actors present at the time, such 
as members of Human Rights Watch and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) cease-fire verification mission. The interviews provided more context for the 
textual discourse analysis. In addition, interviewees provided background and personal thoughts, 
and elaborated on strategies hinted at in the texts. The main interviews were targeted interviews 
with senior members of the KLA who were approached directly. Interviews with rank and file 
members of the KLA were planned using the snow-ball method. The interview format was 
loosely structured, allowing for respondents to elaborate and supplement the interview with 






Chapter 2:  Background on the Kosovo and Sri Lanka cases 
 
The religion of the Albanian is the Albanian cause.  
--Pashko Vasa, 1878-1890 
 
This chapter gives an overall background to the conflict in two cases: Kosovo, as the 
main case, and Sri Lanka as the supplementary case. It provides a brief overview of each of the 
conflicts, describes the origins of both the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and details the structure of the organization and normative 
environments of each group.  
2.1 Background on the conflict in Kosovo
16
 
At the time of the conflict, Kosovo was a province of Serbia within the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (FRY) with a majority of ethnic Albanians and minorities of Serbs and other 
ethnicities, namely Bosniaks, Goranis, Turks, Roma, Egyptians, and Ashkalis.
17
  Kosovo is 
approximately 4,200 square miles (or slightly smaller than Connecticut), landlocked, and almost 
entirely surrounded by mountain ranges, with the Sharr mountains in the southeast, the Kopaonik 
mountains in the north, and the Albanian Alps (known locally as the Cursed Mountains) in the 
south and west. Located along the southwestern flank of Yugoslavia, Kosovo borders Albania. It 
also shares borders with Montenegro to its north, and Macedonia to the southeast.  Historically, 
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 For the purposes of this research, the conflict in Kosovo refers to the armed conflict between the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) and forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The KLA began using violent 
tactics against the state in 1993 and continued to do so until June 1999. Other discussions of the conflict in Kosovo 
refer to the conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Yugoslav forces, beginning with 
the NATO air attacks of March 1999 and ending with the arrival of NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) ground troops 
in June 1999. However, the focus of this study is on the conflict between the non-state actor, the KLA, and the 
forces of the state actor, the FRY.  
17
 In 1992, Serbia and Montenegro formed a federation, the FRY, which lasted until 2003 when Serbia and 
Montenegro each became independent states from one another. From 1945 to 1963, Serbia was part of the Federal 
People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY), which was renamed the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) 




Kosovo was located at the crossroads of empires and trade routes, and was a strategic prize for a 
succession of invaders throughout its history. 
Kosovo was for centuries under the control of the Ottoman Empire (1392 to 1912).
18
  
After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire by Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece in the First 
Balkan War in 1912, the territory came under Serbian rule. At the end of World War I in 1918, 
Kosovo became part of a new Yugoslav state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. It 
remained part of the different iterations of the Yugoslav state until it declared independence in 
February 2008.
19
    
The main armed group using violence to challenge the state in Kosovo in the 1990s was 
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). They were founded in at the end of 1993 at a meeting in 
Drenica in rural Kosovo west of Pristina.  The KLA began activities in 1993 and continued 
targeting police stations, policemen, and other individuals sporadically over the next three years 
although some founding members, such as the Jasharis, were involved in several attacks on 
police in Kosovo before 1993.
20
 The first multi-city attacks did not occur until 1996. While there 
were other armed groups in Kosovo, primarily the National Movement for the Liberation of 
Kosovo (LKCK) and the FARK (Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo), the KLA emerged 
as the main rebel group during the conflict.   
                                                          
18
 The well-known Battle of Kosovo in Kosovo Polje (or, the Field of the Blackbirds) in 1389 between Prince Lazar 
at the head of the Serbian army, joined by a coalition of Hungarians, Albanians, Bulgarians, and Bosnians, and 
Sultan Murad at the head of the Ottoman army was fought to a draw, with neither side emerging a clear victor. It 
pre-dated the eventual victory of the Ottoman Empire over all the Serb territory in 1455.  See (Fine 1987) for more 
detail on the battle. 
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The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was renamed Yugoslavia in 1929. Yugoslavia became known as the 
Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY) in November 1945 and was renamed the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1963. 
20




Members of the KLA point to events at the beginning of the twentieth century as 
significant to the development of Albanian resistance to Serbian rule of Kosovo.
21
 In particular, 
the December 1912 conference in London, attended by the Great Powers (Austria-Hungary, 
Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia) at which the borders of the new state of Albania 
were discussed with parts of Kosovo designated as falling under Serbian control, is considered to 
be a significant turning point for one senior KLA member.
22
 The KLA believed that these 
decisions imposed by outside actors lacked legitimacy and date the Albanian resistance to 
Serbian rule to this time.  Some historians considered that the decisions made at the conference 
regarding the borders of Albania marked the beginning of the movement in search for a Greater 
Albania (see, for example, Batt et al. 2008; McMahon 1998). 
Following the outcome of the London Conference, resistance by rural Albanians to 
Serbian rule, known as the Kaçak movement, began in 1913. The KLA considered the 
antecedents to their struggle to be found in the Kaçak movement. This movement opposed the 
policy of Serb colonization of the region that was begun with the enactment of the Regulation for 
the Settlement of Southern Regions that helped settle almost 18,000 Slavic families on land 
taken from local farmers between 1920 and 1939 (Banac 1984: 300).  The Kaçaks fought the 
authorities and attacked settlers throughout Kosovo, in parts of Macedonia, and in Montenegro. 
The movement was brought to an end with the capture and killing of its leader, Azem Bejta from 
Drenica, in central Kosovo in 1924.  The Drenica region, a rural region in the hills west of 
Pristina, was also one of the strongholds of the KLA, and prominent leaders of the KLA, such as 
Hashim Thaçi, Adem Jashari, Fatmir Limaj, and Jakup Krasniqi hailed from the villages of the 
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 Author interview with Dr. Ram Buja, senior member of the KLA (Director for Civilian Affairs of its General 
Staff) and later Minister of Education of the Republic of Kosovo, Pristina, Kosovo, October 2010. 
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region.  Adem Jashari, known as the “legendary commander,” was one of the original members 
of the KLA, and the stories of his individual acts of resistance to Serbian rule were said by 
fellow members of the KLA to be inspirational.
23
  A “modern Kaçak” (Judah 2000), Jashari and 
the story of his life and his death in a massacre at his family compound in Prekaz in March 1998, 
took on mythical significance for the Albanian Kosovars.
24
 It became a central theme of the 
narrative of the KLA and later for Kosovo itself after 1999 (Lellio and Schwander-Sievers 2006).  
The outbreak of violence in the mid-1990s was not the first expression of resistance to 
Belgrade’s control of Kosovo; however, previous periods of violence were short-lived and 
directly related to demonstrations.  For example, in the spring of 1981, student demonstrations in 
Pristina turned violent. The demonstrations initiated by students in Pristina in late March quickly 
spread to the urban population and demonstrators made broader political demands and began 
condemning the political system as a whole.  Thousands of troops were called in on April 2, a 
state of emergency imposed, and a province-wide curfew was enforced. The death toll numbers 
varied greatly from official Yugoslav numbers of 11 fatalities (Malcolm 1998: 334), to 120 
fatalities reported by Albanian sources (Pajazit 1996: 150), to as many as 300 reported dead 
according to Amnesty International (Amnesty International 1985: 12). Numerous students and 
participants in the demonstrations, fleeing arrest, were forced into exile and many found work 
abroad among the tightly-knit expatriate communities in Germany and Switzerland. Those who 
fled abroad formed a core group from which the KLA could draw a decade later. In addition, 
many of the students jailed in 1981 for lengthy periods experienced harsh conditions in prison 
and were primed to join the resistance on their release.  
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Interviews with the author of various KLA members in Kosovo, October 2010.  
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 Not all Albanian Kosovars were taken with the myth of Jashari. One LDK member said confidentially: “Adem 
Jashari was not a ‘legendary commander.’ He commanded no one. He was a rural ruffian who was killed in a 




Over the course of the 1980s, the relations between the Albanians and the Serbs in 
Kosovo deteriorated. Events such as the leaking of a draft “Memorandum” of the Serbian 
Academy of Sciences and Arts, the most prominent academic body in Yugoslavia, which 
portrayed the Serbs as the only nation in Yugoslavia without their own state, served only to 
exacerbate the already tense relations between the two ethnic groups in Kosovo.
25
  It called the 
March and April 1981 demonstrations in Kosovo a declaration of “open war” on Serbs.  It 
dubbed the creation of autonomy in Vojvodina and Kosovo a dismembering of Serbia and called 
for the revoking of the autonomy granted to these provinces in the 1974 constitution (Vickers 
1998: 221). In November 1988, the federal parliament in Belgrade adopted amendments that 
allowed for the changes in the Serbian constitution, which included reducing the autonomous 
regions’ powers in the field of legislation and imposing republican law from Belgrade over 
provincial law from Pristina. The changes in Kosovo were met with protests and massive strikes 
throughout the region, which were countered with the declaration of a state of emergency. 
On March 28, 1989, with Kosovo under emergency rule, the Assembly of Serbia met to 
revoke the autonomy granted to Kosovo in 1974 and to restore Kosovo to Serbian control.  
Kosovo Albanians protested throughout the province, marching in the streets and chanting 
slogans supporting independence for Kosovo and unification with Albania: “We are Albania,” 
“Kosova is ours!”  (Sullivan 2004: 53). At least 28 Kosovo Albanians were killed in the protests 
(Bideleux and Jeffries 2007: 532), although the total might be as high as 100 (Malcolm 1998: 
344).  
New legislation went into effect and Kosovo Albanians across the region were dismissed 
from their jobs. The medical system was revamped with 1,855 Albanian doctors and medical 
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staff losing their jobs (Judah 2000: 62). The main Albanian language daily newspaper, Rilindja, 
was shuttered along with the province’s Albanian language radio and television stations, as was 
the Kosovo Academy of Arts and Sciences (Vickers 1998: 24). Schools were forced to stop 
teaching in Albanian and offer courses only in Serbian. When most teachers refused, police went 
into the schools and physically removed the teachers and 21,000 teachers lost their jobs as a 
result (Vickers 1998: 247). The University of Pristina was declared a Serbian language 
institution and 863 professors were dismissed from their posts (ibid.: 247). In total, 
approximately 80,000 Kosovo Albanians lost their jobs (ibid.).   
By 1990, the situation for Kosovo Albanians was grim. A journalist from the Washington 
Post who visited the province in February 1990 described the situation as a “minority . . . sitting 
on a seething majority, using tanks, tear gas, and helicopter gunships to keep the lid on” (Harden 
1990, 33). In July 1990, the provincial assembly in Pristina was physically forced from the 
building and on July 2 the delegates, locked out of their building, assembled on the steps and 
declared the Republic of Kosovo within the SFRY. Most likely invalid on procedural grounds, 
nevertheless, it prompted the Serbian authorities to respond by formally dissolving the 
government of Kosovo.  
Kosovo’s declaration of independence and the non-violent approach 
In September 1991, Kosovo Albanians held a referendum and voted overwhelmingly for 
independence. The balloting was held in the open in rural areas, and in private homes in urban 
areas.  The results declared were that 99.87% of the eligible voters supported independence and 




Serbian authorities, declared independence on October 19, 1991 (Vickers 1998: 251).
26
 While 
the Yugoslav government did not recognize the referendum and the newly declared independent 
state of Kosovo was recognized by only one country, Albania, the outlawed Kosovo parliament 
set up a shadow state led by its elected president and leader of the political party, the Democratic 
League of Kosovo (LDK), Ibrahim Rugova.
27
 The Prime Minister, Bujar Bukoshi, was in exile, 
based in Bonn, Germany. Rugova’s position on the future of Kosovo was clear:  while 
Yugoslavia still existed, Kosovo should be awarded equal status to its other republics, but once 
Yugoslavia disintegrated, the only way forward was independence (Rugova 1994: 172).  
From April 1990 onwards, the majority of the population had embraced non-violent resistance, 
which became the center-piece of the LDK policy. The majority of Kosovo Albanians believed 
in this approach and in the assurances of its champion, Rugova, who whole-heartedly advocated 
it as the way forward for Kosovo (Stephan 2005). In April 1992, he argued: “We have no chance 
of successfully resisting the army. In fact the Serbs only wait for a pretext to attack the Albanian 
population and wipe it out. We believe it is better to do nothing and stay alive than to be 
massacred.” (Vickers 1998: 264).  
Coupled with the non-violent approach, the LDK urged Kosovo Albanians to refuse to 
recognize the legitimacy of the Serbian state in Kosovo. In practice, this meant that Kosovo 
Albanians stopped participating in any official state elections and they set up a virtual parallel 
state, with education and medical care continuing partly outside official state-led education and 
medical systems.  
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Despite this approach, however, there was a continuing decline in the human rights 
situation in Kosovo throughout the 1990s.
28
  By 1995, virtually all Albanians in Kosovo wanted 
to separate from Serbia: a 1995 survey found 43% favored joining Albania, while 57% wanted 
independence (Mertus 1999: 316).  There was also a rejection of the pacifist approach from 
certain sectors of Kosovo Albanian society, some of whom turned to violent means to bring 
about the end of Serbian rule in Kosovo.  
The pacifist approach touted by Rugova did not end the frustration and anger in Kosovo.  
Shkelzen Maliqi, a leading Kosovo Albanian intellectual and political analyst, and a member of 
the Kosovo Helsinki Committee in the 1990s, said of the situation in the mid-1990s in Kosovo:  
[It] has turned into a kind of intense war of nerves, in which one side stops at nothing, 
committing the most brutal violations of human rights and civil liberties, completely 
ignoring the protests of the international organizations which for a while kept monitoring 
teams in Kosovo, while the other side bottles up its humiliation, despair, fury, rage and 
hatred—but for how long before it explodes? (Maliqi 1998)  
 
Already by the end of 1993, living conditions in Kosovo had deteriorated significantly—
there was very little to buy in any shops, tanks surrounded Pristina, and Serbian military 
presence in the province increased.  The judiciary in Kosovo was almost entirely in Serbian 
control and the concept of a fair trial was largely abandoned (International Helsinki Federation 
for Human Rights 1993).  Previously preventable or treatable diseases were on the rise, incidents 
of polio, tetanus, tuberculosis were increasing, and infant mortality rates were rising (Vickers 
1998: 275). Mother Teresa Society calculated that the number of people receiving humanitarian 
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aid was over 370,000, or about 20% of the population (ibid.: 276).  It was in this environment 
that the KLA arose.  
Emergence of the KLA 
Formed in 1993, the KLA was in its early days and was in a largely diffuse form (see the 
section below “The Establishment of the KLA” for more detail). In 1995 it began taking 
responsibility for violent attacks on Serbian police within Kosovo and occasional attacks against 
Macedonian police in Macedonia.
29
   
At the negotiations for the Dayton Peace Agreement for  Bosnia negotiated in Dayton, 
Ohio, in November, 1995, the thorny issue  of Kosovo was largely ignored, which was a blow to 
Rugova who had attached a great deal of importance to the inclusion of Kosovo in the 
negotiations. This outcome gave credibility to the KLA’s argument that the international 
community only listened to violence. Veton Serroi, then a journalist and political commentator in 
Kosovo, commented, “for many Albanians, one conclusion was inescapable: only violence gets 
international attention” (Surroi 1996).  A KLA fighter later recounted for Western journalists: 
“The so-called pacifist way failed and finally Albanians were convinced that they had to 
organize armed resistance….From 1996 we had some movements or groups who didn’t approve 
any more Rugova’s peaceful way” (Sell 2002: 274).  
Prior to Dayton, violence was sporadic and isolated. For example, in April 1995, a border 
post on the border between Kosovo and Albania was attacked, killing a guard and injuring two 
others, and in August 1995, a police station in Decan had a bomb thrown inside it, wounding two 
police officers.  Following Dayton, the violence increased. In April 1996, five Serbs were killed 
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and four were wounded in what appeared to be coordinated attacks in different towns across 
Kosovo.  
The violence increased throughout 1996 and 1997 as the KLA became more organized 
and able to coordinate simultaneous attacks in different locations.  As neighboring Albania 
descended into chaos in 1997 following the implosion of a pyramid scheme, vast numbers of 
weapons, raided from unprotected military stores, were freely traded on the open market and 
made their way across the mountains into Kosovo and into the hands of the KLA (Dannreuther 
2001). The organization, however, remained a small one, with about 150 men fighting towards 
the end of 1997 (Bardhyl Mahmuti quoted in (Judah 2000: 106). And despite their regular press 
releases, the wider Albanian population in Kosovo remained unaware of who the KLA were.  
Escalation of violence   
In February 1998, the Serbian forces began moving against the KLA in earnest.  Serbian 
forces in Kosovo, including the Yugoslav Army (VJ), the Serbian Ministry of Interior’s special 
police (MUP), and its Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (SAJ), had reached as many as 50,000 troops 
(SIPRI 1999). Attacks in the Drenica region, known to be a center of KLA resistance, included 
attacks on the villages of Likoshan and Qirez, and were followed by the massacre of the entire 
Jashari family in Prekaz in March 1998.  These three attacks marked a turning point in the 
perception in Kosovo of the use of violence in the struggle in Kosovo (Perritt 2008: 38; and 
Xharra 2000). The dead Adem Jashari, writes Howard Clark, “became a more potent symbol in 
1998 than the passive Rugova or the erratic Demaci” (Clark 2000). After the massacre in Prekaz, 
the cost of the non-violent path advocated by Rugova and the leading political party, the LDK, 
seemed too high for many to pay.  As a result, the KLA was overwhelmed with volunteers eager 




Labeled a terrorist group by the government in Belgrade since its inception, the KLA was 
labeled as a terrorist organization by outside actors for the first time in 1998. Robert Gelbard, the 
US special envoy to the region, called the KLA, “without any questions, a terrorist group” in 
February 1998 (Agence France Presse, February 23, 1998). This label was seen by some to be a 
nod to Belgrade that actions against the KLA would not be opposed by the US (Kola 2003: 334). 
The UN Security Council also condemned acts of terrorism employed by the KLA, putting in 
place an arms embargo against both the KLA and the Serbian regime.
30
  The same Security 
Council resolution also condemned the excessive use of force employed by the Serbian police 
forces. 
International response 
International efforts to bring peace to Kosovo, for years desultory, were finally beginning 
to gain momentum in the spring of 1998, albeit not consistently.
31
  The Contact Group urged the 
FRY to address the status of the province of Kosovo in February 1998, sanctions against the 
FRY were imposed (and quickly lifted again) in May, and Milosevic and Rugova were forced to 
negotiate directly.
32
  US special presidential envoy to the Balkans, Richard Holbrooke, 
succeeded in getting Milosevic and Rugova to meet in Belgrade on May 15.  By June of that 
year, it was clear that discussions also had to include the KLA (Bellamy 2002). Holbrooke 
became the first foreign diplomat to meet with KLA members and to begin trying to facilitate 
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 Security Council Resolution 1160, March 31, 1998. 
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 In 1992 and 1993, there was a period of limited engagement in Kosovo, when the Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) included Kosovo in its Mission of Long Duration to Yugoslavia, and the 
International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) mandated a minorities rights’ working group to include 
Kosovo in its studies.  CSCE had permanent missions in both Peja (known at that time by the Serbian name, Pec) in 
the west, and Prizren in the south. However, between 1993 and 1997, there was less engagement directly in Kosovo, 
following ejection of the Mission of Long Duration from Kosovo, and the removal of Kosovo from the ICFY 
working group mandate.   
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 The Contact Group was first established to mediate the peace process in Bosnia in April 1994, and consisted of 
representatives from Britain, France, Germany, the US, Russia, and Italy. After Dayton, the Contact Group, after 
some delay, turned its attention towards Kosovo. It first publicly expressed concern about the Kosovo crisis on 




negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia, bringing the KLA onboard as well. Holbrooke’s first 
meeting with the KLA was with a local KLA commander, Gani Shehu, and KLA member, Lum 
Haxhiu, in the town of Junik, near Decani, on June 24, 1998.
33
  Throughout the summer, US 
Ambassador Christopher Hill engaged in shuttle diplomacy between Pristina and Belgrade and 
tried to put together negotiations between the Kosovo Albanians and the Serbs. On July 29, Hill 
met with KLA member and former human rights activist Shaban Shala (Judah 2000:170). 
International diplomacy efforts and discussions with the KLA continued throughout the summer 
months as violence escalated throughout the province, particularly in the rural areas. The 
summer 1998 Serbian offensive conducted throughout Kosovo by both the military, providing 
artillery and tank support, and special police forces, who went from village to village, engaging 
with KLA troops, their supporters, and civilians, forced up to 250,000 Kosovo Albanians from 
their homes (Sell 2002: 285). 
Not content to allow diplomatic options be the only ones explored, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) began flexing its military muscles. In June NATO issued a 
communiqué,  expressing concern at the escalating violence in Kosovo and outlined additional 
military steps it planned, including air excercises over the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) and Albania “to demonstrate NATO’s capability to project power rapidly 
into the region.”34
 
At the same time, NATO military authorities were tasked to assess and 
develop a full range of military options. On June 15 and 16, 1998, 13 NATO countries 
participated in Operation Determined Falcon—a display of air force power with more than 80 
war planes flying over Macedonia and Albania within 10 miles of the border of FRY. Lieutenant 
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 Shehu was the sub-commander of the Junik area within the Dukagjini zone, interview with author, New York, 
June 2010. 
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General Michael Short said of the exercise that it “intended to demonstrate the alliance's 
commitment to peace and stability in the region and the alliance's ability to project power into 
the region” (Carassavas 1998).  The exercise, intended as a threat, may not have been taken very 
seriously by Belgrade however—General Klaus Naumann, NATO's Military Committee 
chairman, conceded after the fact that Milosevic “rightly concluded that the NATO threat was a 
bluff…and finished his summer offensive” (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000: 33). Operation 
Determined Falcon was followed by a ground troop exercise in Macedonia from September 11 to 
18, termed Cooperative Best Effort 98.  A Partnership for Peace exercise, it involved troops from 
20 NATO and partner countries.
35
  By September 24, NATO’s Supreme Commander was given 
permission to issue an activation warning (ACTWARN) by NATO’s Defense Ministers. This 
was the first real step in preparation for airstrikes.   
By September 1998, the UN was calling for a cease-fire, which was agreed on October 
16.
36
 With agreement from Belgrade, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) launched a cease-fire verification mission (KVM) on October 25, 1998, with civilian 
monitors patrolling Kosovo. The agreement was reached only after NATO gave an activation 
order (ACTORD) on October 13 to the warning issued in September to authorize air strikes 
against Yugoslavia. The ceasefire was shaky at best, and by the New Year both the KLA and the 
government forces were accusing the other side of breaking it.  
                                                          
35
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 UN Security Council Resolution 1199, September 23, 1998. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter the 
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Rambouillet and NATO’s bombing campaign 
International efforts to broker peace culminated with discussions between Serbian 
officials and the Albanian delegation, which included top commanders from the KLA, in 
Rambouillet, France, in February 1999. The two sides were given the option to sign the Interim 
Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo. It called for the presence of NATO’s 
Kosovo Force (KFOR) on the ground in Kosovo and the withdrawal (or demilitarization) of 
Serbian forces. The draft accord also provided for an international meeting after three years to 
determine the mechanism for the final solution in Kosovo.   The delegation from the FRY 
refused to accept the demand that NATO control all FRY air space,  a key NATO demand, and 
NATO resumed its threats of military force. After a delay, the Kosovo Albanian delegation 
signed the February 23 Interim Agreement on March 18 in Paris (Weller 1999).  Holbrooke gave 
a final warning visit to Belgrade and NATO bombing began on March 24. The bombing 
campaign, dubbed Operation Allied Force, aimed to deter Serbian attacks in Kosovo and reduce 




After the failure of Rambouillet and during the bombing campaign, the Serbian forces 
launched a massive offensive throughout Kosovo, creating an enormous flow of refugees. An 
estimated 1.5 million Kosovo Albanians were forced from their homes and approximately 
800,000 fled over the Kosovo borders, primarily into Albania and Macedonia (UNHCR 1999). 
The conflict came to an end when, on June 3, 1999, Milosevic accepted NATO’s terms for 
settlement presented to him by Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari and Russian envoy Viktor 
Chernomyrdin. Serbian popular support for the war had ebbed as the damage from the bombing 
of infrastructure in Serbia increasingly affected the economy and ordinary citizens’ lives 
(Hosmer 2001). Anticipating intensified bombing and the possibility of an assault by NATO 
ground troops, Milosevic felt pressure to settle, particularly when the support from Serbia’s long-
time ally, Russia, evaporated (Hosmer 2001: 47). NATO-led KFOR ground troops entered 
Kosovo on June 12, 1999.  
2.2 The Kosovo Liberation Army 
Establishment of the KLA 
 
Prior to the KLA’s formation, there had been groups favoring violence on the radical 
fringes of Kosovar politics for decades.  Many of the groups active in Kosovo in the 1980s and 
1990s had their roots in the underground movements of the 1960s and 1970s.  The groups began 
to coalesce after the demonstrations in 1981.  The student demonstrations in March and April 
1981, which led to the wave of arrests and imprisonment of young activists by the authorities, 
also led to exile for those who escaped arrest.  Summary trials were held, and by the end of 
April, 194 people were sentenced to imprisonment for their part in the demonstrations and 28 




Many of those who fled found their way to Germany, where on February 17, 1982, four separate 
movements merged into one, the People’s Movement for a Republic of Kosova (LPRK), which 
later became known as the People’s Movement of Kosova (LPK). The four merging were the 
National Liberation Movement Kosova and the other Albanian Regions in Yugoslavia 
(LNCKVSHJ), the Marxist-Leninist Organization Kosova (OMLK), the Communist Marxist-
Leninist Party of Albanians in Yugoslavia (PKMLSHJ), and the Red Popular Front (FKB) 
(Lipsius 1998).  
The LPRK became a rallying point for students and activists involved in the 
demonstrations of 1981, many of whom were jailed after the demonstrations, and only released 
after years behind bars (Judah 2000). Even in Germany, however, participation in these 
clandestine groups was not safe. In January 1982, the founders of the LNCKVSHJ, Jusuf and 
Bardhosh Gervalla, were assassinated in Stuttgart, but it is unclear who was behind the killings, 
the Serbian secret police (Lipsius 1998) or the Albanian intelligence services (Judah 2000: 105). 
The LPRK began printing leaflets abroad calling for Kosovo’s independence and distributing 
these clandestinely within Kosovo (Sullivan 2004: 54). The LPRK was a focal point for those 
seeking to resist Serbian domination of Kosovo and other Albanian-majority areas of Yugoslavia 
until the formation of the LDK, and the subsequent declaration of the Republic of Kosova in July 
1990. Also, by the early 1990s, activists jailed during the 1981 demonstration began to leave 
prison and, radicalized by their experiences, many were willing to turn to violence (Sell 2002: 
278). The members of the LPRK did accept the underground state built by Rugova and the 
authority of the LDK, but some did not, and some members, such as the former OMLK leader, 
Hydajet Hyseni, left the LPRK to join the LDK instead.  The LPRK began publishing a weekly 




1998).  This group favored a violent solution to the repression in Kosovo and began some 
military training exercises in Albania for its members. It also began connecting with militant 
families within Kosovo, such as the Jasharis in Drenica (Perritt 2008).  Following clandestine 
meetings in Macedonia in late 1992 and Pristina in 1993, this group split into two: the Popular 
Movement for Kosova (LPK) and the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosova (LKCK), 




A small core group of the LPK, including Hashim Thaçi, renamed themselves the KLA at 
the end of 1993. Between 1993 and 1995, the group spent time consolidating, fund raising, and 
setting up connections among the small pockets of active resistance within Kosovo. Connections 
were made with Adem Jashari in Drenica, the Haradinaj family and others in Dukagjini, and 
Zahir Pajaziti in the Llap valley (Perritt 2008: 69). A key point person in Kosovo was Adem 
Jashari from the village of Prekaz in Drenica, the region historically associated with the Kaçak 
uprising, whose resistance to Serbian authority made him seem like “a kaçak for the 1990s” 
(Judah 2000: 111).
38
 Jashari was nominated as the head of the KLA within Kosovo, operating 
out of his compound in Prekaz (Krasniqi 2006: 23).
39
  
The turn towards violence was piecemeal at first, with small groups organizing their own 
operations, in a guerrilla style. Groups were organized in cells, with no more than four or five 
members in each cell and with very little contact between cells (Bekaj 2010).  Some of the 
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groups were drawn from single families, some of which had already been targeted by the Serbian 
secret police. Ramush Haradinaj, who was the KLA Regional Commander in the Dukagjini 
region, said of his choice to take up arms: “Those families were already the targets; they had to 
make the choice [to fight] earlier than the others. We didn’t have much choice at the time. We 
knew that we could be killed one way or another—in the prisons of Serbia, by being 
assassinated, or by resisting them directly” (Perritt 2008: 1). 
The date at which the violent resistance started is under dispute. Jashari had begun 
attacking Serbian police as early as March 1992, when members of the Jashari and Lladrofci 
families shot policemen in the Drenas bus-station.  Jakup Krasniqi, who later became the 
spokesman for the KLA, termed this operation the first politically motivated violence by the 
group (Krasniqi 2006: 21).
40
 Other sources suggest the violence started later, citing the attack 
against Serb policemen near Komorane in Glogovac in May 1993 as the first attack (ICG 
1998b:2). In any event, the initial violence was isolated and sporadic. The KLA also conducted a 
number of attacks on police outposts outside Kosovo in Macedonia.   
The first planned, coordinated assaults began in April 1996. On April 22, four almost 
simultaneous attacks were launched in separate locations in Stimlje, Peje, and Mitrovica (ICG 
1998b). The simultaneous attacks resulted in the Serbian response being spread over several 
areas (Tsekov 2002). At the same time, attacks against Kosovo Albanians who were termed 
collaborators and Serbian families who had been resettled in Kosovo began as well.  At this 
point, the KLA was not a real threat to the Serbian forces, but the use of violence was a symbolic 
act, which was used to advertise the existence of the group, raise popular consciousness, and 
increase popular participation (Mulaj 2008).  
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By the end of the summer of 1997, the KLA had grown in size and complexity to be able 
to conduct a ten part operation between September 10 and 11, targeting police vehicles and 
barracks up to 90 miles apart in coordinated, separate attacks (Kusovac 1998). By this time, more 
than 13,000 armed Serbian police were stationed in Kosovo, along with 6,500 soldiers of the 
Yugoslav Army (VJ) (ICG 1998a).  The KLA made their first public appearance in November 
1997 at the funeral of a teacher in Lausha, when three members of the KLA in uniform took off 
their masks and spoke to the 15,000 assembled mourners (Kusovac 1998). One Kosovo Albanian 
journalist said the appearance of the KLA at the funeral had an electrifying effect on the 
population. “Ten years of so-called nonresistance resistance softened the backbone of the 
Albanian population. Everyone was surprised when the KLA rose up because there had been no 
open defiance for so long” (Stephan 2005: 199).  
The ranks of the KLA greatly expanded after the massacres in Likoshane, Qirez, and 
Prekaz in March 1998. Some Albanian Kosovars flew back to Kosovo from abroad on hearing 
the news to join the fight. “I was in the US at the time, and I heard about the massacres through 
the American newspapers. I heard about the massacres, the burning, and the next day I bought a 
ticket to fly to Albania.”
41
 Village militias were formed and began calling themselves KLA and 
the KLA found itself inundated with an influx of men willing to fight. In addition, some senior 
LDK leaders, such as Jakup Krasniqi, announced themselves to be KLA members, and former 
political prisoners who were leaders in the Center for Defending Human Rights and Freedom 
(CDHRF) aligned themselves with the KLA (Clark 2000: 176).  
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Structure of the KLA 
 
The structure of the KLA as it grew over time is an important variable under 
examination.  The degree of formal structure or hierarchy displayed by the KLA affected its 
ability to identify and use international norms in its discourse.  
Initially, the KLA was made up of disparate groups with loose links between them and 
strong bonds of family or friendship within each group keeping each small group together.  The 
units were very secretive and communication between them was limited.  “Our unit functioned 
with three members. Each group knew of only one other person outside the unit. We used nick 
names, and had limited knowledge of other units, which was done more for our and our families’ 
protection.”
42
 Most of the early attacks were separate initiatives by one of these small groups of 
individuals acting independently (Perritt 2008: 81). Some groups were started by the members of 
the group themselves, and it was only over time that these groups came together and came to be 
known as the KLA. “My brother established a group with his friends around 1995 and 1996, 
called the Eagles. [Zahir] Pajaziti came up with the idea of cooperating together and somehow 
establishing the KLA.[…] In 1996 we got together and joined up with the KLA.”
43
 Secrecy was 
essential to protect members, primarily from the Secret Service. “Our groups were so well-
organized, so that the Secret Service of Serbia could not break it. Before there had been many 
people who had tried to start a resistance, but they were infiltrated.”
44
  
It has also been argued that this early loose horizontal structure was a clan-based 
structure, wherein the local leaders incorporated traditional social, cultural, and political 
elements into the organization (Tsekov 2002). It was not until much later in the war, in the 
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summer of 1998, that a more formal structure was established, with a hierarchical command 
added to the loosely formed initial horizontal structure.
45
     
In November 1994, meetings were held in Tirana between the groups inside Kosovo and 
those in exile. A group of those in exile were given the task of representing the political platform 
of the KLA, fundraising, and weapons supply. They included Xhavit Haliti, Azem Syla, and Ali 
Ahmeti, among others (Perritt 2008: 81). These men established themselves as the General Staff, 
but none (apart from Ahmeti) saw any military action. Others, including Thaçi, Rexhep Selimi, 
and Nait Hasani, worked to coordinate activities within Kosovo, unite the disparate groups, and 
connect them with those in exile. Between 1994 and 1998, these three helped to forge links 
among the groups within Kosovo and travelled frequently in and out of Kosovo over the border 
into Albania to connect those groups with the exiles (ibid.).  In addition, each group within 
Kosovo had its own links to others in Switzerland, Germany, or the US through family members 
in the extensive Kosovar diaspora, which had grown rapidly as the economic and security 
situation in Kosovo steadily worsened. The KLA was not large initially—according to Rexhep 
Selimi, it had only reached about 200 combatants by November 1997, along with operational and 
logistical support (quoted in Bekaj 2010). Selimi also said that “in the beginning, we were all 




The KLA operated in regional zones throughout its development, each led by a local 
leader, or regional commander. These seven zones were Drenica in Central Kosovo; Llap in the 
northeast, bordering on Serbia and including Pristina; Dukagjini in the southwest from Peja to 
Decan and Gjakova, including the essential access to the border with Albania; Shala in the north; 
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Pastriku in the south from Prizren to Maleshevo; Nerodima in the south-central area, around 
Lipjan and Ferizaj; and Karadaku in the southeast, bordering on Macedonia (Krasniqi 2006). 
Coordination between zones was limited and each zone operated mostly independently (Troebst 
1999). There were also significant differences in operating styles, abilities, and levels of control 
over the soldiers in different zones. For example, one KLA fighter who had experience in both 
the Drenica and Llapi zones said: “the army was much more organized in Llapi than in Drenica. 
It was more hierarchical, and there was more education and experience in Llapi. Many of the 
officers there were from the ex-Yugoslavian army.”
47
 
In June 1998, the KLA underwent reorganization. It established a political wing with five 
senior members: Hashim Thaçi, Sokol Bashota, Rame Buja, Xhavit Haliti and Jakup Krasniqi, 
and organized various functions, such as public relations, into a vertical structure.  By the end of 
the war, the organization had evolved into a more recognizable army, each zone having brigades 
and each brigade consisting of four battalions (each battalion may have had as few as 90 to 100 
men) (Perritt 2008: 83). Battalions were broken into companies, each of which was made up of 
three or four platoons (Perritt 2008: 71).  In addition to these forces, there were irregular troops, 
or civilian defense militia forces, which defended home villages. There remained considerable 
differences between each zone, however, with each zone commander using different tactics and 
managing his troops differently (ibid.).  
In November 1998, the KLA underwent further reorganization and stratification, with the 
introduction of nine departments: Personnel; Information services; Operations; Logistics; Public 
relations and Civil administration; Communication and Interdepartmental Relations; Finance and 
Economics; Public information; and Military Police (Krasniqi 2006). 
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KLA and Media 
This section outlines how the KLA worked with the media to publicize its discourse. In 
the early days, from 1995 to the summer of 1998, the KLA had no formal mechanism for 
contacting and dealing with the press and the media.  Although press releases (termed 
communiqués) were written and faxed to both local and international press outlets with the help 
of the LPK in Switzerland, the authorship of the communiqués was unclear. These communiqués 
were transmitted by the BBC Albanian services and were printed in Albanian and foreign 
newspapers in Switzerland, the UK, Germany and other countries (Mulaj 2008). The 
communiqués were, although imperfect, the only direct method the KLA had to communicate 
with the public until the founding of their radio station in January 1999. Initially, communiqués 
gave information about all KLA activity, but by 1999, individual zones were also releasing 
communiqués, offering information which was zone specific. 
In July 1998, Jakup Krasniqi was appointed official spokesman for the KLA and assumed 
responsibility for coordinating the official message released by the KLA from the General 
Headquarters. Each zone, however, retained its own media point person, each of whom 
frequently gave direct interviews themselves.
48
 The net result was that while there was some 
oversight of press contacts about the particulars of items such as troop engagement, even after 
July 1998 there remained only loose oversight of how the message was framed and presented to 
the public at large.  
By the summer of 1998, international media representatives were in Kosovo trying to 
identify and interview senior members of the KLA (Judah 2000: 168; and Pettifer 2004). 
Initially, the KLA, traditionally suspicious of outsiders, were not terribly receptive to receiving 
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members of the foreign press (Hedges 1999). Gradually, they came to realize this was the best 
way for them to present their case to the world at large. The interviews, however, were not 
tightly controlled from the General Headquarters.  
Congruence of international norms with local culture in Kosovo and within the KLA 
This section provides an overview of the local culture in Kosovo immediately prior to 
and during the conflict, with a focus on parts of the culture with which there was some overlap 
with the international norms under discussion (human rights, international humanitarian law, and 
the norm against terrorism).  This overview is helpful in determining the degree to which the 
level of congruence between international norms and the local culture was a factor in which 
norms were used in the discourse, and when.  
During the 1990s, Kosovar Albanians turned away from official state institutions in the 
areas of education, healthcare and justice. As a form of civil resistance, a parallel system of 
schools and clinics were set up in homes and other non-governmental buildings and were outside 
the control of the authorities in Belgrade. Albanian Kosovars doubting the fairness of the 
government became less likely to pursue justice through official channels.  This withdrawal from 
state institutions from 1990 onwards was coupled with a suspicion of what the state offered and 
was accompanied by a return to more traditional modes of interaction which included a return to 
the oral culture which had strong historical roots in Kosovo (Krasniqi 2009; Clark 2000). 
Official news was no longer trusted, and instead, news was spread by word of mouth, from 
neighbor to neighbor. Families gathered together with neighbors to listen to the sparse news 
programs broadcast from Albania, jointly financed by the Albanian government and the LDK, 




In the field of law and justice, as Kosovars withdrew from the official state justice 
institutions, they turned to alternative ways to solve disputes, mainly traditional laws and 
mechanisms. In Kosovo, the traditional laws, shared orally for centuries, are known as the Kanun 
of Leke Dukagjini.
49
  The Kanun is comprised of 12 books and l,263 articles, which together 
form a comprehensive legal framework which governs almost every aspect of rural Albanian life, 
from interfamily relationships, to communal matters, to matters of life and death. The twelve 
books are Church, Family, Marriage, House, Livestock and Property, Work, Transfer of 
Property, Spoken Word, Honor, Damages, Law Regarding Crimes, Judicial Law, Exemptions 
and Exceptions. The Kanun applies equally to Catholic and Muslim Albanians.  At the heart of 
the Kanun are the principles of personal honor, equality of all men, hospitality, and kin loyalty.  
For some scholars, like Leonard Fox, the Code of Leke Dukagjini is “the expression and 
reflection of the Albanian character, a character which embodies an uncompromising morality 
based on justice, honor, and respect for oneself and others” (Fox 1989: xix.). While some dispute 
the relevance of the Kanun to modern Kosovar life  (see for example Pula 2006), others have 
argued that the Kanun has played, and continues to play, an important role in Albanian culture in 
Kosovo and northern Albania (see, for example, Mangalakova 2004, Tarifa 2008, Arsovska 
2006, and Trnavci 2010).  
What parts of the Kanun are relevant to this discussion of international norms? While the 
Kanun does specify how disputes may be resolved peacefully, at times with mediators, it also 
outlines laws of behavior for individuals involved in deadly conflict, or blood feuds. Known as 
gjakmarrja in Albanian, blood feuds are derived from a social obligation to murder or take the 
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blood of the individual responsible for the slighting of one’s honor. The murder of a member of 
another family in its turn creates the obligation in that family to pursue their honor with a 
retaliatory murder, and some blood feuds may continue for generations.
50
 Of note is that family 
members traditionally vulnerable to killing in blood feuds are adult males. Thus, certain 
categories of people were immune from the threat of death, namely, children, women, the 
elderly, and the mentally ill. Some individuals are, then, legitimate targets during blood feuds, 
while others are not.  In this specification of targets, there is a foreshadowing of which types of 
individuals are considered illegitimate targets under international humanitarian law—namely, 
those not directly involved in the conflict, or civilians, which often includes children, women, 
and the elderly.   
Blood feuds were still very much part of life and the culture in rural Kosovo in the 1990s, 
as can be seen from the immense campaign conducted by Anton Cetta in 1990 and 1991 to 
reconcile opposing families involved in feuds.  In 1990, Cetta, a university professor and 
folklorist, founded the Reconciliation Committee to Reconcile Blood Feuds in Kosovo (Komiteti 
për pajtimin e gjaqeve ne Kosove). Cetta toured rural Kosovo with hundreds of volunteers, 
attempting to mediate between parties, and convince families to forgive their blood feuds. His 
form of mediation, outlined in the Kanun, allowed for families to negotiate a besa, or sworn 
truce. It is estimated that blood feuds affected as many as 17,000 men in Kosovo at the end of the 
1980s, confining many to their homes (Clark 2008: 60).  Cetta said at the time: “It is not easy for 
families required to draw blood to forgive, because for many centuries, families who did not take 
vengeance were considered cowards” (Bytyci 2005). In a large public gathering in rural Kosovo 
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to “forgive the blood” on May 1, 1990, at least 100,000 people attended, although the total could 
have been many more (ibid: 63). Part of the civil resistance to the Serbian state at that time, Cetta 
said of the campaign: “The enthusiasm and sense of fraternity that spread gave courage to our 
politicians and also encouraged the self-organization of our population” (Clark 2008: 63).  By 
halting the blood feuds, the attention of the Kosovo Albanians could be turned to resisting the 
Serbian government. 
The KLA drew many of its members from rural communities, where the ties of 
traditional culture where strong. One Kosovo expert (who wished to remain anonymous) argued 
that traditions such as loyalty, honor and vigilante justice were likely to be very strong among 
former KLA members: “[The KLA] was rooted in a strong rural culture, and consciously 
invoked traditionalist concepts as a way of developing its image as a very ‘Albanian’ army” (as 
quoted anonymously in Farquhar 2005). 
Another point of evidence to indicate the importance of the blood feud and the Kanun in 
Kosovo is the prevalence of blood feuds after the end of the conflict. Some parts of the province 
saw a resurgence of blood feuds after the end of the conflict in 1999, including the Dukagjini 
region, in the west of Kosovo (Xharra, Hajrullahu, and Salihu 2005; Xharra 2005). Some of 
these blood feuds were between families who were active in the KLA, such as the Haradinaj 
family in the west of Kosovo (Xharra 2005).  One sociology professor, Fadil Maloku at Pristina 
University,  argued that the new post-conflict legal system failed to take root in Kosovo because 
“it does not comply with traditional norms, so many people are turning back to old customs” 
(Musliu and Lani 2005). 
In addition to the Kanun, another potential source of historical traditions that were 




which date to the fifteenth century, are known as the Songs of the Frontier Warriors, or Kenge 
Kreshnikesh. They are tales of honor, friendship, ties between brothers and blood brothers, and 
bravery on the battle-field, where heroes fight and win battles against dramatic odds. The kenge, 
or traditional ballads, were very popular with Adem Jashari, the legendary KLA commander, 
who, legend has it, sang the traditional songs as his home was being shelled (Christian Science 
Monitor 1999).  
Other traditional folk songs were about Skanderbeg, a legendary Albanian warrior who led an 
uprising against the Ottomans in the fifteenth century. These songs center around the traditional 
themes of honor, hospitality, and revenge and celebrate one man’s struggle against foreign 
invaders (Pistrick 2012).  Both the Kenge and the songs about Skanderbeg were popular with a 
number of KLA leaders, some of whom vigorously embraced traditional parts of Albanian 
culture. Over time as one of those leaders, Adem Jashari, came to be mythologized as a heroic 
leader of the resistance, the songs came to be identified with the resistance itself.  New folk 
songs, such as “A vritet pafajesa” (translated as “Should Innocence be Slaughtered”), by Leonora 
Jakupi, the daughter of a KLA soldier, became popular.  Other songs popular in Kosovo at the 
time were folk songs about other Albanian leaders, notably the leaders of the Kaçak uprising at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, Azem Bejta and his wife, Shote Galica (Sugarman 2010). 
Indeed, during the conflict, multiple songs about the violence were produced in Kosovo and 
Albania—those produced in Kosovo with a historic tone and those in Albania explicitly 
celebrating the KLA and their fight (Sugarman 2010: 36). 
The ballads had a number of themes which could be seen as potential sources of culture 
in Kosovo and contributors to the congruence (or lack thereof) with aspects of international 




bond that exists between two people. For example, in The Marriage of Halili, warriors are 
hailed:  
To perish in bed we must not while we’re sleeping 
But rather while brandishing swords, loudly singing.
51
  
And in the ballad, The Death of Omer, heroes who die on the battlefield are not mourned:  
Mourn not sons who died in battle, 
Mourn no living who go raiding, 
Death’s none sweeter than in warfare, 
To fall in battle yet unvanquished.
52
 
The protection of guests and of children is also emphasized: in Omer, son of Mujo, Mujo tests his 
son’s honor by pretending to attack two boys in his care. When his son shows he is prepared to 
fight his father to protect his guests, his father relents and recognizes him.  
With one hand he [Mujo] seized the twin sons, 
With the other seized his sabre, 
When he was about to slay them,  
His son jumped to his feet, protesting,  
Arming himself for a battle, 
That his guests should not be slaughtered, 
The two men set upon each other, 
But in harmony they parted, 
Throwing arms around each other,  
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‘Hail, my boy, that I now see you, 
And you really are my true son.’
53
 
Overall, in Kosovo during the 1990s there was a resurgence of traditional culture, 
particularly in the rural areas from which the KLA drew most of its membership. It was this 
more traditional culture with which international norms interacted and needed to resonate in 
order to be adopted into the discourse of the KLA.  Three features of the traditional culture, 
namely the justness of the selection of targets, equality of all, and protection of guests have areas 
of overlap with three international norms under consideration: human rights, humanitarian law 
(in particular protection of civilians), and proscriptions against the selection of civilians in acts of 
terror. Other features of the traditional culture, for example, the importance of kin, loyalty, and 
the celebration of warriors fighting much larger foes all will have had an effect on the formation 
and functioning of the KLA in practice.   
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2.3 Background on the conflict in Sri Lanka
54
  
The conflict in Sri Lanka between 1983 and 2009 was seen by many as an escalation of 
the communal violence that had broken out at regular intervals in Sri Lanka from 1948 onwards 
(Winslow and Woost 2004: 6). Previous periods of violence include the violence around the 
1956 elections after the election of Bandaranaike, who ran on a pro-Buddhist and Sinhalese 
platform, and the period between 1974 and 1977 (during which time the Tamil Tigers were 
founded). Some scholars have suggested that the increasing interethnic polarization between the 
Sinhalese and the Tamils was driven by the nature of Sri Lanka’s electoral system, bequeathed to 
the country by British colonialism, which magnified slender majorities of national votes into 
disproportionately large majority of seats in parliament (Bose 2007; O'Duffy 2007).  Beyond 
communal violence, political violence has also been part of the landscape in Sri Lanka from the 
early 1970s onwards. In addition to the emergence of a movement for Tamil Eelam, with groups 
such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of 
Students (EROS), and the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), the left wing 




In the shadow of violence, there was a significant shift within the Tamil community 
towards an assertion of the right to self-determination away from demands for structural changes 
and constitutional reform of the mid-1970s (De Silva 1998). This shift began with the formation 
of the political party, the Tamil United Front (TUF) in 1972, which began to articulate the 
demands for Tamil rights. In 1975, the TUF changed its name to the Tamil United Liberation 
Front (TULF) and began calling for an independent state of Tamil Eelam.  By 1977, the TULF 
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had won 17 seats in parliament, primarily in the Northeast.  However, the presence of Tamil 
politicians in parliament calling for secession and the establishment of an independent Tamil 
state did little to alleviate tensions between the Tamils and the Sinhala-dominated government of 
Sri Lanka. 
Impatient with the pace of political change and with the approach of the political parties, 
the LTTE and other groups began the initial stages of a violent campaign in 1977.  At this point, 
the LTTE’s self-described “national liberation struggle” was proclaimed a struggle against 
institutionalized racism and escalating violence against the Tamil people (Balasingham 1983). 
The violence was at first on a low level and included assassinations of political actors and attacks 
on policemen. The Sri Lankan government criminalized the LTTE specifically under the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act in 1979.  
On July 23, 1983, the LTTE escalated the level of violence and killed 13 government 
soldiers in an ambush in Jaffna. Immediately thereafter there were violent anti-Tamil riots 
throughout the Sinhala majority areas, including the capital, Colombo. Accounts of the riots are 
contentious, with reports of between 350 to 2,000 Tamil deaths (depending on the source).
56
 The 
government was seen by the Tamils as either turning a blind eye to the violence or actively 
encouraging it and, after this point, support for the LTTE among Tamils increased. Some point to 
the events of the summer of 1983 as those that “turned a conflict between the state and radical 
Tamil youth into an ethnic war” (Herring 2001: 163).   
The unrest in 1983 was followed by an amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution on 
August 8, 1983. This sixth amendment prohibited any movement for independence of any part of 
the Sri Lankan state. It effectively criminalized the demands of the Tamil militants.  The elected 
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members of parliament of the TULF resigned in protest. The amendment stated: “No person 
shall, directly or indirectly, in or outside Sri Lanka, support, espouse, promote, finance, 
encourage or advocate the establishment of a separate state within the territory of Sri Lanka.”  
These events marked the start of the First Eelam War and the LTTE forces in the north of the 
country began engaging the government troops in heavy fighting.  At the same time as support 
for the LTTE was growing, other militant groups also enjoyed a similar flourishing of support.
57
  
In July 1985, peace talks were held in Thimpu, Bhutan between the Sri Lankan government and 
a number of Tamil groups, including the LTTE. The demands of the Tamil groups were the 
recognition of the Tamil people as a distinct nationality, the guarantee of an independent Tamil 
homeland, recognition of the right of the Tamil nation to self-determination, and safeguards for 
the Tamil people who were outside the independent Tamil nation (Wilson 2000). While these 
talks collapsed, the demands made in Thimpu remained fairly consistent as demands made by the 
LTTE at periodic intervals. 
Initially, the LTTE received support from the Indian government and the state 
government of Tamil Nadu in the south of India, including military training, and shipments of 
arms, such as grenades and land mines.  Indian support ceased in 1987 when Rajiv Gandhi was 
elected Prime Minister of India and signed the Indo-Sri Lankan accords on July 29, 1987. The 
accords were signed only days after the first suicide bomb attack by the LTTE on July 5, when 
an LTTE soldier from the Black Tiger unit, known as “Captain Miller,” drove a truck laden with 
explosives into a Sri Lankan army camp in Jaffna, killing at least 40 soldiers. The accords 
included the establishment and deployment of the Indian Peacekeeping force (IPKF) in the north 
east of Sri Lanka in an attempt to disarm the LTTE. At the same time, the Sri Lankan 
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government placed the predominantly Tamil areas in the north and east under emergency control. 
The IPKF maintained a front engaging in heavy fighting with the LTTE in the northeast until 
1990, when they finally withdrew.  Fighting between the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka 
resumed, termed the Second Eelam War. 
In August 1994, Chandrika Kumaratunga was elected president in Sri Lanka and, 
pledging an end to the war with the LTTE, announced a unilateral ceasefire.  A round of peace 
talks with the LTTE opened in October 1994.
58
 However, the peace talks made little headway 
and came to an end when the LTTE sank a naval war ship in April 1995, beginning the Third 
Eelam War.  
While Jaffna fell to the Sri Lankan army in December 1995, the LTTE retaliated  in the 
heart of the capital with an attack on the Central Bank in January 1996, killing at least 50 people 
and injuring 1,400 (BBC 1996), and the bombing of a commuter train near Colombo, killing 70 
people and injuring 600 (New York Times 1996). Other significant attacks by the LTTE during 
this period include a suicide bombing of Sri Lanka’s holiest Buddhist shrine, the Temple of the 
Tooth, on January 25, 1998.  
In October 1997, the United States banned the LTTE under anti-terrorism legislation.
59
 
The Sri Lankan government subsequently launched their largest military operation in the hopes 
of eradicating the LTTE from their jungle positions. However, the LTTE proved to be resilient 
and following significant territorial gains by the LTTE, the Sri Lankan government declared a 
nation-wide state of emergency in August 1998. Fighting continued intermittently and the LTTE 
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were able to regain control of most of the Jaffna peninsula by 1999, and recapture most territory 
it had lost since 1996. 
In 1998, the LTTE approached the Sri Lankan government with an offer of ceasefire, 
calling for another round of peace talks (Rotberg 1999). The negotiations continued for a number 
of years without much result until 2002 with the signing of a ceasefire agreement between the 
rebel leaders and Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe.
60
 This agreement included 
provisions for the LTTE to consider a federal settlement based on a unified Sri Lanka, rather 
than holding out for full independence. The Norwegian government played an important 
intermediary role in the negotiations after February 2000. 
Following the ceasefire agreement, a number of steps towards normalizing relations 
between the LTTE-dominated parts of the country and the rest of Sri Lanka began, including the 
de-commissioning of weapons, the reopening of the road linking the Jaffna peninsula with the 
rest of Sri Lanka for the first time in 12 years, the resumption of passenger flights to Jaffna, and 
lifting of the Sri Lankan government ban on the LTTE.  Joint committees and taskforces between 
the two parties were established to deal with issues such as humanitarian relief, refugee 
resettlement, and constitutional issues.  
The ceasefire was monitored by the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM), staffed by 
monitors from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland. While the ceasefire agreement 
did lead to a reduction in armed clashes between the main parties to the conflict, both the LTTE 
and the government forces also used the respite to consolidate and improve their positions, and 
human rights violations persisted.
61
  The SLMM collected information about ceasefire violations, 
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which included actions such as movement in the zone of separation, hostile acts against civilians, 
and the illegal carrying of arms. The majority of incidents of ceasefire violations were by the 
LTTE (Hoglund 2005). Negotiations for a final settlement dragged on and, after six rounds of 
direct talks, the LTTE pulled out of the negotiations in April 2003. 
In 2004, the LTTE faced a number of internal challenges.  In March, an LTTE 
commander from the eastern part of Sri Lanka, Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan (alias Colonel 
Karuna), broke away from the group’s leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, and led a splinter group 
to leave the LTTE, drawing almost half of the LTTE soldiers with him. The split resulted in an 
outbreak of fighting between the two LTTE factions, with the north claiming victory within a 
month when the Karuna faction lay down their arms following the deaths of hundreds of soldiers 
and bystanders. While the faction went underground, Karuna never stopped resisting 
Prabhakaran’s leadership and eventually joined forces with the Sri Lankan security forces and 
helped push back the LTTE’s stronghold in the east in 2008.  Also in March 2004, a political 
group, the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), split from the LTTE to ally itself with the 
government.  
In December 2004, a tsunami devastated coastal communities in Sri Lanka, many of 
which were in LTTE-dominated territory. In Sri Lanka, more than 30,000 people were killed by 
the tsunami and a further 500,000 were displaced immediately after the disaster (CNN 2005). A 
period of relative calm followed the tsunami as both the government and the LTTE worked to 
provide services to the communities most affected. However, the assassination of the Sri Lankan 
foreign minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, in September 2005, allegedly by the LTTE, caused the 
ceasefire agreement (in place since 2002) to collapse.  In addition, the LTTE had become 




groups that continued to use terrorism. For example, in May 2006, the European Union officially 
labeled the LTTE a terrorist organization (Council of the European Union 2006).
62
  
By December 2007, the government had begun operations in the north of the country, seeking to 
oust the LTTE from its stronghold. Fighting was fierce and the toll on local civilians was high. 
As reported by the UN Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of 
Internally Displaced Persons (RSG-IDPs), up to 70,000 civilians had been displaced by the 
fighting and there were high levels of allegations of extrajudicial killings, physical assault, 
abduction, disappearances, forced recruitment, the use of civilians as human shields, prevention 
of civilians from fleeing hostilities, and indiscriminate shelling of civilians.
63
  
On January 2, 2008, the government formally announced its withdrawal from the 2002 
ceasefire agreement and the conflict worsened over the course of 2008. The government forces 
advanced steadily towards the LTTE stronghold and de facto capital of Kilinochchi, surrounding 
it by November 2008, and capturing it by January 2009.  
The situation for civilians caught between the two opposing sides was grim. There are 
credible reports that the LTTE used civilians as shields in order to increase civilian casualties 
and attract the attention of international community to broker a ceasefire (ICG 2010).  The LTTE 
stopped and often shot civilians attempting to escape their area of control (UN Secretary-General 
2011). The Sri Lankan government troops were accused of shelling and bombarding areas 
around the fighting in which civilians were concentrated (ICG 2010) and refusing to allow 
humanitarian aid to reach civilians in the conflict zone during the conflict or immediately 
thereafter (ICRC 2009). 
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The final battles between the government forces and the LTTE took place east of 
Kilinochchi on the eastern coast near the town of Mullivaykkal, where the LTTE was encircled 
and defeated on a beach between the ocean and a lagoon.  The LTTE conceded defeat on May 
17, 2009. “This battle has reached its bitter end,” Selvarasa Pathmanathan, the Tigers’ chief of 
international relations, said in a statement carried on the pro-rebel Tamilnet website. “We have 
decided to silence our guns. Our only regrets are for the lives lost and that we could not hold out 
for longer.”  The death of Vellupillai Prabhakaran was announced the following day. 
 
2.4 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
Establishment of the LTTE 
Vellupillai Prabhakaran first founded an organization called the Tamil New Tigers in 
1972. In July 1975, Prabhakaran shot and killed the Mayor of Jaffna, Alfred Duraiappah, in the 
first and very public major attack by the group. On May 5, 1976, he renamed the group the 
LTTE. Initially structured as a traditional guerrilla force, it was restructured to become a more 
broad-based armed resistance movement of the Tamil People (Balasingham 1983).  In the 
beginning, the attacks by the LTTE were modest: in 1977, the LTTE attacked and shot three 
Tamil police officers said to be investigating the LTTE; in 1978, six more police officers were 
shot; and they undertook a number of robberies of banks and buses (Pathak 2005).  Their first 
major engagement was in 1983, when the LTTE staged an ambush and killed 13 Sri Lankan 
government soldiers in Jaffna.  
Structure of the LTTE 
The LTTE had a hierarchical two-tier structure, with a military wing and a subordinate 




supreme leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran. The political office was headed by Thamilchevlam (as 
the political leader) and Anton Balasingham (in the role of political advisor).  The military wing 
was divided into an elite fighting unit, the Charles Anthony Regiment, an amphibious group (Sea 
Tigers), an airborne group (Air Tigers), and a suicide commando unit (Black Tigers). Other 
smaller units such as an all-female unit (Freedom Birds), a unit with recruits under the age of 16 
(Baby Brigade), and a unit made up of orphans (Leopard Brigade) also existed.  
The LTTE was very hierarchical and ruled by one leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran. Many 
of his followers hailed Prabhakaran as a hero and took an oath of loyalty to his every word (Post 
2007: 92). Some have characterized the sense of personal duty and obligation to the leader felt 
by the LTTE cadres as a cult of personality (O'Duffy 2007). Prabhakaran characterized his 
stature as a choice of the people: “I cannot help this kind of projection and characterization. I am 
only concerned with the political liberation and social emancipation of oppressed people. My 
people are aware of my commitment and trust me to lead them on the right path” (Tamil 
National Leader Velupillai Pirapaharan’s interview, March 1986, quoted in (Post 2007).  
During the first years of the conflict (from 1983-1987), the LTTE faced competition from 
other Tamil factions and one of its objectives was the elimination of these challenges to its rule. 
The unified structure of the LTTE and its willingness to use violence against these competitors 
gave the group an advantage.  This was also the period in which the LTTE first established its 
civil administration, which continued to develop particularly after the withdrawal of the IPKF. 
The first government structure established within the civil administration was the Tamil Eelam 
Economic Development Organization (TEEDO), in charge of economic planning and 
reconstruction in the region under the LTTE control (Mampilly 2011).  Between 1990 and 1995, 




administrative bodies and began to build the institutional capacity for local governance (Stokke 
2006). By the late 1990s, as the LTTE came to control significant parts of territory, they were 
able to build on these early experiences of governance, building civil administration bodies 
throughout the territories they controlled.  Soon thereafter, the civil administration structures 
bloomed to cover areas such as education, health, police, judiciary, and taxation.  The Sri Lankan 
government continued throughout most of the conflict, however, to provide services to the local 
population, working with and often funneling funds through the rebel group’s administration 
structures.  
Following the ceasefire in 2002, the civil administration in LTTE controlled areas 
changed in two ways: the easing of travel restrictions allowed for more centralization and 
concentration of power in the north away from the eastern area and, second, in order to manage 
the influx of post-conflict aid and international agencies, the LTTE created the Planning and 
Development Secretariat (PDS). The areas controlled by the LTTE were described by some as 
feeling remarkably state-like.  For example, by 2005, moving across Sri Lanka and crossing from 
Sri Lankan government-held territory into LTTE-held territory was described by one traveler as 
resembling “a border crossing between two nation-states, with well-guarded border control posts 
where travelers are required to show identity cards, goods are inspected and customs fees are 
collected” (Stokke 2006). 
The NGOs in the LTTE territory were able to supplement the efforts of the civil 
administration, thereby increasing the capacity of the LTTE’s governance system significantly 
until the fighting recommenced in 2007.  The presence of the international organizations and the 




Lankan government sources of funding and, perhaps inadvertently, alter the dynamics of the 
conflict away from negotiation towards military resolution (Mampilly 2009). 
Congruence of international norms with local culture within the LTTE 
 
In comparison with the KLA, the LTTE had a very different approach to creating their 
normative environment. Rather than reaching towards traditional norms like the KLA, the LTTE 
tried to reshape Tamil culture in a completely new way in areas under their control. Under the 
guidance of Anton Balasingham, a Marxist intellectual writer who became the ideologue for the 
organization, the LTTE created a socialist platform and planned a social revolution seeking to 
upend the deeply conservative Tamil society, bound by a rigid caste system (Weiss 2012). The 
leader of the LTTE, Prabakharan, was of lower caste himself and in many ways the LTTE 
represented an inversion of the traditional social hierarchy.   
A second element of the culture within the LTTE that is essential to consider is the 
veneration of death, in particular, death for the cause. The fight for Tamil Eelam, in the LTTE’s 
view, was one where every Tamil was expected to give everything for the struggle—money, 
future, and even his or her life. Parents were expected to give up their children for the national 
liberation struggle and threatened with violence or detention if they did not (Human Rights 
Watch 2004).  The devotion of the Tigers to the death and to their cause was exemplified by the 
capsule of cyanide worn around their necks, to be drunk at the time of capture. The adoption of 
the cyanide capsules between 1983 and 1984 reinforced the case for suicide bombers and, after 
1987, suicide bombers and assassinations became a regular part of the LTTE’s tactics (Hopgood 
2006).  Between the first suicide attack by “Captain Miller” in 1987 and May 2009, at the end of 




The importance of the celebration of death can also be seen in the example of burial. The 
LTTE wrought significant change on the culture in the north and east with the introduction of 
graveyards in which soldiers, termed martyrs, were buried. This was a significant break with the 
past in a culture that cremated the dead. Cemeteries began to be venerated as temples and 
monuments to war and struggle and the Tigers began commemorating the dead in a series of 
powerful rituals, including Heroes Day on November 27, and Black Tigers day on July 5 
(Roberts 2006).
64 
The gravestones in the graveyards were referred to as a memorial stone or hero 
stone and were ritually garlanded with flowers.
65
  By these acts, the soldiers were both honoring 
the dead, and also affirming that they themselves would be so honored on their deaths.   
It is important to note the significance of the celebration of death and the dead alongside the 
norms against terrorism and international humanitarian law which maintain the importance of not 
killing civilians or those not involved in the conflict.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the conflicts in the two cases, Kosovo and Sri 
Lanka, outlining the development of violence in each case. It also provides a background on the 
establishment and structure of the two organizations, with a focus on the normative environment 
established and maintained by each group.  
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Chapter 3: Patterns of change: A state to non-state level 
comparison 
The discourse and behavior of states change as a result of changing international norms. 
However, very little scholarly attention has been focused on how norms affect the discourse and 
behavior of non-state actors. Andrew Cortell and James Davis note that “the first sign of an 
international norm’s domestic impact is its appearance in the domestic political discourse” 
(Cortell and Davis 2000). Applying that idea to non-state actors, this chapter examines 
international norms in the discourse of two armed resistance groups, the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  
This chapter reviews evidence that armed resistance groups follow changes in the 
hegemonic discourse and behavior and change their discourse to echo the changes at the state 
level. It compares the patterns in the changes in the discourse of these groups with the changes 
observed at the state level over the same period.  The international norms analyzed are human 
rights, international humanitarian law, humanitarian intervention, genocide, and the norm against 
the use of terrorism.  
The patterns observed in the discourse of the non-state actors under examination do not 
mirror the changes at the international level exactly, and they vary across cases indicating that 
the patterns of change in rebel groups’ discourse are not solely as a result of external pressures.  
Evidence of two other factors’ effect on discourse is also explored: first, the timing of the use of 
international norms, and second, the degree of hierarchical structure of the group. The timing of 
when a group uses these norms is examined in the context of each conflict. Findings show that 
the groups make changes in their discourse and incorporate international norms at significant 




turning points, indicating an intentional strategic use of these norms by the groups. The second 
factor, structure, is investigated to determine if greater hierarchy within the group is a 
precondition for the group’s ability to reliably incorporate international norms into the discourse.  
The evidence from one case, the KLA, suggests that armed groups do require a certain level of 
hierarchical structure before international norms enter their discourse in a significant way.  
Structure as a variable in the second case was inconclusive, as the hierarchical structure of the 
LTTE did not vary significantly over the period under examination. 
The period of time under examination is from 1989 and the end of the Cold War through 
the early 2000s.  This is a period which saw a great deal of change in the relative strength of a 
number of international norms, which provides for fruitful comparisons between state and non-
state levels.  
This chapter begins with an overview of the changes in the salience of selected 
international norms at the state level. It then examines how these norms might affect non-state 
actors or how the norms might be translated into their local sphere. The chapter offers an 
empirical analysis of changes observed in the use of these same norms in the discourse of the 
two rebel groups, the KLA and the LTTE, and charts those changes against key turning points in 
the conflict, such as negotiations for termination of the conflict, monitoring of the conflict by 
influential outside actors, or imminent ending of the conflict. (The KLA is the primary case 
study, and the LTTE is the secondary case.) The analysis is based on an analysis of the KLA’s 
press releases, political statements, interviews and speeches, and LTTE leader’s speeches.  
Finally, the chapter offers an analysis of the evolving structures of the two groups to gain insight 




3.1 States and international norms  
International norms are not static. There is a constant interplay between state actors and 
norms as state behavior affects norms and, at the same time, norms affect and change state 
behavior and discourse. The changes in the norms may be sudden and result from a specific 
incident or moment in time or the changes may be the result of a slow, evolutionary process. The 
change may not be in the norm itself, but may be in the perception of the norm or in actors’ 
responses to the norm.  
The international norms under examination are those which, for a variety of reasons, are 
most relevant to armed resistance groups: human rights, because human rights violations and 
abuses tend to increase dramatically during times of armed struggle; international humanitarian 
law (IHL) and associated norms, because this body of law may be applied to all sides of an 
armed struggle; humanitarian intervention, because the international response to conflicts in 
recent years has included the option of a military intervention on humanitarian grounds; 
genocide, because of the increased frequency of use of this term by either party during conflicts 
and the connection between genocide and outside state action; and the norm against terrorism, 
because rebel groups are frequently branded terrorists although they may or may not resort to 
terrorist tactics in their struggle with a more powerful opponent.  Each of these norms followed a 
different path of change over the course of the 1990s and beyond, although all show a 
strengthening of certain aspects of the norm over time. We would, therefore, expect to see 
different patterns reflected in the use of these norms in the discourse of armed groups over the 
same period.  
Several of these norms are linked. For example, human rights and international 




proscribe the killing of civilians during conflict. This overlap became more significant in the 
1990s when states gave increasing attention to the issue of civilian mortality during the conflict, 
and states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) began drawing on both bodies of law in 
an effort to address the problem. Similarly, humanitarian intervention and the related 
responsibility to protect (known as R2P), the norm which supports military intervention in 
another state without that state’s consent with the aim of protecting innocent individuals from 
death or gross human rights violations, draw from both human rights law and international 
humanitarian law. The norm against terrorism also proscribes the targeting of civilians for 
military or political objectives. Taken together, the norms of human rights, IHL, and against 
terrorism circumscribe how armed actors are supposed to act during conflict.  
Similarly to states, non-state actors are under pressure from outside actors (states or 
NGOS, for example) to conform to changes in international norms. These norms might be 
international norms under examination in this work, or indeed other norms such as religious or 
cultural norms. Pressures on groups include such negative inducements like the reduction of 
support or embargoes, or positive inducements like the increase in support or improved 
legitimacy (the latter may be conferred through activities such as inclusion in negotiations or 
dialogues).  We can, therefore, reasonably expect groups such as armed resistance groups to 
change their discourse as a result of that external pressure in some instances. In addition to 
responding to outside pressures, these groups may also be consciously choosing to echo 
international norms in their discourse for strategic reasons or in order to frame their conflict in a 





3.2 Changes in international norms 
A number of factors led to the rapidly changing international environment of the 1990s, 
including a perceived increase in the number and length of intrastate conflicts and an increase in 
states’ capacity and will to intervene collectively, due in part to the end of deadlock that 
persisted during the Cold War. These changes led directly to changes in international norms as 
states came to terms with a new world order.  
Human rights 
Between 1989 and the early to mid-2000s, activities by international organizations, 
human rights groups, and states strengthened international human rights norms to the point 
where they became a dominant theme in the discourse and actions of states. Although human 
rights norms began to strengthen from the mid-1970s onwards, there was a more recent and 
dramatic rise that was partly attributable to the post-1989 changes noted above.  
The shift towards greater use of human rights language is described by legal scholar Antonio 
Cassese in 1999: “it is a truism that today human rights are no longer of exclusive concern to the 
particular state where they may be infringed. Human rights are increasingly becoming the 
concern of the world community as a whole” (Cassese 1999: 22). 
The increased focus on human rights at the state level following the end of the Cold War can 
be measured in three ways: first, an increase in the accession to human rights systems, for 
example as seen in Europe; second, an increase in human rights concerns discussed and acted 
upon as international security concerns; and third, an increase in human rights enforcement 
measures. All of these changes were reaching a peak in the mid-1990s resulting in a strong 
likelihood that these changes at the state level, coming as they did within a relatively short 




During the Cold War many states signed and ratified numerous human rights treaties; 
however, it was also a period in which these human rights treaties had limited impact.  Some 
have argued that the Cold War allowed states to sign and ratify human rights treaties without 
expecting many consequences, such as pressure from other states to live up to the treaties, 
because those states could expect one of the superpowers to shield them from possible 
consequences (Wotipka and Tsutsui 2008; Buergenthal 1997).  This comfortable state of affairs 
began to change with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which established human rights as binding 
on all states of Europe and as a legitimate issue between states (Thomas 2001). At the end of the 
Cold War, rhetoric about human rights at the state level altered: the status of human rights 
improved, but enforcement action continued to be infrequent. Although human rights 
instruments have weak or non-existent enforcement mechanisms, the treaties themselves do 
confer certain legitimacy and allow for legal leverage to improve human rights situations within 
countries (Donnelly 2006; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). The period following 1989 saw 
human rights instruments begin to be more consequential as monitoring and promotional 
activities began in earnest.    
The first indicator of change is the accession to a regional human rights system, and the 
expansion to the European human rights framework offers a good example.  After 1990, there 
were significant changes taking place. The European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms expanded from the original western European countries to be 
signed by an additional 17 countries, all of which were Eastern European states and former 
members of the Soviet Union.
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 This is significant from an enforcement point of view because 
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the Convention provides for adjudication of individual complaints about human rights violations 
at the Human Rights Court in Strasbourg. Although the primary addressee of human rights 
violations remains the applicant’s home country where the violation takes place, the court in 
Strasbourg provides additional remedies for a violation of an individual’s human rights.   
The second indicator, the growth of human rights as international security concerns, is most 
apparent in the language used by the United Nations (UN) Security Council and their subsequent 
actions. During the Cold War, neither human rights issues nor humanitarian issues were 
addressed as security concerns and, therefore, not on the Security Council’s agenda. Indeed, for 
the first two decades of the modern human rights era following the adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948, there was no mention of any humanitarian aspect 
of any conflict (Badescu and Weiss 2010). Following the end of the Cold War, human rights 
issues, including issues such as children in armed conflict and women’s rights, gradually became 
security issues and for the first time warranted engagement by the UN Security Council. This 
level of engagement by the Security Council in the post-1989 period was particularly striking 
given the low degree of engagement during the previous decade (during which the Security 
Council did not approve any peacekeeping operations).  
In addition, after 1990, the UN Security Council began transitioning from discourse, or 
merely condemning human rights violations, to practice, increasingly using a variety of 
sanctions, for example, as an expression of disapproval.  In the decade after the end of the Cold 
War, the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions 16 times, compared to only twice in 
the period between 1945 and 1988.
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 These sanctions had varying levels of severity: the most 
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severe being comprehensive economic sanctions, for example in the cases of Iraq in 1990 and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1992; partial economic sanctions, such as in Sudan in 
1996; targeted financial sanctions, for example against the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA) and its senior officials in 1998; and arms embargoes, such as 
on the republics of the former Yugoslavia in 1991, and on the FRY in 1998. While the efficacy 
of sanctions is widely debated (see, for example Cortright and Lopez 2000; De Jonge Oudraat 
2001; Pape 1998), the pattern of applying sanctions continued into the first decade of the twenty-
first century, with sanctions regimes imposed in countries such as Sudan, Cote D’Ivoire, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and Libya, as well 
as targeted sanctions on individuals.   
The third indicator is the increase of enforceability measures; or rather a shift from principled 
pronouncements to calls for more enforcement and action.  Over time, there has been a move 
from principled declarations (such as the UDHR) to enforceable principles. And with this move 
came changes in the norm of criminal accountability for violations of human rights. These 
changes are seen primarily in the kinds of prosecutions of human rights violations which took 
place, namely, holding individual state officials criminally accountable for violations. This 
change was termed the “justice cascade” by Kathryn Sikkink: “a justice cascade means that there 
has been a shift in the legitimacy of the norm of individual criminal accountability for human 
rights violations and an increase in criminal prosecutions on behalf of that norm” (Sikkink 2011). 
According to Sikkink, in the justice cascade, there are three basic ideas: first, the most basic 
violations of human rights—summary executions, torture, and disappearance—cannot be 
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legitimate acts of state and thus must be seen as crimes committed by individuals; second, 
individuals who commit these crimes should be prosecuted; and third, the accused also have 
rights and deserve to have these rights protected at a fair trial. This new individual accountability 
does not apply to the whole range of civil and political rights, but to a small subset of rights: 
“physical integrity rights,” the “rights of the person,” or, when violated, “core crimes.” These 
include prohibitions against torture, summary execution, and genocide, as well as against war 
crimes and crimes against humanity (these are rights from only two or three of the 27 substantive 
articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)). 
One visible example of change was the increased accountability of sitting heads of states. A 
landmark case in the development of the norm of accountability was the indictment of Slobodan 
Milosevic of the FRY in May 1999 by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY).
68
 Milosevic was the first sitting head of state to be indicted for war crimes.
69
 
Charles Taylor became the second sitting head of state indicted for war crimes, this time by the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone in March 2003.  
A second example of an increase in enforceability is the creation of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) in July 1998.  Its founding treaty, the Rome Statute of the ICC, came into 
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force on July 1, 2002. This court has jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
The court represents a new embodiment of the convergence of international law, such as human 
rights law and humanitarian law, with domestic criminal law. The new accountability challenges 
sovereignty and sovereign immunity.  It not only extends to individual members of government, 
but also extends to individual members of armed groups who may be equally accused of war 
crimes or crimes against humanity.  
Human rights and rebel groups 
For armed resistance groups, the two indicators of the change in human rights norms at the 
state level with the most direct effect on their operations were the growth of human rights as a 
security concern and the increased enforceability mechanisms as the latter began to be 
increasingly applied to individuals as well as states.   
With the growing attention by the UN on human rights issues as security concerns, armed 
resistance groups found themselves under greater scrutiny. Pressure on these groups from the 
outside to begin to conform to the obligations inherent in these norms can be seen in the 1990s as 
the General Assembly and the Security Council began calling on these groups directly to stop 
human rights violations.
70
 In addition, these exhortations were accompanied in some cases by 
negative enforcements such as sanctions, or positive incentives, such as support for groups’ 
causes in public fora, inclusion in a peace process, or, in more extreme cases, military assistance.  
In many cases, the increased UN scrutiny was paralleled by increased scrutiny by international 
NGOs such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International.  
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In the example of Kosovo, in 1998, the UN Security Council turned its attention to the 
situation in Kosovo and linked human rights violations to the security risk posed by the conflict 
in each of three resolutions pertaining to Kosovo (UN Security Council Resolutions 1160, 1199, 
and 1203, in March, September, and October respectively), and one Statement of its President 
(S/PRST/1998/25) in August 1999. In addition, the Secretary-General also issued his own report 
on October 5, 1998 (S/1998/912). These statements condemned the violence in Kosovo, 
mentioned human rights violations as a security problem, and drew attention to the grave 
humanitarian situation and impending human catastrophe.  In 1999, the UN Security Council 
issued two resolutions on Kosovo (UN Security Council Resolutions 1239 in May 1999, and 
1244 in June 1999) and two Statements of the President, both in January (S/PRST/1999/2 and 
S/PRST/1999/5).  The volume of attention to the conflict by the UN Security Council is notable 
and the direct references to all parties and Kosovo Albanians to halt the violence was a direct 
appeal to the KLA.  
Kosovo was also very much under scrutiny by NGOs, although the majority of the 
reports until the end of the war focused on the human rights violations of the state, rather than 
the KLA. This changed after June 1999 when the actions of members of the KLA vis-à-vis the 
local Serb and Roma populations came under investigation.  
The conflict in Sri Lanka, on the other hand, was never an item on the Security Council’s 
agenda; however, the conflict was followed closely by other parts of the UN. UN Special 
Rapporteurs produced regular reports on torture, involuntary disappearances, and other human 
rights issues in Sri Lanka, naming both the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka as 
perpetrators from 1990 onwards. Sri Lanka was also on the radar for international human rights 




human rights violations and abuses in Sri Lanka as early as 1990.
71
 Reporting in the region as 
Asia Watch, HRW monitored all parties to the conflict, including the LTTE, pro-government 
militias, and the Sri Lankan government.  Their coverage used a mix of human rights law and 
international humanitarian law, reporting on evidence that all sides were torturing individuals, 
killing civilians, and executing soldiers without due process. The reports also urged the ending of 
aid to Sri Lanka and the LTTE as a consequence of the violations of both bodies of law. 
Amnesty International was also active in Sri Lanka from the late 1980s onwards, detailing 
incidents of human rights violations such as torture, extrajudicial killing, and disappearances 
(Amnesty International 1990).  
The beginning of increased enforceability mechanisms would also have drawn the 
attention of armed resistance groups. One such mechanism which was highly visible in Kosovo 
would have been the ICTY: its establishment in 1993 and the subsequent indictments were 
followed closely in Kosovo. The ICTY was decidedly relevant to the conflict in Kosovo because 
its mandate covered crimes committed in Kosovo.
72
 The UN Security Council drew further 
attention to the ICTY and the prosecutions in the Hague when it began calling for prompt and 
complete investigations of all atrocities in Kosovo and for the cooperation of all parties with the 
ICTY in the later months of 1998 (see, for example, UN Security Council Resolution 1203 of 
October 23, 1998).  
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International humanitarian law 
There were two significant changes within the broader norm of international 
humanitarian law in the 1990s (although one began slightly earlier during the 1980s, and gained 
momentum during the 1990s). The first was the increasing practice of non-governmental watch-
dogs, such as HRW and Amnesty International, to focus on violations of international 
humanitarian law in addition to human rights law. The second was a shift in which some of the 
laws of war—those pertaining to the protection of civilians—rose in prominence relative to 
others as states began increasingly focusing on them. 
As HRW and Amnesty International began watching for violations of international 
humanitarian law, they focused in particular on violations of the laws pertaining to the protection 
of civilians during conflict. With states and the media relying heavily on their reporting to inform 
policy and frame specific conflicts, this development was significant (Lutz 2006). But this 
development was also notable not only for what these groups were documenting, but for which 
actors they were observing as well. According to international humanitarian law and the Geneva 
Conventions, armed groups are expected to adhere to certain standards of conduct during 
conflict. Thus, for the first time, armed groups themselves were under observation for their 
actions and treatment of civilians.  
In 1982, using Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions, which applies to internal as 
well as inter-state war, HRW began to monitor the laws of war in addition to human rights law. 
This meant that, for the first time, HRW was able to talk about violations committed by non-state 
actors, such as armed resistance groups, as well as by governments. They first did this in Central 
America, which allowed them, for example, to monitor the activities in El Salvador of both the 




for violations of international humanitarian law. Likewise, in Nicaragua, they monitored both the 
US-supported Contras, a collection of right-wing rebel groups, and the Sandinista Junta of 
National Reconstruction government (Sikkink 2011: 107). Following HRW’s lead, Amnesty 
International began to incorporate the monitoring of international humanitarian law into their 
activities in the early 1990s (Weissbrodt 1984). 
The second shift was the rise in prominence of the norm of the protection of civilians. 
The focus by the Security Council on this issue did not emerge until the late 1990s.  In 
September 1999, the Security Council requested a report on the issue by the UN Secretary-
General following the Council’s strong condemnation of the deliberate targeting of civilians in 
situations of armed conflict.73 Concern on the part of the Security Council over the plight of 
civilians in conflict had increased over the course of the 1990s with the crises in Somalia, the 
Balkans, and Rwanda, in particular. These crises led to concern at the Security Council level that 
the impact of war on civilians was of such magnitude that protection of civilians should be 
considered an underpinning objective of the Council’s work. In late 1999 and early 2000, the 
Council took up the protection of civilians in conflict as a thematic issue. For example, Security 
Council Resolution 1296 dated April 19, 2000, states that “the deliberate targeting of civilian 
populations or other protected persons and the committing of systematic, flagrant and 
widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed 
conflict may constitute a threat to international peace and security.”
74
 
The protection of civilians stems from the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 
subsequent protocols. However, both the definition of what constitutes protection of civilians and 
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the Security Council’s role in the protection was fluid and evolved over the course of the 2000s.  
While it cannot be said that the norm of the protection of civilians was new in the 1990s or 
thereafter, given its basis in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the attention to the issue at the state 
level and the international level was new.  It was not until 2011 that the full force of the focus on 
the protection of civilians was felt with the authorization by the UN Security Council in March 
2011 of the use of force in the protection of civilians in Libya. This was the first time that the 
Security Council authorized the invasion of a functioning state giving this reason. 
The focus on this aspect of international humanitarian law at the state level would almost 
certainly have had an effect on non-state actors, who could also be held accountable under 
international humanitarian law, and whose interactions with civilians had come under increasing 
scrutiny.  
International humanitarian law and rebel groups 
After major shifts in the enforceability of human rights and humanitarian laws and the 
changes in individual responsibility for breaking such laws, such as the creation of the ICC in 
July 1998, for example, armed groups would have become more aware of the implications of 
continued human rights abuses, and this is likely to be reflected in the discourse after this date.  
The growing focus by states and by monitoring organizations on humanitarian law and 
the protection of civilians—and the associated monitoring—would generate  substantial pressure 
on armed resistance groups to be more aware of these laws  and tailor their discourse, if not their 
behavior, to agree with these laws.  While it would not be surprising for armed resistance groups 
to be aware of the Geneva Conventions and their obligations in general, we would still expect an 




civilians over the course of the 1990s and particularly after 1999, once it becomes such a central 
issue at the state level and in international fora. 
Humanitarian intervention 
The norm of humanitarian intervention is quite possibly the fastest changing norm 
growing from a barely recognized practice at the beginning of the 1990s to receiving broad 
consensus among states about the importance of the responsibility to protect at the September 
2005 World Summit.  In a new environment where problems confronting states included “the 
collapse of states, humanitarian emergencies, state terror against segments of the local 
populations, civil wars of various types, and international terrorist organizations” (Holsti 2004): 
318), states grappled for new approaches to these problems.  While some have asserted that the 
debates around humanitarian intervention are “in many ways a continuation of arguments about 
colonialism” (Crawford 2002: 400), what was new was the emerging consensus behind the right 
of outside actors to pierce the sovereignty of the state.  The International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty argued that “military intervention for human protection 
purposes is justified . . . in order to halt or avert large-scale loss of life . . . or large-scale ethnic 
cleansing” (ICISS 2001).  
Throughout the tumultuous 1990s, states turned to intervention with varying degrees of 
support and success, but in an overall pattern indicating increasing acceptance of the practice.  
Military interventions in the 1990s occurred in: Liberia (ECOMOG 1990-97), former Yugoslavia 
(UNPROFOR 1992-1995, IFOR 1995-1996 and SFOR 1996-2004), Somalia (1992-1993), 
Rwanda (1994-1996), Haiti (1994-1997), Sierra Leone (ECOMOG 1997-1999, and UNAMSIL 




1999-2000). Some of these interventions were with UN Security Council support and some 
without.  
Humanitarian intervention and rebel groups 
The growing drumbeat towards acceptance of the norm of humanitarian intervention and 
the responsibility to protect by states would be very likely to be heard by armed resistance 
groups. Some scholars have already explored the effects of the rise of the norm of humanitarian 
intervention on armed groups. For example, Alan Kuperman argues that the right to intervene 
creates a moral hazard for armed resistance groups who are likely to engage in activities which 
lead to increased civilian fatalities in order to improve the possibility of a humanitarian 
intervention (Kuperman 2006).  
Armed groups tend to be aware of events in their neighborhood (for example, the KLA 
demonstrated first-hand knowledge of international involvement in the conflict in Bosnia) and 
dramatic interventions, such as that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 
Kosovo, are witnessed around the globe. With the growing acceptance of the norm, armed 
groups would be aware that any conflict in which there might be an overwhelming number of 
human rights violations and abuses might also be subject to international military intervention.  
For some groups, this might be appealing, for others, decidedly less so. The KLA is an example 
of the former, as they understood that a humanitarian intervention in Kosovo would be likely to 
remove Serbian army from the area and thus support their cause. The LTTE, on the other hand, 
having experienced a military intervention by an outside party, India, which harmed their cause, 





Over the course of the 1990s, discussions among states that referred to events as genocide 
increased compared to the Cold War Period when the term genocide was barely used.
75
  
Genocide is defined by the 1948 Genocide Convention as the killing or causing of serious bodily 
or mental harm to members of a group with the intent to destroy the national, ethnic, racial or 
religious group.
76
  Article 1 of the Convention also assigns the signatories the duty to prevent 
genocide and in the 1990s, for the first time, there began to be calls for such interventions.
77
  
International attention to the genocide convention and the meaning of the term genocide 
were sharply refocused by a number of events of the 1990s, such as the genocide in Rwanda 
between April and July 1994 and the killings in Srebrenica in Bosnia in 1995 (termed genocide 
by the ICTY). Hardly used since the signing of the Genocide Convention in 1948, the term 
genocide once again rose to prominence and became a significant feature of states’ discourse as 
they grappled with their obligations under the Convention in the aftermath of the mass killings of 
civilians in the mid-1990s and later. 
The events in Rwanda and in Bosnia contributed to the international environment which 
pushed states to take more concrete steps such as the enforcement measures described above, 
which, in turn, generated support for new emerging norms such as the responsibility to protect. 
The violence in Rwanda in 1994, which resulted in the deaths of at least half a million people, 
coupled with the lack of response from outside states was followed by soul searching in 
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killing of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps an act of genocide.  
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subsequent years and a focus on the need for action when genocide occurs (Desforges 1999). The 
town of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia, predominantly Bosnian Muslim, was declared a UN safe 
area on April 16, 1993 and guarded by a small unit of the United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR).  In July 1995, despite its status as a safe haven, the town was attacked by the 
Army of Republika Srpska and more than 7,000 people, mostly boys and men, were killed 
(ICMP 2012).  Subsequently calling the massacre at Srebrenica “the worst on European soil 
since the Second World War,” the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan pointed to the need for 
states to act collectively against crimes such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other crimes 
against humanity (United Nations 2005).  
Beyond the Genocide Convention, after the events of the 1990s, genocide as a crime 
became a central focus of some of the new enforcement mechanisms, such as the ICTY and the 
ICC. The General Assembly adopted a resolution in 2005, the World Summit Outcome, giving 
each state the responsibily to protect its citizens from genocide (article 138), and allowing for 
intervention by the United Nations to stop genocide through Chapters VI and VII of the United 
Nations Charter (article 139).
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Genocide is also one of the four mass atrocity crimes upon which 
the emerging norm of the responsibility to protect is focused. The others are war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.   
Genocide and rebel groups 
With the reemergence of the term genocide in the international discourse in the mid-
1990s, it is likely that armed groups would be more apt to use the term after 1994 or 1995. This 
would be especially true for those groups for whom drawing international attention is a major 
objective.  
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In Kosovo, the term genocide had already been in use in the 1980s by Kosovo Serbs, 
claiming that the Kosovo Albanians were systematically driving them from Kosovo (Smith 
2010). However, the first time the KLA used the term was in March of 1998 in reference to 
specific events in Drenica municipality.  In Sri Lanka, the LTTE used the term genocide 
sparingly throughout the 1990s, showing a small increase throughout the middle years of the 
decade.  
Terrorism 
The norm against the use of terror as a tactic showed a slight strengthening at the 
international level over the course of the 1990s. Debates on the definition of terrorism, which 
had begun during the anti-colonial struggles for independence, continued at the state level during 
this period, over the difference, or lack thereof, between a terrorist and freedom fighter. It was 
not until the attacks of September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington, D.C. that states 
engaged in a new discourse about terrorism and began taking aggressive steps against it.  
Until the 1990s, terrorism at the UN was dealt with almost entirely by the General 
Assembly (GA). The GA was working to develop a normative framework on terrorism and to 
encourage cooperation among states on the development of a legal framework, establishing an 
Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism in 1996. From that point on, four treaties tackling terrorism 
were under negotiation by the GA.
79
 However, the question remained of how to define terrorism 
and still allow for legitimate actions by oppressed people.   The UN Security Council was 
involved in a handful of cases of terrorist attacks, such as the downing of Pan Am flight 103 over 
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Res 54/109 adopted on December 9, 1999; and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism, GA Res 59/290, adopted April 13, 2005; a comprehensive convention to combat international terrorism 




Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988, which led to accusations of Libyan support of terrorism 
and eventual sanctions against the country. 
During the 1990s, states slowly began developing a consensus about the illegitimate 
nature of terrorism, marking the beginnings of the evolution of a norm prohibiting terrorism, 
which we now see occurring more vigorously in the post-9/11 world. The UN Security Council 
became increasingly engaged in the issue of terrorism, issuing the first sanctions for the support 
of terrorism against Libya in March 1992, followed by Sudan in 1996, and the Taliban in 1999. 
Sanctions stigmatized terrorism as an illegal activity that needed international attention and 
response (De Jonge Oudraat 2004). States’ support of activities which can be labeled terrorism 
has come under more criticism than before that date. There even appears to be a loose agreement 
that a particular act of violence can be described as terrorism whenever a large group of states 
regard that act as illegitimate (Keohane 2002).
  
Some states, notably Algeria, India, Sri Lanka, and Turkey, pressed for terrorism to be 
included as a crime against humanity and subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC. This position was 
rejected by many states who found that terrorism was not sufficiently well defined, that its 
inclusion would politicize the court, and that the prosecution of terrorism would be better suited 
to domestic courts (Cassese 2001). 
Terrorism and rebel groups 
The changes in the usage of the norm of terrorism in the discourse of rebel groups should 
follow a different pattern than the pattern expected for human rights norms and IHL. We would 
expect armed resistance groups to engage moderately with this norm throughout the 1990s, 
refuting accusations that their actions were terroristic. And with the dramatic change in 2001 at 




resistance groups’ discourse to show much more engagement with terrorism, as groups become 
more energetic in their efforts to refute the label of terrorist.  
3.3 Rebel groups and international norms 
This chapter now turns to an empirical analysis of these international norms in the 
language of two armed resistance groups: the KLA and the LTTE. These two cases are used to 
test the above expectations of norm usage by armed resistance groups. This section will examine 
the groups’ patterns of discourse to determine whether the changes correspond to local changes 
in the conflict or to international level events in some cases, and to what extent the structure of a 
group contributes to its ability to use international norms in its discourse. 
The Kosovo Liberation Army and its discourse 
Over the course of the four years from 1995 to 1999 that the KLA was engaged in 
shaping their public image, their use of international norms in general in their public discourse 
shifted considerably. The usage grew from very little use of any international norm at all for the 
first year and a half that the KLA was making public pronouncements to a significant part of 
their discourse by the final months of the war.  
The table and chart below (Table 3.1 and Chart 3.1:  Change over time of the use of 
international norms language in KLA discourse ) show this evolution. This chart and table show 
the number of times in a given period that the KLA made a reference to human rights, 
international humanitarian law, humanitarian intervention, genocide, or terrorism between June 
1995 and June 1999. These references are in public pronouncements made by the KLA. The 




speeches, radio announcements on the KLA-sponsored radio station, and interviews.
80
 All of 
these materials contain words spoken by or written by a member of the KLA. No articles written 
by non-KLA journalists about the KLA, without direct quotes from KLA members, are included. 
The total number of public pronouncements included in the analysis is 325.
81
 Table 3.1 and 
Chart 3.1 capture the dramatic increase in the KLA’s exposure in the media after December 1998 
when local journalists began to interview KLA members in earnest and the KLA launched its 
own radio station. The increase of exposure to journalists was matched by an increase in the 
output of statements and press releases by the KLA. The count of media items issued by the 
KLA in each three-month period, expanded from single digit numbers to 136 items in the first 
quarter of 1999 and reached 107 between April and June 1999.
82,83
  (See the first column in 
Table 3.1 “Number of items.”)   
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 A significant number of interviews with KLA members in local newspaper contain verbatim excerpts of the 
interviews, printing the KLA interviewees’ answers to printed questions from the journalist. 
81 
A full list of these documents is provided in Appendix 2. The radio broadcasts were transcribed and published 
as three volumes. These data were primarily collected from archives in Kosovo, although some material had been 
published in book form. 
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 The number of items between April and June 1999 most likely would have been higher but for a period 
during which the radio broadcasts supported by the KLA were interrupted when the building housing the radio 
station RKL was destroyed. 
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 For reasons explained more fully in the Methodology section in Chapter 1, this analysis does not include 
interviews by foreign journalists, primarily to avert any potential contamination of the discourse by international 




Table 3.1: Change over time of the use of international norm language in KLA discourse 









Apr - June 1995 1 0 0 0 0 1 
July - Sept 1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Oct - Dec 1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jan - Mar 1996 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Apr - June 1996 2 0 0 0 0 1 
July - Sept 1996 3 0 0 0 0 2 
Oct - Dec 1996 2 0 0 0 0 4 
Jan - Mar 1997 5 0 0 0 0 3 
Apr - June 1997 2 0 0 0 0 0 
July - Sept 1997 2 2 0 0 0 1 
Oct - Dec 1997 7 5 6 0 0 11 
Jan - Mar 1998 8 6 6 0 3 3 
Apr - June 1998 4 1 2 0 0 1 
July - Sept 1998 9 4 5 1 0 3 
Oct - Dec 1998 10 10 5 0 0 4 
Jan - Mar 1999 136 106 94 24 5 35 
Apr - June 1999 107 117 112 168 5 11 
        
Total: 299 251 230 193 13 81 
 
 
From Table 3.1 (above) and Chart 3.1 (below), it can be seen that human rights norms 
were introduced in the discourse in the third quarter of 1997 (specifically in August) and go on to 
become a significant part of the discourse by the end of 1998, with 10 mentions in the final 
quarter of 1998 rising more than tenfold to 117 mentions between April 1999 and June 1999.
84
 
Humanitarian law references also increase over time beginning with 6 references between 
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 It should be noted that human rights mentions include references to general human rights, human rights 
conventions, and mentions of specific human rights such as the right to life, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, 
economic, social and cultural rights, and genocide.  The mentions of genocide are also considered separately in 
another category.  
Source: Data were extracted from KLA documents listed in Appendix 2. The documents were coded for 




October 1997 and December 1997 and, again, showing a dramatic increase to 117 references in 
the final quarter of the conflict (April – June 1999).
85
   
An example of the use of human rights language in the discourse of the KLA is from a 
speech made at a funeral in November 1997. Rexhep Selimi, a founding member of the KLA, 
and two other KLA members in uniform attended a funeral for a teacher, Halit Gecaj, who had 
been shot by the Serbian police in his village. “Our best sons and daughters of our unprotected 
people have been killed, imprisoned, massacred…[The Serbian invader] has killed children, 
youth, teachers in schools, and farmers in their fields” (Elshani 2003). Selimi’s speech makes 
reference to the right to life and to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment and represents one of the 
first instances of the use of this kind of language in the KLA’s discourse. Previous press releases 
had focused more on taking credit for activities undertaken by the KLA and using language 
which framed the conflict in terms of colonial suppression.  
An example of the use of international humanitarian law in the discourse is from October 
1997: “The occupiers are taking revenge with violence and never-before seen terror against the 
unprotected and unarmed civilian population. With this barbaric action, Serbia is breaking the 
international laws of war” (Communiqué  37, October 23, 1997). This is the first reference the 
KLA makes to international humanitarian law. Its use of this type of language increases 
significantly from the end of 1997 onwards. 
References to genocide are more targeted: the term genocide is used in the first quarter of 
1998 in conjunction with mentions of the three massacres in Drenica municipality in March of 
that year and again in the first quarter of 1999, referencing the alleged massacre in Racak.   
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 International humanitarian law (IHL) mentions include references to IHL in general, specific mentions of IHL 
conventions, the protection of civilians, harm to civilians, the treatment of prisoners, rules for occupying forces, and 
destruction of cultural artifacts. 
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Human rights Humanitarian law Humanitarian Intervention





Source: Data were extracted from KLA documents listed in Appendix 2. The documents were coded for the use of the international 
norms by using terms listed in the coding table, in Appendix 1.  
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It can also be seen that calls for or discussions of humanitarian intervention do not begin 
until such an intervention is imminent, in the first months of 1999, at which point references to 
humanitarian intervention begin in earnest.  It was clear to members of the KLA that a military 
defeat of the Serbian forces would not be possible without outside intervention.
86
 By 1999, it was 
also clear to the KLA that the intervention by NATO would be to their advantage.  The KLA was 
also certainly aware of the intervention by the UN in nearby Bosnia. Kosovo Albanians had 
watched the unfolding of the war in Bosnia very closely in an effort to understand how a conflict 
would unfold in Kosovo.
87
 The adoption of this language by the KLA in January 1999 indicates 
a perception by the KLA of the importance of echoing international positions.  
References to terrorism (or the norm against the use of terror) follow a different 
trajectory.  This norm is present in the discourse from the beginning. Mentions of terrorism 
continue until the end of the conflict in June 1999, with a peak in October 1997 and another 
around the time of the massacre in Racak in January 1999 and immediately thereafter.  The KLA 
had been presented in the media in the FRY as a terrorist organization and some of their use of 
the term terrorist is in refutation of those accusations. In October 1996, for example, when the 
group was still small and little-known, it was engaged in refuting the charge that they were 
terrorists: 
The invaders can threaten to eliminate the KLA and our guerrilla units as much as they 
want through their spokesmen in Belgrade or the violent ones in power in Kosovo, but we 
are not afraid because our roots and support are with our people, who know very well that 
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 Interview with Ram Buja, Kosovo October 2010 
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 Interview with Ram Buja, Kosovo October 2010.  
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 Translation from the Albanian language to English was completed by the author, with the assistance of an 
Albanian language expert, Blerina Xhangoli Morena, unless otherwise noted. 
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However, relative to the upswing in the number of references to human rights and 
humanitarian law language, the peak in the use of the norm against terrorism was relatively 
small, only tripling from 11 mentions in October 1997 to a peak of 35 in the first quarter of 1999.   
One characteristic of the data that makes the comparison of the relative importance of 
each norm in the discourse over time more difficult is the massive uptick in the number of media 
items produced in the last six months of the conflict. In order to control for this change in 
number of press releases and interviews issued in each period, the following table and chart show 
mentions of international norms in terms of saturation level, i.e., as a proportion of total media 
items for that period (See Table 3.2 and Chart 3.2: Saturation of international norms in KLA 
discourse). For example, if there are four press releases in one period and two mentions of 
human rights, this will show as 0.5—half the media items in that period had mentions of human 
rights. Also, if there are multiple mentions of a particular norm in several press releases during 
the same period, the saturation will be greater than one.  Controlling for the significant variation 
in the number of media items shows more clearly the relative importance of each norm in the 
discourse over time, rather than only an increase in the media exposure overall.  
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Apr - June 1995 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
July - Sept 1995 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Oct - Dec 1995 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Jan - Mar 1996 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Apr - June 1996 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 
July - Sept 1996 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 
Oct - Dec 1996 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 
Jan - Mar 1997 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 
Apr - June 1997 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
July - Sept 1997 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 
Oct - Dec 1997 0.71 0.86 0.00 0.00 1.57 
Jan - Mar 1998 0.75 0.75 0.00 0.38 0.38 
Apr - June 1998 0.25 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.25 
July - Sept 1998 0.44 0.56 0.11 0.00 0.33 
Oct - Dec 1998 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.40 
Jan - Mar 1999 0.78 0.69 0.18 0.04 0.26 
Apr - June 1999 1.09 1.05 1.57 0.05 0.10 
 
 
From Table 3.2, and the accompanying Chart 3.2 (below), it can be seen clearly that the 
international norms of human rights and humanitarian law began to be used in the third quarter 
1997 and become a regular part of the discourse thereafter. Human rights and humanitarian law 
references appear to be used with similar frequency, with both gaining roughly similar saturation 
levels after September 1997, despite their levels varying from quarter to quarter. Humanitarian 
law references lag slightly behind human rights references in terms of timing, but the pattern of 
change for these two norms is similar. 
Source: Data were extracted from KLA documents listed in Appendix 2. The documents were coded 





























































































Human rights Humanitarian law Humanitarian intervention Genocide Terror
Source: Data were extracted from KLA documents listed in Appendix 2. The documents were coded for the use of the international norms by using 









There are roughly three peaks which can be seen in the human rights and humanitarian 
law language: the first in the second half of 1997, the second in October and November 1998, 
and the third in April and June of 1999, right as the war was ending. All three of these points in 
time were significant points in the conflict.  
The first coincides with the KLA’s first push to announce itself as an organization to the 
world. This period was a critical period for the KLA as they emerged from their underground or 
clandestine period and began to be more visible as an actor in Kosovo. The transition for the 
KLA from a small, secretive organization to one which was out in the open was fraught with 
danger for the survival of the organization as a whole. The secret police of the FRY were 
relentless and extremely good at tracking down members or suspected members of groups 
opposing the state. At this crucial point, the KLA began framing its struggle using human rights 
terms.  
This is also a point at which the appeal to outside actors began in earnest (see Chart 3.3 
Appeals to outside actors by the KLA, below). From April 1997 to March 1998, the KLA made a 
significant appeal to international actors such as other states and the UN.  The appeals were 
typically for outside actors to take a stance against the authorities in Belgrade, rather than for 
direct support for the KLA. For example, in November 1997, the KLA General Headquarters 
said the following in a press release:  
We appeal to international institutions and in particular to the members of the UN 
Security Council, to the members of UN General Assembly, European Council and 
European Parliament to take definitive position against the terrorist authority of Belgrade 
and to support realization of our aspiration for freedom and independence. Continuing 
indifference to the state terror committed against our people empowers the terrorist 
authority of Belgrade to continue the ethnocide and genocide in Kosovo (Communiqué 
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Chart 3.3: Appeals to outside actors by the KLA 





Source: Data were extracted from KLA documents listed in Appendix 2. The documents were coded for the use of the international norms by using 
terms listed in the coding table, in Appendix 1.  “Appeal to outside actors” refers to a direct appeal made by the KLA to actors outside of Kosovo. 
“Outside Actor Influence” refers to a KLA mention or discussion of the influence of outside actors on the events within Kosovo.  This chart shows 




The use of the term genocide in this communiqué was atypical as it referred to a general 
state of genocide in Kosovo rather than referencing a specific event, which was more frequently 
the case.  The appeals to actors beyond the borders of Kosovo coincided with the transition of the 
KLA from a shadowy, secretive organization to one willing to act in the open and included 
human rights language, and is indicative of the KLA’s ability to use international norms 
strategically when framing their struggle as one which echoed the concerns of states at the 
international level.  
A second peak appears in October and November 1998. This was the period in which the 
negotiations for a ceasefire between the Serbian forces and the KLA, urged on by the UN, were 
concluded on October 16, and after which the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) force began its work. During this period 
the KLA was engaged in negotiating an agreement and was having repeated interactions with 
diplomats, OSCE monitors, and international human rights advocates. The nature of many of 
these interactions reinforced the importance of international norms and emphasized the need for 
the KLA to behave a certain way to be taken seriously as a legitimate player in Kosovo during 
the conflict—and as a potential political leader after the conflict. One KLA leader, Rame Buja, 
talked about a meeting with European diplomats in late 1998 that he attended alongside Jakup 
Krasniqi (the KLA spokesman) and Fatmir Limaj (one of the KLA commanders in Drenica) and 
the pressure they felt from outside actors.  
They were there to test our willingness, our intentions to take part in a conference to end 
the war. They thought we were only fighting to enrich ourselves, and they provoked us 
quite straightforwardly. They said, “The Yugoslav Army is the third largest military in 
Europe, you can fight it for a few days, but it will beat you.” I asked if any of them knew 
world history and could tell us of any case over the whole world where a regular army 
could win over a guerrilla force. None of them could.  I said we were guerrillas, and we 




come to an international conference for Kosovo. Krasniqi replied that we were ready to 




Towards the end of 1998, the UN Security Council was addressing the KLA in its 
resolutions (for example, UN Security Council resolution 1199 in September which condemns 
all violence by all parties).  By the end of 1998, the UN Security Council was also drawing 
attention to the ICTY as it began calling for complete investigations into all atrocities in Kosovo, 
and for all parties to cooperate with the ICTY at this time. The ICTY had announced in July 
1998 that it considered the conflict in Kosovo to fall under its jurisdiction. The KLA leadership 
was most certainly aware of these developments and the implications for its soldiers as highly 
publicized trials were underway in the Hague. Valon Murati, a member of the KLA in the Llap 
region, and press officer for that region, said:  
The higher ranks knew about the Geneva Conventions, UDHR, and about international 
conventions. They were aware of the Tribunal—and we knew we would be watched in 
retrospect…  It was much harder to be part of it when everything was going on, children 




The ordinary soldier, however, was not aware of the developments in the Hague. Rexhep 
Selimi, a KLA leader, said: 
More than 90% of the fighters did not know about the Hague during the war. It was not 
yet so famous. There hadn’t been any of the big trials yet. Also many of the guys were 
not convinced that they would survive the war. The Hague was not a topic of the war.
92
   
 
The third peak in the use of human rights and international humanitarian law language is 
seen at the end of the war, increasing from approximately February 1999 until June 1999. This is 
the period during the run up to the international conference held in Rambouillet, France, and the 
subsequent NATO bombing campaign which lasted from March 24 to June 11, 1999. This was 
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 Interview with Rame Buja, Pristina, Kosovo, October 2010. 
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 Interview with Valon Murati, Pristina, Kosovo, October 2010. 
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also a crucial period for the KLA to establish its legitimacy both with outside actors and the 
domestic audience.  
An additional example of the KLA’s use of language in order to bolster its legitimacy is 
in their use of the term democracy. The first time democracy is used in their discourse is on 
September 18, 1998. It is used twice more by the end of the year, but between January 1, 1999 
and March 31, the term democracy is used 45 times.  To appear to want to establish a democratic 
system was essential to establishing the legitimacy of the KLA as a potential political successor 
of the Serbian state after its removal during the conflict.  
Thus, the three peaks in the use of human rights and humanitarian law language 
correspond with turning points in the conflict at which times the KLA was at great pains to 
establish itself as a legitimate actor and, later, as a legitimate political force in Kosovo.  
An alternative explanation for the changes in the use of human rights language would be 
that the increase in use of human rights language follows the increases in the violence of the war. 
While explanation might account for some of the increases observed over time, the norm usage 
does not match the pattern of violence experienced in Kosovo, and is, therefore, not as 
convincing. The last two years of the conflict, 1998 and 1999, were marked by much higher 
levels of violence overall and therefore we would expect higher levels of references to victims of 
that violence, accompanying human rights references, and protection of civilian references. 
However, the increase in the level of violence does not match the changes in the discourse and, 
therefore, cannot be the only explanatory variable. For example, the summer offensive in 1998 
by the FRY troops and Special Forces was a period of high levels of violence which resulted in 
the displacement of a large number of Kosovar Albanians within Kosovo. This period 




references in the discourse—in the first quarter, the saturation of these norms are 0.75 (for both 
human rights and humanitarian law). These levels drop to 0.25 for human rights and 0.50 for 
humanitarian law in the second quarter and rise only slightly to 0.44 and 0.56 in the third quarter 
for human rights and humanitarian law respectively. During this period, between January 1998 
and September 1998, at least 200,000 Kosovar Albanians were displaced within Kosovo, and an 
additional 90,000 individuals had fled Kosovo and were sheltering in surrounding countries and 
provinces (UN High Commissioner for Refugees 1998). However, the final months of the war, 
from April to June 1999, do show the highest saturation levels of human rights and humanitarian 
law language. This was the period during the NATO bombing campaign when the forces of the 
FRY began their efforts to push Kosovo Albanians forcibly over the borders into Macedonia and 
Albania.  
References to the use of terror (both denials of the use of terrorism tactics and the 
accusations by the KLA that the FRY was a terrorist state) follow a different pattern and are 
present from the very beginning of the study period, in the second quarter of 1995 between April 
and June 1995, with peaks in the fourth quarter of 1996 and again in the fourth quarter of 1997. 
An example from August 1996 is fairly typical in that the KLA refute their label as a terrorist 
group and try to position themselves as freedom fighters: “The decision-making centers should 
be aware that we are not terrorists, as the Serbs are trying to call us, but that we are warriors of 
liberty” (Communiqué 22, August 10, 1996). 
A significant pattern to note in the use of the norm against terror is that the saturation of 
references to terror stays fairly constant and begins to tail off when the other international norms 
of human rights, humanitarian law and humanitarian intervention are introduced and become part 




is probable that the replacement of one international norm (against terrorism) with two others 
(human rights and IHL) is an indication of the relative strength these norms had at an 
international level and of the traction the KLA believed they could get from using one or the 
other. Given that most states had been arguing that states could not be terrorists (only non-state 
actors could), it is probable that the KLA practice of calling the Serbian state a terrorist state was 
not improving its legitimacy with the outside actors and states. The decline of the relative 
importance of terrorism in the discourse shows that the KLA was aware that some norms carried 
greater salience than others.  The shift from one set of norms to another over time shows an 
adaptive strategy. 
Structure as a factor influencing discourse 
The patterns of the changes in the discourse of the KLA can be further examined to see if 
there is a connection between the changes in the structure of the KLA and its use of international 
norms, as it shifted from a loose collection of atomized groups to a somewhat hierarchical 
structure with a central command.  
There are two possible mechanisms which would account for this. The first is one of 
control: the literature on rebel groups supports the idea that a strong internal structure is needed 
to control resistance fighters and their actions.
93
 The concept of control can be extended to 
include control over the language used by the group: speaking to the media, producing public 
statements, and shaping the public perception of the struggle.  The second mechanism is one of 
increased specialized knowledge: as an organization grows more hierarchical and complex, 
individuals within the organization are able to specialize and grow more competent in one area, 
or the organization may attract a different type of recruit to fill the gaps created by increased 
stratification.  
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Turning first to the issue of control, in the case of the KLA and its evolving structure, we 
would expect to see a strong correlation between when the group becomes more hierarchical and 
when it adopts international norms in the discourse. If the mechanism of control due to increased 
hierarchy is in effect, we would also expect to find direct evidence of such control on individuals 
speaking with the media on behalf of the KLA, such as media contacts in each of the Operative 
Zones, or media spokesmen overseas.  
The KLA was initially a loosely linked horizontal organization of multiple cells throughout 
Kosovo. The KLA over time established seven Operative Zones throughout Kosovo, each 
headed by a different commander.
94
 The zones were partly determined by geographical features, 
such as mountain ranges, which limited contact between groups in different parts of Kosovo. The 
development of these zones was part of the KLA’s evolution from a more fluid horizontal 
structure toward a hierarchical structure, with each area operating more or less independently, 
and gradually cooperating and coordinating, and eventually, coming under control of the Central 
Command.  As the hierarchies grew within each zone as well as over the KLA as a whole, each 
of the seven Operative Zones in Kosovo began to appoint its own media representative, or press 
officer, tasked with liaising with the press, coordinating interviews and contacts with journalists, 
and generally putting out information about activities.
95
  
In June 1998, in part as a way to manage the large influx of recruits following the 
Drenica massacres in March of that year, the KLA underwent reorganization and established a 
political wing and a central command located in the Drenica Operative Zone.  As part of the 
overall reorganization, the KLA put in place structures to have more control over access to the 
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media.  This was in recognition of what KLA saw as a need to work actively on their image in 
the press and with the outside world.
96
  In addition, journalists were demanding more interviews 
with members of the KLA, and in order to handle the demand the KLA appointed an official 
spokesman, Jakup Krasniqi, tasked with coordinating all official contacts with the KLA. An 
announcement that month stated that only he could speak for the KLA.
97
 Krasniqi emphasized 
recently that the reorganization was necessary partly to control what was said to the press by any 
press officer within the KLA as the lack of control had led to some misunderstandings.
98
 
Commander Remi, the Llap region Commander, agreed: “The biggest mistake the KLA made 
was we allowed so many people to speak on our behalf.”
99
 
The KLA underwent a further restructuring in November 1998 during the pause in the 
fighting provided by the ceasefire of October 1998. 
However, despite these efforts at reshaping the internal structure and creating the 
appearance of control over contacts between KLA members and the media, interviews with KLA 
press officers from the outlying regions indicate that this might not have held true in practice in 
the zones outside of Drenica where the Headquarters was located. Each zone was allowed to 
issue its own press releases.  One KLA member in Llap said: “there was a strategy to change our 
image, which came from the General HQ [in Drenica], but there were also press releases issued 
by individual zones. Even the zones had the right to issue communiqués and regulations.”
100
 One 
press officer in the south west area of Dukagjini said: “I spoke to the press, but didn’t get 
direction on how to talk to the press.  There was no real means to control what people would 
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 Interview with Jakup Krasniqi, October 11, 2010. 
99 
Interview with Rrustem Mustafa (a.k.a Commander Remi), Pristina, Kosovo, October 7, 2010.  
100










 Similarly, control from the headquarters over KLA spokesmen overseas, such as Bardhyl 
Mahmuti in Switzerland and Pleurat Sedjiu in London, was not as strong as the structure might 
otherwise suggest. Contact with commanders and troops on the ground was via satellite phone 
and not always reliable. Sedjiu, who was meeting with both British government officials and 
with major London media outlets, acting as the press officer there, said of the guidance he 
received when talking to the media:  
It all depended on the situation on the ground… I didn’t always have the chance to 
consult with people in Kosovo. I couldn’t always check in to get advice on how to deal 




Thus, while there was a structure in place, with specific individuals appointed to meet with 
the press, the control from the top of the hierarchy over exactly what was said by local press 
officers to journalists was not as strong in practice as the appearance of restructuring would lead 
us to believe.  Therefore, while there is an observed increase in the international norms in the 
discourse after June 1998, when the reorganization of the KLA towards greater hierarchy 
occurred, in practice, the control such hierarchy afforded over the message issued by the KLA 
was not strong.  
The analysis turns now to the second mechanism, which suggests that an increased structural 
hierarchy would allow for increased specialization of tasks of KLA members, and thereby allow 
for the development or accumulation of specific types of knowledge, such as knowledge of 
international conventions and norms. Put another way, increasing hierarchal structure would act 
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 Interview with Hysen Fazliu, KLA member, Llap Operative Zone, October, 2010. 
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as a precondition for the acquisition and use of international norms. The evidence shows greater 
support for this mechanism, compared to the mechanism of control.  It is also likely that the 
increasing appointment of press officers and the greater importance accorded to the press was 
also connected to the significant increase we see in the number of press releases from the end of 
1998 onwards. 
At the point at which the KLA had begun to introduce levels of hierarchy in the spring 
and summer of 1998, it had begun to attract a different type of recruit. The local press officers 
appointed starting at this time were typically individuals with previous experience in the media, 
those with a higher level of education than many of the regular volunteers, or those with foreign 
language skills. Prior to this time, journalists would talk to whomever they could find, and 
whoever was available. An example of the appointed press officer in the Llap Operative Zone 
was Lirac Qirac, who had previous experience working at the newspaper Koha Ditore (in the 
layout department) and was a known theatrical actor from a family of intellectuals and journalists 
in Pristina.
104
 In the Dukagjini Operative Zone, Ardian Gjini was one of the press officers. At the 
time of his appointment, he had recently returned from studying overseas and carried a copy of 




When Adem Demaci, formerly founder of the Council for the Defense of Human Rights 
and Freedoms and a highly regarded former political prisoner, became the general political 
representative for the KLA in August 1998, the tone of the discourse shifted somewhat. His 
office in Pristina, staffed by Albin Kurti who had led the students in protests as the head of the 
Students Independent Union of the University of Pristina, issued communiqués directly. Many of 
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the interviews with Demaci and Kurti in the fall of 1998 and the early months of 1999 make 
direct reference to human rights and emphasize the role the KLA had in protecting civilians. For 
example, in February 1999, Kurti said: “the liberation army of the KLA, because of the nature of 
the Serbian regime, is fighting not only a liberation war, but also a war for protection of life, 
human beings, and human values” (Kosova Sot, 1999). 
Thus, the increasing specialization of certain roles within the KLA that accompanied the 
restructuring and the increasing hierarchical nature of the KLA, allowed for the entry of 
individuals into the ranks of the KLA who brought with them specialized knowledge and a more 
access to the terminology of international norms such as human rights.  The uptick in the use of 
human rights language and international humanitarian law language after June 1998, therefore, 
can be partly accounted for by restructuring as a precondition for the acquisition of the detailed 
knowledge of those norms. 
 The analysis now turns briefly to the second case, the LTTE. 
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelamand its discourse 
The LTTE, a long-standing separatist movement, was active for more than 30 years from 
its founding in May 1976 to its military defeat in May 2009.  Similar to the KLA, the LTTE’s 
use of international norms in their public discourse changed considerably over time. The period 
under consideration is from 1992 to 2006 as these are the years that the leader of the LTTE, 
Velupillai Prabhakaran, made his annual speech to the troops available publicly.  This speech is 
considered by many to give the best annual “state of mind” of the Tigers.
106
 One advantage of 
this case, compared to the KLA, is the longer span of time that the LTTE was active and making 
public pronouncements, allows for a greater understanding of the development of language usage 
over time. 
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The table and chart (Table 3.4 and Chart 3.4: Change over time of the use of international 
norms  in LTTE discourse) below show the evolution of the use of international norms in 




Table 3.4: Change over time of the use of international norm language in LTTE discourse  





11/27/1992 1 0 0 1 0 
11/27/1993 0 0 0 0 0 
11/27/1994 0 0 0 0 0 
11/27/1995 1 5 0 1 0 
11/27/1996 6 1 0 2 2 
11/27/1997 5 1 0 2 2 
11/27/1998 11 3 0 2 1 
11/27/1999 3 2 0 0 1 
11/27/2000 2 3 0 1 5 
11/27/2001 8 0 0 4 26 
11/27/2002 2 3 0 0 0 
11/27/2003 0 2 0 0 0 
11/27/2004 0 0 0 0 0 






















International norms in general, meaning references to norms as norms, rather than 
references to a specific norm, are mentioned several times, showing keen awareness of the 
importance of those norms. However, when these occur, they are immediately linked to the right 
of self-determination, as if this international norm was the most important norm in the case of the 
LTTE. It also appears that the LTTE drew on international law to offer legal justification for 
their struggle.  
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Our political objectives conform with international norms and principles. Our people are 
eligible for the right to self-determination. They have a right to statehood. Under 




Human rights norms are present in the sample from the beginning in 1992, but are 
primarily clustered around two peaks, one in 1998, when mentions reached 11 references, 
following six in 1996, and five in 1997, and a second peak in 2006, with 16 mentions. Both 
peaks coincide with periods of heavy fighting.  The peak in 1998, however, mirrors a similar 
peak in the language of the KLA at a time when the norm was particularly strong at the state 
level and coincided with the creation of the ICC in July 1998.  
The connection between human rights and genocide is made explicit in a number of 
speeches and occurs after the intense focus by states on genocide in the mid-1990s. The 
following quote, from 1996, illustrates this:  
The incidents of arrests, detention, torture, rape, murder, disappearances and the 
discovery of the disappeared in mass graves reveal that a covert genocidal policy is 
practiced in the army controlled areas. (Hero’s Day Speech, November 1996) 
 
The majority of the references to human rights by the LTTE in 1998 are an attempt to 
highlight the relative lack of attention to the plight of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka as a human 
rights issue amid a growing international understanding of the importance of human rights. This 
is a strong indication of the LTTE’s awareness of the changes in this norm at the state level.   For 
example: 
The world community has always fought for the cause of the oppressed and it has always 
raised its voice of protest or intervened whenever there have been incidents of human 
rights violations, crimes against humanity or repression of minority nations in any part of 
the world. But we are dismayed to note that the international community is observing a 
muted silence over the colossal tragedy faced by the Eelam Tamils (Hero’s Day Speech, 
November 1998). 
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Source: Data were extracted from documents listed in Appendix 4.  The documents were coded for international norms according to 




Humanitarian law references, however, show a different pattern, with lower overall levels 
and only a slight peak in 1995 with five references. In comparison to the KLA, the LTTE’s use 
of human rights and international humanitarian law language is less closely linked.   
The references to genocide appear to be more general, rather than referring to specific 
events, contrary to the KLA case.   
Our historical enemy, Sinhala Buddhist Chauvinism…has been conducting a genocidal 




Successive Sri Lankan Governments adopted a policy of genocidal repression aimed at 
the gradual and systematic destruction of the Tamil nation (Hero’s Day Speech, 
November 1997). 
  
The references to genocide are fairly stable over time, with a slight peak in November 2001.  
The peaks in the human rights and genocide language in 2001 coincide with the 
negotiations for the ceasefire agreement, which had begun under the auspices of the Norwegian 
government in 2000. The ceasefire agreement was signed in 2002.  
The LTTE also never mention the norm of humanitarian intervention—they were not 
interested in promoting any massive outside military intervention and preferred to keep the 
conflict, albeit supported by outside sources such as the large Tamil diaspora, strictly between 
the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government forces. The deployment of the Indian peace-keeping 
force following the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in July 1987 led to major military engagement with 
the LTTE and left the group wanting to have little to do with outside military forces. 
The references to terror are small in number until 2001 when a dramatic shift occurs: 
Prabhakaran mentions it 26 times. In 2001 the LTTE began a massive effort to refute their being 
labeled a terrorist organization and even seemed to question the definition of what a terrorist 




freedom fighter (which was considered legitimate by the LTTE) and terrorist (which was not).  
At the same time, Prabhakaran appears to be insisting on a broader definition of terrorism to 
include state violence.   
Our struggle has a concrete, legitimate political objective….We are freedom fighters. The 
Sinhala state terrorists, who have failed in their efforts to crush our freedom movement 
for the last two decades, branded our liberation struggle as terrorism (Hero’s Day Speech, 
November 2001). 
 
3.4 Conclusions  
Both the KLA and the LTTE show significant variation in their talk of international 
norms, and their patterns of discourse can offer some support for the expectations derived from 
the overview of international norm change at the international level.  Both groups show increases 
in human rights language, although only the KLA pairs this increase with an increase in 
humanitarian law language and discussion of the protection of civilians.  Both groups show an 
increase in 1998, at a time when human rights and international humanitarian law issues were 
much discussed at the state level, and when international events such as the creation of the ICC 
in July 1998 and the increase of the jurisdiction of the ICTY over Kosovo were highlighting the 
importance of those norms for non-state actors. With the changes in the discourse on terror, the 
LTTE offers a clear example of how a sudden shift in a norm at the international level can be 
immediately reflected at the non-state level.  However, because the discourse is so particular to 
each group’s immediate environment and their goals, more in-depth analysis of the shift in the 
norms in each case is required (and will be conducted in subsequent chapters).  
Combining the two cases, it would appear as if the pressure from external forces to adopt 
human rights language may have been particularly effective in the latter half of the 1990s. Both 
groups show significant increases in the use of human rights language from 1998 onwards, 




Usage of these norms also increased at times when international involvement was imminent or 
present and the legitimacy of the group was in need of a boost.  For both the KLA and the LTTE, 
their use of international norms in discourse changed during periods of negotiation with outside 
actors. In Kosovo, the fall of 1998 saw intensive negotiations with outside actors for a cease-fire. 
During this period, and again in the early days of 1999 with the run-up to Rambouillet, the KLA 
was striving to appear to be legitimate to outside actors. To do so, it began adopting language 
and discourse familiar to these actors and to frame its struggle in terms which would resonate 
with them in order to bolster its claims. For the LTTE, the peace-talks led by the Norwegians in 
2002 provided an opportunity to appear as a legitimate and reasonable opponent for the Sri 
Lankan government. With the LTTE’s practice of using terror tactics and the delegitimation of 
such tactics in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, the LTTE would have been searching for 
a discourse to shape international opinion.  Finally, the sudden appearance and substantive 
discussion of the meaning of terror in the discourse in 2001 indicates that armed groups are 
aware of changes in the international environment and the use of international norms and do 
respond very quickly to changes in these.  
The analysis of the effect of the changes of structure on the use of international norms in 
the discourse of the KLA indicates that the increase in the hierarchy allowed for specialization of 
certain roles within the KLA which was accompanied by increased knowledge of international 
norms. The increased specialization acted as a prerequisite for the KLA’s reliable use of 
international norms from June 1998 onwards. 
Overall, the patterns in the changes in the discourse of these groups show them acting 
strategically and adopting international norms such as human rights, IHL, and genocide at 




adopted once the possibility of an intervention looks like it might become a reality. One norm 
does not follow that pattern, the norm against the use of terror. This norm appears to lose 
salience and relative importance over the course of the conflict for the KLA, and not to  feature 
in the LTTE’s discourse until the sea-change in the international response to terrorism in 2001. 
The following two chapters turn to an in-depth examination of human rights and IHL 






Chapter 4: Human rights and international humanitarian law: 
Evidence of incorporation of norms into the discourse of rebel 
groups 
This chapter analyzes the discourse of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) with particular focus on the changes in the use over 
time of two international norms: human rights norms and international humanitarian law norms. 
The chapter provides evidence to answer two overarching questions: why do armed groups adopt 
these norms, and why are certain norms more likely than others to be adopted?   
This chapter examines the micro-patterns in the variations of the usage of the two norms 
and finds that day to day or week to week fluctuations in the usage of these are tied to local 
events. The findings also point to variation in the local normative environment as a likely reason 
why some norms, such as the protection of civilians, appear to be adopted into the discourse with 
greater frequency in some conflicts than others.  
In order to provide context for the subsequent analysis, this chapter begins with a brief 
overview of the two bodies of law, human rights and humanitarian law, as well as the obligations 
armed resistance groups have under each. The subsequent analysis focuses on three areas: first, 
the change of discourse over time; second, evidence demonstrating the knowledge and use of 
conventions in the discourse by the rebel groups; and, third, the frequency of the mention of 
specific human rights violations, such as torture or the right to life, as well as specific areas of 




4.1 Human rights law and international humanitarian law during conflict 
This chapter focuses mainly on two sets of international norms: human rights norms and 
international humanitarian law norms. Human rights norms are frequently cited during times of 
conflict, because during periods of conflict rates of human rights violations tend to be higher 
than during times of peace. They may also be cited to draw international attention to the behavior 
of the parties, or to frame the conflict in human rights terms. Humanitarian law, which only 
comes into effect during times of conflict, provides the framework for the behavior of the parties 
in the conflict.  Both bodies of law are cited during times of conflict by international 
organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), and states external to the conflict, particularly 
when there are high numbers of civilian deaths during the conflict. 
These two bodies of law are quite distinct, with very different historical and philosophical 
foundations. Human rights law, as defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) and related treaties, outlines the basic rights each human being possesses with respect 
to their state. International humanitarian law provides the rules that regulate conduct during 
times of war, including the treatment of civilians during war.  
The distinction between the two bodies of law is very clear during times of peace. 
However, there are ongoing discussions and differences of opinion among jurists and courts 
about which body of law to apply during times of conflict. If human rights law applies at all 
times (which some states dispute), then which law should take precedence during times of 
conflict? This is a particularly thorny issue when non-combatants are killed during conflict. 
Under human rights law, no individual should lose his or her life, while under humanitarian law 
civilian deaths should merely be minimized. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its 




the body of law with the most conflict-specific approach (i.e., humanitarian law) should take 
precedence. However, it complicated the matter with its 2004 ruling on the Wall in Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, which articulated three separate options for the relationship between 
human rights law and humanitarian law, stating that some rights are matters of international 
humanitarian law; some are exclusively matters of human rights law; and some fall under both 
branches of the law, without specifying which rights fall under which body of law, or in which 
contexts (Tomuschat 2010). 
Further, two states, the United States and Israel, have long maintained that human rights 
law does not apply in times of war (Hampson 2008). However, despite long-standing objections 
from both of these states, most states have accepted the ICJ position that human rights law and 
humanitarian law can exist concurrently.  
 In addition to the complicated judicial interpretation of which body of law takes 
precedence, there is increasingly an apparent blurring between these two bodies of law by parties 
involved in the conflict (as subsequent parts of this chapter will show), non-government 
watchdogs monitoring the conflict, such as Human Rights Watch (HRW), journalists covering 
the conflict, and, at times, international organizations and state actors.  The blurring may take 
place for strategic reasons, for example, because  enforcement mechanisms are stronger for 
international humanitarian law than human rights law, or because these two branches of law 
appear to be converging in certain areas, or, finally, because the parties involved may be unsure 




Armed resistance groups and their obligations under human rights and international 
humanitarian law 
The obligations for armed resistance groups under human rights law and international 
humanitarian law are significantly different.  
Armed opposition groups are not party to human rights conventions or treaties, which are 
signed by states and primarily designed to protect individuals from the state. However, these 
groups are frequently significant human rights abusers.
109
 This makes their growing use of 
human rights language in framing their struggles puzzling. Highlighting the state’s violations of 
human rights law can serve several strategic purposes. It provides a way to explain their 
motivations and denigrate the state they are fighting by using language familiar to domestic and 
international audiences. Also, by invoking human rights, they can trigger mechanisms already in 
place to sanction states engaging in that behavior.  However, this strategy also carries risks. By 
framing the struggle in human rights terms, groups also draw attention to their own (often poor) 
human rights records, which in light of the framing, can potentially undermine their legitimacy. 
To complicate matters further, towards the end of the 1990s, UN bodies, notably the Security 
Council, began to call upon all parties to conflicts to respect both humanitarian law and human 




Turning to international humanitarian law, traditionally, international law laid out the 
rules for engagement between states and was applied only to insurgents, a subset of armed non-
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state actors in times of conflict. Insurgents were rebels recognized by one or more states once 
they had proved they controlled territory and demonstrated that the conflict was of some degree 
of intensity and duration, excluding, for example, riots and sporadic violence (Cassese 2005). 
Today, armed non-state groups no longer have to be recognized by other states. Instead, the 
conflict itself must reach a certain level for humanitarian law to apply.
111
 Once that condition is 
fulfilled, humanitarian law applies to non-state armed resistance groups, whether labeled as 
rebels, insurgents, or separatist movements. These groups have rights and obligations under 
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Additional Protocol II of 1977, and 
Article 19 of the Hague Convention on Cultural Property of 1954 (Clapham 2006). Groups may, 
as part of their quest for legitimacy, use humanitarian law language when framing their 
grievances, regardless of their status or the legal designation of the intensity of the conflict. They 
may even use the language before the conflict has reached the level of an “armed conflict not of 
an international character” in order to bolster their case that they are a legitimate armed actor and 
on their way to becoming a state-like actor. This latter status would then garner them the 
protection offered actors under international humanitarian law, such as protection of prisoners. 
However, the states they are fighting resist this, trying to portray the armed group as criminals or 
terrorists, in part to deny the legitimacy the groups crave, and in part to resist opening up the 
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conflict to international law.  Different laws apply to domestic disputes and the last thing most 
states want is a degree of international scrutiny of their domestic matters.  
In sum, armed opposition groups have long-standing reasons to use international 
humanitarian law in their discourse, but much less reason to use human rights language. Both 
sets of norms are used in their discourse, but there is a lingering question of whether the groups 
do so from a firm understanding of the two different bodies of law, or whether there is a basic 
misunderstanding about what rights and obligations each body of law implies.  
4.2 Human rights and humanitarian law norms in the discourse of the armed 
resistance groups 
This section analyzes the use of human rights and humanitarian law norms in the 
discourse of the KLA, the main case, and the LTTE, the secondary case. It first examines the 
change of the discourse over time, connecting these changes to events and apparent changes in 
the groups’ strategies.  Following is an analysis of the level of detailed understanding of both 
norms, examining the references to specific conventions and treaties. This section then concludes 
with an analysis of which human rights norms and which humanitarian law norms are most 
referenced in the groups’ discourse.  
Change of discourse over time: The KLA 
Overall, the pattern of change of the use of human rights and humanitarian law shows an 
increasing use of these norms in the KLA’s discourse, beginning in August 1997. The norms are 
introduced at low levels initially, but swell to make up a significant part of the overall discourse 
by the end of the conflict in June 1999. The analysis links the discourse to local events on the 




The media materials and interviews issued by the KLA evolved over time and broadly 
fall into three different periods: the Underground Period, roughly from June 1995 to September 
1997; the Emergent Period, from October 1997 to October 1998; and, the Mature Period, from 
November 1998 to the end of the war, in June 1999.  Each of these periods is marked by 
differences in the framing of the KLA’s struggle and the way international norms are 
incorporated into their discourse. 
The Underground Period: June 1995 – September 1997 
 
During this early period, the KLA operated as a loosely interconnected web of different 
groups with a limited number of cells throughout rural Kosovo. Within each cell, members were 
well known to each other—often relatives, or long-time friends—and contacts beyond the cell 
were limited to one or two individuals. One estimate put the group’s size at fewer than 150 
members towards the end of 1997 (Bardhyl Mahmuti, a senior KLA member quoted in Judah 
2000). To protect the identity of the individuals involved in the KLA, the wider population of 
Kosovo and political elites knew very little about the KLA.   
Kosovar politicians in the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) remained skeptical that 
the KLA was an Albanian organization, rather than an elaborate cover by Serbian intelligence to 
increase repression in the region. 
We are not clear on what is happening, and we do not have data on the attacks on the 
Serbian police stations, and thus cannot give a conclusion as to who is behind them, and 
what their reasons might be. The truth is that such events are used to exercise extended 
reprisals against the innocent population (Hidajet Hysent, Deputy Leader of the LDK, 
Koha Jone, August 6, 1996). 
 
Comparing early KLA documents with documents from other local groups established in 
Kosovo at or before the same time provides context for the discourse adopted by the KLA. Other 




(primarily self-determination, but also human rights language) in their discourse as early as 
1993, indicating that the language of human rights was in use in Kosovo by non-state actors prior 
to the significant increase visible in the language of the KLA.  For example, the LPK, a precursor 
of the KLA, and, for a brief time, the self-proclaimed political arm of the KLA, framed its 
political agenda in terms drawn explicitly from international norms.  In September 1993, its 
published political program stated: 
Initiated by the legitimate right of every population for freedom, independence, and self-
determination, it is an undeniable right and a need for the Albanian population to fight 
with all means and forms for liberation with respect to international norms (“Program of 
the LPK,” Zeri I Kosoves, September 15, 1993).   
 
Paragraph I of the program further clarifies: “the right of self-determination is a universal right 
and one of the key principles of the UN, Helsinki, and Paris Charters” (Zeri I Kosoves, 
September 15, 1993). 
The program goes on to voice support for whatever means might be necessary to achieve 
their stated goals of self-determination, independence, full human rights, and democracy, 
including armed resistance (although the latter is condemned by the UN, Helsinki, and Paris 
Charters). This program does show that the members of the LPK were attempting (however 
imperfectly) to connect their struggle with international norms and frame the struggle in a way 
that might resonate beyond the borders of Kosovo.  
In contrast with the LPK published program, the first press releases from the KLA are 
much simpler, with more modest goals. The connection to international norms is virtually non-
existent.  The press releases (called “communiqués”) were written by KLA members within 




and other potentially interested parties.
112
 The first publicly distributed communiqués appear to 
have had three goals, broadly defined as: first, establishing the presence of the KLA, by taking 
responsibility for attacks on police stations or other symbolic targets; second, cautioning against 
potential leaks to the Serbian secret service, by announcing murders of alleged collaborators; and 
third, reaching beyond the borders of Kosovo to engage a wider audience on the struggle within 
Kosovo.  
The first communiqué, issued in June 1995, claims responsibility for several attacks and 
announces the presence of a central command, suggesting that the KLA was more than a group 
of isolated individuals attacking vulnerable symbols of Serbian authority: “During the last two 
months, the central command has commanded armed units for military actions, which were 
executed according to plan. In April, the Serbian police station of Irzniq village was attacked” 
(Communiqué 13, June 1995). Chillingly, the early press releases also detail the murders of 





 of July, our guerrilla units carried out two assassinations. The first was of a 
collaborator with the Serbian regime, Shukri Krasniqi from Ostozubi, and the second was in 
Podujeva, the criminal policeman Sredoje Radojeviq” (Communiqué 21, July 14, 1996). 
The communiqués make regular references to these types of attacks on civilians, most 
frequently referred to as collaborators or criminals. This language is used 33 times between June 
1995 and September 1998, at which point these references cease. References to the murder of 
civilians went on to be used in the trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), in the Hague, as evidence of war crimes committed by KLA members.
113
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Missing from these early documents is any reference to, or understanding of, 
international norms of either human rights or humanitarian law.  Looking at these communiqués 
from this perspective, not only is the KLA not using human rights language or referencing 
humanitarian law to bolster their case during this period, they are doing the exact opposite: 
taking responsibility for events which are human rights abuses, or, as the prosecutors at the 
ICTY allege, war crimes.
114
   
The strategic advantage gained from dissuading potential collaboration with the Serbian 
secret police (SDB) would seem to outweigh the negative perception of the organization 
appearing to be a human rights abuser or humanitarian law violator. It also suggests a simple 
failure to see the norms as relevant to their struggle.  
In addition, unlike the LPK program, references to long-term goals, such as independence 
or democracy, are rare. Indeed, democracy is not mentioned as a goal until September 1998.
115
 
Rather than references to self-determination, independence, or secession, the framing of the 
struggle is stated more in terms of anti-colonialism, or as being against an invasion of their land: 
“We want to let all the friends and enemies of our people know that we will continue our armed 
war until we force our invaders to surrender from our lands” (Communiqué 20, June 27, 1996). 
Another example from 1996 states:  “We would like to state clearly to the current Serbian 
political leadership that they must withdraw from our territories as soon as possible or our 
attacks to liberate the country will be fierce and merciless” (Communiqué 22, August 10, 1996). 
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The Emergent Period: October 1997 – September 1998 
The KLA began to emerge from the shadows in this period, making itself more known to 
the public in Kosovo and the world at large. This is also the period during which the KLA 
experienced a great deal of growth in its numbers and a reshaping and consolidation of its 
internal structure, taking on more features of a centralized fighting force. This development also 
had an impact on the shaping of its image and how the KLA cause was framed.  In June 1998, 
the KLA appointed its first official media spokesman, Jakup Krasniqi. The following month the 
KLA appointed Bardhyl Mahmuti in Switzerland to represent the KLA outside of Kosovo. 
Mahmuti appointed representatives in Germany, England, and the United States. In August 1998, 
Adem Demaci, the leading political activist in Kosovo, was also appointed to a prominent role, 
as political spokesman, based in Pristina.  
In terms of discourse, the period is marked by the beginnings of the use of international 
norms in the public discourse. Both human rights norms and humanitarian law norms begin to be 
included in press releases, speeches, and political declarations. There are 17 mentions of human 
rights violations during this period, compared with two during the previous Underground Period, 
and 18 mentions of humanitarian law or humanitarian law violations, compared to none in the 
Underground Period. In particular, this period sees the emergence of an important theme in the 
presentation of the KLA: the idea that the KLA does not attack civilians (barring, of course, the 
two previously mentioned categories of possible collaborators and those deemed to be 
criminals). This view of the KLA was set in contrast to the actions of the Serbian police and, 
later, the military and paramilitary groups, who were portrayed as attacking civilians as part of 
their counter-insurgency campaign.  This presentation of the KLA became the core of its 




our army units, the occupiers are taking revenge with violence and unprecedented terror against 
the unprotected and unarmed civilian population. With these barbaric acts, Serbia is breaking the 
international laws of war” (Communiqué 37, October 23, 1997). And see also the press release of 
March 12, 1998, which outlines the behavior by the KLA: “Through our actions to date, the 
KLA has demonstrated that this army excludes any form of violence and terror towards an 
innocent population. We assure everyone that we will not step back from this principle” 
(Communiqué 44, March 12, 1998). 
A turning point in the public perception of the KLA, as an organization, was the funeral 
of a teacher, Halit Gecaj, on November 28, 1997.  It was the first public event where KLA 
members appeared in uniform. Falling as it did on Albania’s Day of Independence, the funeral 
took on a mythical quality and drew a spontaneous attendance of thousands of mourners, many 
of whom evaded road blocks to attend. Rame Buja, the KLA Chief of the Board for Public 
Relationships and Civil Administration in 1998 and 1999, said of the funeral: 
This big, massive funeral was something that had not been seen before then […] There 
was no organization to get people to attend. They just came. Another thing that was 
strange for our tradition—people applauded. This was a break with our tradition. During 
this funeral, something emerged that was historical. And mobilization spread rapidly over 




Three KLA members, Daut Haradinaj, Rexhep Selimi, and Muje Krasniqi, made the first 
public statement by the KLA to the gathered mourners. The speech given by Rexhep Selimi, who 
played a central role in the establishment of the KLA along with Hashim Thaçi, and later was the 
KLA’s Chief of Staff, paints a much more personal and vivid picture of the KLA’s struggle than 
previously seen in KLA documents.  
The Albanian people in their territories here in enslaved Kosovo have shouldered the 
oppression and the burden of inhuman violence of the Serbian invaders for decades. Our 
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best sons and daughters of our unprotected people have been killed, imprisoned, 
massacred… [The Serbian invader] has killed children, youth, teachers in schools, and 
farmers in their fields (Elshani 2003). 
 
According to members of the KLA, the combination of finally seeing members of the 
KLA in uniform at a public event and the content of the speech was the beginning of the swing 
towards the KLA in terms of public sentiment.
117
  This was not an unplanned appearance, but 
was likely part of the beginnings of the campaign to make the KLA better known to the Kosovar 
public at large: “Our public appearance at the burial of our beloved school teacher, Halit Gecaj, 
on 28
th
 of November was not a chance appearance, but rather an appeal to all those who 
genuinely wish to commit themselves to the liberation of Kosovo” (Communiqué 40, December 
5, 1997). 
The Mature Period: October 1998 – June 1999 
 
The Mature Period was marked by a large increase in the amount of press the KLA was 
able to generate, through local newspapers, which were increasingly willing to interview 
members of the KLA following their appearance at the Gecaj funeral, and through their own 
media outlets. The KLA’s use of references to international norms increased significantly during 
this period, both in real terms (the total number of references) and in terms of the saturation of 
media events (the percentage of all discourse at the time).  This period saw the implementation 
of a ceasefire negotiated between Holbrooke and Milosevic on October 16, 1998, which was 
monitored by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Kosovo 
Verification Mission (KVM). It also included international efforts to broker a peace deal 
culminating with the Rambouillet talks between February 6 and March 18, and finally, NATO’s 
intervention, beginning with the bombing campaign on March 24, 1999. 
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The goal of the discourse during this period appears to be to further discredit the Serbian 
regime by increasing the critique of the actions of Serbian troops and the police force, using 
humanitarian law and human rights language to do so.  Mentions of the behavior of the Serbian 
troops are frequently contrasted unfavorably with the behavior of the KLA troops. A second goal 
appears to be to portray the KLA in more professional terms and to present the group as a 
legitimate fighting force. There is an increase in the use of specific humanitarian law references 
particularly with regards to treatment of prisoners. A third goal appears to be to present the KLA 
as a group with a political vision of the future. This period also saw a substantial increase in the 
number of references to humanitarian intervention. 
The heightened efforts to de-legitimize the Serbian regime make use of both international 
humanitarian law and human rights law. The regime itself (or the state) is portrayed as violating 
human rights law by denying its citizens the right to life, while in other instances Serbian forces 
are portrayed as harming civilian populations (a violation of humanitarian law).  For example, in 
the two quotes below the first uses human rights language, while the second references 
humanitarian law, with an emphasis on Serbian forces:  
There is no end to the state terrorism and systematic repression of the Belgrade regime in 
Kosovo. The murder of children who are the future of every people and society shows 
that the Serbian regime wants to kill the future of the Albanians in Kosovo. The 
execution of dozens of Albanians, including women, children and the elderly, shows 
clearly that the Serbian regime and state have launched themselves into classic fascism 
(Communiqué 69/70, January 16, 1999).  
 
And: 
The complete Serbian defeat in the Llap region has led the Serbian occupation forces to 
take revenge on the Albanian civilian population, women and children, and to threaten 






The frequency of press releases and interviews allows us to see to what extent the human 
rights and international humanitarian law language during this period is attached to events at the 
local level.  The chart below (Chart 4.1: Weekly human rights and international humanitarian 
law references during the KLA’s Mature Period, October 1998 – June 1999) shows, on a week-
by-week basis, the number of human rights and international humanitarian law language in the 
media items during the Mature Period. From Chart 4.1, it can be seen that references to human 
rights and humanitarian law norms fluctuate closely together, although the peaks of human rights 

























Chart 4.1: Weekly human rights and international humantiaran law 
references during the KLA's Mature Period, October 1998 - June 1999 





Source: Data were extracted from the KLA documents listed in Appendix 2. The documents were coded for the use of the international norms by 





It appears that there is a close connection between events and the use of both sets of 
discourse. For example, the jump in human rights language between November 12 and 18, 1998 
was in response to attacks by Serbian forces on two Albanian villages, Negroc and Decan.  
The KLA General Staff asks the international community, the Red Cross and the OSCE 
observers to oblige the fascist regime of Belgrade not to abuse our self-restraint or to 
allow their own insignia and cars to be used to enter Albanian villages to kill and 
massacre people, as happened in Negroc, near Gllogoc and Decan, near Malisheve. 




The jump between January 14 and February 17 is in response to the massacre in Recak, 
on January 15, 1999.
119
 The news of the massacre prompted numerous press releases and 
interviews by the KLA. Between January 14 and 17, human rights language is used 24 times, and 
international humanitarian law is referenced four times, in both press releases and in radio 
broadcasts. Most mention the massacre and the loss of life in Recak. For example, the KLA 
office in Pristina issued a statement on January 17: “In the Neredima Operative Zone the Serbian 
criminal regime and their forces killed, massacred, and barbarically executed at least 46 
Albanians aged between 12 and 80 years old” (Memo from the Office of the Political 
Representative of the KLA, January 17, 1999). 
The massacre was internationally significant, as the bodies were witnessed by the head of 
the OSCE KVM mission, William Walker, who denounced what he saw as a crime against 
humanity.
120
  While there is some dispute over exactly what happened at Recak, due to 
differences among the accounts of eye-witnesses, the Serbian Interior Ministry, and the KLA, the 
press attention to the massacre and the words of Walker helped drive international sentiment 
towards intervention.  Following the news of the massacre, autopsies were conducted on the dead 
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by two teams: a joint Yugoslav-Belarus team of pathologists and a forensic Finnish team of sent 
by the European Union (EU). The Serbian account was that the dead were all members of the 
KLA, while Walker and the KLA maintained that the dead were civilians. The  Finnish team of 
forensic pathologists carried out an autopsy on 40 of the 45 bodies (some with the assistance of 
the Yugoslav and Belarus forensic experts, and their findings were published in 2001. The 
findings detail causes of death, but not the manner in which they occurred, adding to the 
confusion of what happened in Recak. The forensic report refuted the claims that the corpses had 
been mutilated (Rainio, Lalu, and Penttila 2001).
121
   
The spike between March 25 and 31 covers the first week of the NATO bombing 
campaign, which was accompanied by an assault in Kosovo by Serbian forces. The final peak 
also corresponds with an increase in violence by Serbian forces. The gap between April 1
 
and 7 
follows the bombing of the KLA-supported radio station’s premises by Serbian forces. After 
April 7, all the broadcasts were sent from mountain tops or bunkers since the radio station staff 
were forced to be on the move.  
The final goal of this period appeared to be paving the way for the KLA to assume a 
leadership role in post-conflict Kosovo. The search for legitimacy was critical during this period 
as the KLA leadership began to position themselves as players in a post-conflict setting.  In the 
final months of the war, the KLA political wing was planning how to govern Kosovo after the 
war. Within weeks of the end of the war, Hashim Thaçi announced the formation of a new 
political party, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), appointed ministers to positions, and 
established an interim government (Perritt 2008: 153).  
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Congruence of human rights and international humanitarian law with local culture in Kosovo  
 From the early 1990s, Kosovo Albanians had been withdrawing from participation within 
the official state institutions in the areas of education, health, and justice, and turning to more 
traditional modes of interaction (Krasniqi 2009 and Clark 2000). In the area of justice, one 
alternative was to turn to traditional ways to solve disputes, using traditional laws and 
mechanisms. In Kosovo, these traditional laws, known locally as the Kanun of Leke Dukagjini, 
provided a framework which had governed the lives of Albanians for centuries.
122
  With regard 
to the international norms in question, human rights and international humanitarian law, in 
particular where these two bodies of law intersect during times of conflict, the laws of the Kanun 
similarly provide some guidance as to which kinds of people may be attacked during violent 
conflict. The Kanun prohibits taking the lives of children, women and the elderly in violent 
confrontations between families (known as blood feuds) and these prohibitions demonstrate 
congruence with international norms, particularly the protection of civilians during conflict. It is 
notable that the mentions of deaths in the KLA press releases frequently specify that the civilians 
killed were women, children, and the elderly. 
 This congruence of the local norms with the international norms made it more likely that 
the KLA would begin using human rights language and international humanitarian law language 
as it pertained to the protection of civilians in their discourse. The congruence is also reflected in 
how members of the KLA described how they felt about their struggle. For example, Rexhep 
Selimi, one of the founding members of the KLA, said he was very proud to belong to a group 
that did not kill children. He also thought that while the soldiers had justification for revenge, as 
many had lost families, their revenge would not be taken out on civilians. He said:  “I am 
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Unusually, he had an opportunity to voice these beliefs with other rebel groups:  
After the war, I was invited to attend a conference given by the Geneva Academy for 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, along with a number of leaders from other rebel 
groups. I was invited to speak about my experience with the KLA. In the break, two 
Tamil soldiers asked me what our secret of success was. I asked them “Do you kill 
civilians? Do you kill women and children?” When they said “Yes,” (a little 




Another group in Kosovo that pursued violent resistance against the Serbian state was the 
National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (LKCK). The LKCK joined forces with the 
KLA in 1998, but prior to their merger, had a similar approach to violence against civilians. 
Valon Murati, a member of the LKCK, and later the KLA said: “A liberation organization should 
not target civilians—this attitude prevailed wherever the LKCK was strong.” Murati argued that 
targeting civilians and using terrorist tactics never achieved results, and did not end in victory. 
“We had nothing against the Serb population—they are equally manipulated by the state.”
125
 It is 
notable that both groups pursing violence in Kosovo at the same time had the same approach to 
violence against civilians. This provides another possible link to the congruence of local norms 
with international ones.  
It should be noted, however, that if asked directly from where the basis of this norm came 
from, it was difficult for the soldiers to pinpoint a source. Selimi said that he believed that the 
idea was not something that came upon them spontaneously, but “maybe, it was something 
spiritual.”
126
  Albin Kurti, who worked with Adem Demaci when the latter was the political 
spokesman for the KLA, said: “The main reason why the KLA wouldn’t attack civilians was 
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 Interview with Valon Murati, Pristina, Kosovo, October 2010.  
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their character, formed by history.”
127
 And Murati listed among his sources of inspiration Frantz 
Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth.  
Change of discourse over time: The LTTE from 1993 – 2007 
Similar to the KLA, one can argue that the LTTE also went through an Underground 
Period, an Emergent Period, and a Mature Period. The Underground Period lasted from the 
group’s founding until 1983. Activities during this Underground Period were limited to the 
establishment of a strong network, fundraising (at times through robberies), and attacks on 
policemen and civilians thought not to be supportive of the LTTE. In many ways the 
Underground Periods for both the KLA and the LTTE were similar. This Underground Period 
came to an end with an ambush of Sri Lankan soldiers in July 1983, when the LTTE emerged 
from the shadows and began the so-called First Eelam War.  The second period, or the Emergent 
Period, extends from 1983 with this first major attack until 1999, when the conflict transitioned 
from a guerrilla war to a more traditional conflict, with set-piece battles, and both sides entering 
battles with thousands of combatants and heavy weaponry. The Mature Period lasted from 2000 
until the end of the war in 2009, when the LTTE suffered comprehensive defeat. The period 
under consideration is from 1993 until 2007, which are the years from which the texts of the 
Annual Hero’s Day speech by Prabhakaran are available publicly. Therefore, only half of the 
Emergent Period can be analyzed, and none of the Underground Period.  
The Emergent Period: June 1993 – 1999 
During this period, the LTTE was fully established as a fighting force and had taken on 
the Sri Lankan army in numerous offensives. The years between 1987 and 1990 also saw 
fighting in the Northeast area of Sri Lanka between the LTTE and the Indian army, which 
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deployed a peacekeeping force to the island.  During these years, the LTTE also demonstrated 
their reach beyond their territory with two high profile assassinations of heads of state:  former 
Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 
1993. On the governance front, the LTTE had begun establishing a civil administration in the 
territory it controlled. In 1994, a third round of peace talks between the LTTE and the 
government was initiated, but, like the first two rounds in 1985 and 1989/1990, it ended in 
failure. The Third Eelam War was launched in 1995.   
The speeches in 1993 and 1994 are focused primarily on presenting the cause of the 
LTTE as a fight for freedom, or a war of liberation. There are no mentions of human rights or 
international humanitarian law in these speeches. Prabhakaran does talk about the deaths of 
LTTE fighters, and celebrates these deaths, but does not frame this loss of life as a violation of 
human rights: “Our heroes have sacrificed their lives for a just cause. Their demise does not 
constitute an ordinary event of death. Rather, their death signifies a profound spiritual aspiration 
for national freedom” (Hero’s Day Speech, November 1993). 
In 1995, the peace talks with the Kumaratunga government collapsed, and the Sri Lankan 
army made a significant push into LTTE territory. By December of that year, they had captured 
the LTTE stronghold of Jaffna. The heavy toll on civilians is referred to in the speech, which 
invokes the norms of international humanitarian law:  “This war is not, as the government 
claims, against the LTTE. This war is against the Tamil people, against the Tamil nation. […] 
The strategic objective of this war is to annihilate the national identity of the Tamils by 





Prabhakaran also points to the LTTE’s good treatment of prisoners of war: “To promote 
the peace process, we released the prisoners of war as a gesture of goodwill” (Hero’s Day 
Speech, November 1995). 
Starting in 1996, there are mentions of human rights violations for the first time. These 
continue over the next few years with growing intensity, reaching a peak in 1998. These years 
were also years of heavy fighting. However, not all the human rights references are to violations 
of the right to life, which may indicate a broader interest in using human rights language at this 
time beyond just mentioning losses due to the intensity of fighting. At same time, however, there 
does not appear to be a matching increase in references to international humanitarian law.  
In 1996, the speech highlights the Sri Lankan government’s use of torture, arbitrary arrest 
and detention, and violation of the right to life, and makes claims that the government was 
pursuing a genocidal policy: “The incidents of arrests, detention, torture, rape, murder, 
disappearances and the discovery of the disappeared in mass graves reveal that a covert 
genocidal policy is practiced in the army controlled areas” (Hero’s Day Speech, November 
1996).  
In 1997, the human rights violations mentioned are of a different category—economic, 
social, and cultural—in addition to the core human rights violations: 
The planned annexation of the traditional lands of the Tamils, the denial of their 
linguistic rights, the deprivation of their educational and employment opportunities, the 
disruption of their social and economic existence, the destruction of their natural 
resources and the mass extermination of the Tamils during riots and military campaigns 
indicate a genocidal policy (Hero’s Day Speech, November 1997).  
 
In 1998, human rights become a significant part of the speech, with 11 separate mentions 




rights situation in Sri Lanka, pointing out that human rights atrocities in other parts of the world 
get far more attention.  
Atrocities and injustices committed against the Tamil people for the last several decades 
have been well-documented and submitted to international forums. […] The civilized 
world has always given primacy to the universal value of human rights and freedoms. 
What dismays us is that the countries which lead the civilized world are reluctant to raise 
their voices against the uncivilized forms of oppression unleashed against the Tamils. 
[…] One day the truths that are buried deeply in the mass graves of Tamil Eelam will 
emerge from slumber and reveal the true face of Sinhala chauvinism (Hero’s Day Speech, 
November 1998).  
 
In 1999 Prabhakaran offers a human rights rationale for the goals of the LTTE: “The anti-
Tamil racist political system—which totally disregards human rights and liberties—offers no 
alternatives to the Tamils other than to fight, secede, and establish an independent Tamil state” 
(Hero’s Day Speech, November 1999). 
At no point in these speeches are there any references to human rights abuses or international 
humanitarian law norm violations committed by the LTTE, despite attacks on civilians during 
this time in bombings in Colombo and massacres in villages. The LTTE is not trying to explain 
or justify their own violations—they simply make no mention of them. The increase in the use of 
the human rights language towards the end of this period does not appear to be directly 
connected to events on the ground. For example, there are no specific mentions of attacks in 
particular areas or on particular days. This may be a function of the nature of the speech, which 
is more of an annual summary of where the LTTE stands, rather than an indication that the 
human rights language is adopted for another reason. However, the efforts in 1998 and 1999 to 
draw the attention of outside actors to the human rights situation of the Tamils by referencing 
human rights violations in other countries would indicate that these references are strategic, and 





The Mature Period: 2000 – 2009  
 During this period, the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka agreed to a ceasefire and 
engaged in peace negotiations mediated by Norwegian intermediaries between 2000 and 2003. 
However, the inflow of international aid following the tsunami altered the delicate balance 
between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE and, over time, both parties resumed 
fighting.  The Sri Lankan government defeated the LTTE forces in May 2009.  
The use of human rights language varied considerably during this period. There were no 
references at all in some years, while there were peaks at the beginning of the period in 2001 
(eight mentions a year) and towards the end in 2007 with 16 mentions.  Use of international 
humanitarian law norms are overall much lower, not rising above three mentions in any one year. 
The year 2000 was a year of significant fighting, and yet, there were few mentions of 
human rights and humanitarian law norms in the annual November speech. Already in 
negotiations mediated by the Norwegian government, Prabhakaran in this speech positions the 
LTTE as a legitimate actor, seeking liberation from an occupation of alien forces. The one 
mention of international humanitarian law paints the LTTE as abiding by these norms, and  
therefore as a legitimate actor, while the Sri Lankan government portrays the LTTE as an 
illegitimate terrorist organization. “Tamil Eelam war is conducted within the norms of 
international humanitarian law pertaining to armed conflict. But the Sri Lanka government has 
been deliberately distorting the nature of this war and its evolutionary historical background and 
debasing it as a phenomenon of ‘terrorism’ ” (Hero’s Day Speech, November 2000). 
In 2001, following the September 11 Al Qaeda attacks in New York and Washington 
D.C., most of the speech is devoted to portraying the LTTE as a freedom movement, not a 




the part of the Sri Lankan government alongside this effort to reframe the conflict in Sri Lanka 
away from terrorism: “[The Sri Lankan] government, holding one of the highest records of 
human rights violations amounting to genocide, has now joined the international alliance against 
terrorism” (Hero’s Day Speech, November 2001).  
After this point, human rights language faded from the speeches until another peak in 
2007, when the Sri Lankan government began its two year military engagement to crush the 
LTTE. This is the only period in which the number of references to international humanitarian 
law norms is greater than those to human rights norms. Most of these references are to the 
behavior of the Sri Lankan forces as occupation forces and their behavior towards local civilians.  
In 2007, as the Sri Lankan army began its onslaught, Prabhakaran again used human 
rights language.  
The Sinhala state’s war of genocide destroyed the peaceful life of the Tamils. […] The 
unjust war, the economic blockade, the restrictions on our people’s freedom of 
movement, the killing of thousands, the displacement of hundreds of thousands, have all 
deeply wounded the Tamil psyche. […] The Rajapakse regime, after unilaterally 
abrogating the ceasefire agreement, is ruthlessly implementing its military plan to remove 
the contiguity of the Tamil homeland. It has killed and disappeared thousands of our 
people (Hero’s Day Speech, November 2007). 
 
Another significant theme of this speech was the appeal to outside actors to step in and 
reignite the peace process, coupled with the suggestion that the Sri Lankan government was 
responsible for co-opting the peace process, undermining the efforts of outside organizations.  
The speech also indicates an understanding of international norms at the state level and the 
connection between human rights, outside actors, and outcomes in other countries, including 
Kosovo. For example: 
The world’s powers, even while taking forward their own geo-political interests, respect 
human rights and democratic institutions. That is why nations like East Timor and 
Montenegro broke free of their subjugation and gained their freedom with the help and 




continues to work for the freedom of nations like Kosovo (Hero’s Day Speech, 
November 2007).  
 
Congruence of human rights and international humanitarian law with local culture in northern 
Sri Lanka 
 In contrast with the KLA, the LTTE did not draw on a traditional culture with 
proscriptions for the taking of life. Indeed, there is evidence that the norms within the LTTE 
were focused on the celebration of death—from the adoption of the cyanide capsules, to the 
central role suicide bombing played in the struggle, to the creation of new burial ceremonies (see 
Roberts 2006; Hopgood 2006; and Weiss 2012). The Tamil cause required a high level of 
devotion from its followers, and Tamil areas under the control of the LTTE were asked to 
sacrifice everything for the struggle. There were also significant areas of difference between the 
norms espoused by the LTTE and the international human rights community, one being the use 
of child soldiers. This would indicate that the LTTE would be less likely than the KLA to adopt 
international norms of human rights and protection of civilians into their discourse, or to do so 
less consistently.  
The KLA and the LTTE 
Overall, there are micro-level fluctuations as the discourse of the groups relates to events 
on the ground, particularly visible in the case of the KLA, whose frequency of press releases and 
speeches in the last six months of the conflict in Kosovo allows for a more finely grained week-
by-week analysis. There is also a shift observed in the use of human rights and IHL norms as 
objectives shift over time, showing the adaptive, strategic nature of the use of these norms in the 




Knowledge and use of conventions 
A key indicator of the extent to which a rebel group demonstrates its understanding of 
human rights law and international humanitarian law is the frequency with which specific 
conventions or treaties are mentioned in the discourse. And in addition to being able to frame the 
conflict in terms of the concepts expressed in the human rights or humanitarian law conventions, 
citing them correctly indicates a deeper understanding of the differences.  The absence of 
references to conventions in a group’s discourse, however, does not necessarily indicate the lack 
of knowledge of the conventions. It may indicate simply that the group is not demonstrating its 
knowledge publicly.  
The two groups show a significant difference in this area. The KLA shows a pattern of 
increasing understanding and use of the conventions in their discourse over time, to the point 
where it becomes a noteworthy part of their discourse by the end of the war. The LTTE refer to 
treaties or conventions only three times over the course of the fifteen years under observation. 
The KLA and conventions 
Over the course of the conflict, the KLA made references to conventions and treaties 95 
times. Of these, the vast majority, or 69 (73%), were direct references to international 
humanitarian law, either the Geneva Conventions specifically or to the laws of war in general. 
Only one was a direct reference to a human rights convention. The remaining 25 mentions were 
to unspecified international conventions.  
The chart below (Chart 4.2: KLA use of conventions and treaties in the discourse) shows 
the references over the course of the conflict. Three different types of references to conventions 




specific human rights conventions; and third, references to the international humanitarian law 
treaties, namely the Geneva Conventions, Hague Conventions, or the laws of war.   
The first reference by the KLA to conventions or treaties is not made until October 1997. 
It is a reference to the laws of war. And it is not until October 1998 that we see significant 
numbers of these specific references.  In the first reference, the KLA states: “The occupiers are 
taking revenge with violence and never-before-seen terror against the unprotected and unarmed 
civilian population. With this barbaric action, Serbia is breaking the international laws of war” 
(Communiqué 37, October 23, 1997). 
Human rights activists have suggested that the KLA was aware of human rights 
conventions, for example, one human rights activist at a leading human rights organization in 
Kosovo, Behgjet Shala, said: “most people in the KLA had a basic understanding of human 
rights. In the war they knew there were international instruments which had to be respected.”
128
  
However, from the data in Chart 4.2 it is clear that the KLA only demonstrated their knowledge 
after October 1997, and the demonstration of the knowledge increases significantly over time. 
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Chart 4.2: KLA use of treaties and conventions in the discourse    
Conventions in General Human Rights Conventions IHL Conventions









It is noteworthy that the OSCE KVM, tasked with verifying a cease-fire between the two 
sides, appears on the ground on October 24, 1998. As argued in Chapter 3, this occurs during a 
key turning point when the KLA felt the need to increase their legitimacy with local and outside 
actors. In the month of October 1998, there are significant increases in the use of conventions 
and treaties in the KLA discourse.   
At this point, towards the end of 1998, the KLA was recognized by international actors as 
a legitimate fighting force, and was dealing directly with international actors on the ground on a 
regular basis.  It is likely that the interaction between the OSCE KVM and the troops on the 
ground, and the implications of that interaction (namely, that the KLA was gaining international 
recognition as a legitimate party to a conflict), prompted increased diffusion of the language of 
humanitarian law and highlighted the implications of the recognition of the KLA as a legitimate 
actor. Members of the KVM interacting with the KLA were well-versed in both human rights 
law and international humanitarian law.129  However, as noted by the staff of the mission, the 
KLA rarely exhibited detailed knowledge of human rights in interviews with the member of the 
KVM. The Deputy Director of Human Rights for OSCE/KVM explained:  “Clearly [the KLA] 
felt ‘victimized’ as a collective community and the violent insurgency was a final resort to the 
abuses of the Serbs, however, in my experience they did not use human rights language to either 




One example of a press release from November 1998 mentions conventions in general, 
but demonstrates little detailed knowledge of the conventions: “Self-restraint was announced, not 
because we are under any obligation from an agreement, but out of respect for international 
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conventions and to leave scope for politicians and diplomats to achieve a stable and peaceful 
political settlement in Kosova” (Communiqué 62, November 14, 1998).
131
 
When the KLA references the international humanitarian law conventions, they appear to 
have a good grasp of the conventions, particularly the need to protect civilians during violence. 
Most of their references are in response to attacks by Serbian forces, and the KLA is at pains to 
point out that the Serbian side is violating the laws of war: “Being unable to catch our Army 
units, the occupiers are taking revenge with violence and never-before-seen terror against the 
unprotected and unarmed civilian population. With this barbaric action, Serbia is breaking the 
international laws of war” (Communiqué Number 37, October 23, 1997). 
There are fewer examples of the KLA announcing that their activities abided by the rules 
in the Geneva Conventions as they pertain to the behavior of non-state actors towards civilians 
and prisoners, but these do appear. For example, the KLA notes their activities to help protect 
civilians on 21 occasions.  In August, 1998, they state: “Our strategic withdrawal in order to 
protect the civilian population was successful” (Political Declaration Number 7, August 13, 
1998). 
For the KLA, their image of a group fighting a good, clean fight was of utmost 
consequence. One KLA press officer stated: “The important thing was that the KLA was not a 
terrorist organization. We were fighting a clean war.”
132
 
The increasing sophistication in the use of the conventions of international humanitarian 
law in the discourse of the KLA may be linked to their attempts, over the course of the last year 
of their struggle, to be seen as a legitimate organization with a formal hierarchy which was in 
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contrast to their image as more loosely-linked bands of rural fighters.  The KLA repeatedly 
emphasized their restructuring, which began in June 1998, as an indication of their status as the 
legitimate fighting force of the Albanian Kosovar people. It was also under pressure from outside 
organizations, such as HRW, to adhere to internationally accepted codes of conduct. For 
example, HRW reported meeting with KLA’s Hashim Thaçi and Fatmire Limaj, in November 
1998, to discuss the KLA’s commitment to the laws of war, and, specifically, the treatment of 
Serbian civilians in KLA custody (Human Rights Watch 2001).  In addition, towards the end of 
the conflict, and coinciding with a significant increase in the use of humanitarian law 
conventions in the discourse, the KLA attracted a number of professional soldiers to their ranks, 
including Agim Çeku, who joined the KLA in February 1999, and was made Chief of General 
Staff of the KLA in April of that year.  
In terms of demonstrated knowledge of human rights conventions, there is only one 
reference to a specific human rights convention. In March 1999, there is a reference to the 
Convention to Eliminate Racial Discrimination (Broadcast, Radio Kosova e Lire, March 12, 
1999). The lack of references to human rights conventions is notable, particularly in light of the 
extensive grassroots human rights monitoring activity throughout Kosovo during this period, as 
well as the crossover between some of these local human rights organizations and the KLA. For 
example, the KLA Spokesman from August 1998 until the Rambouillet talks, Adem Demaci, 
was the co-founder of one of the leading human rights organizations in Kosovo from the early 
1990s onwards, Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms of the People of 
Kosovo. 
The final group of 25 references to conventions is broader and reference either 




reference is vague as to which conventions it cites: “In accordance with the known and 
sanctioned norms in the Charter and documents of the UN” (Communiqué 45, March 12, 1998). 
Other references also conflate human rights and international humanitarian law: “The KLA has, 
for a long time, declared that it respects all the war and peace conventions of the international 
community” (Political Declaration number 10, September 27, 1998). 
It is possible that these were intended to reference human rights documents, such as the 
UDHR, but without the concrete citation, it is impossible to determine the level of knowledge of 
the speaker. It is more likely that while the speaker knew conventions existed, he was unable to 
cite the specific convention itself.  
The LTTE and conventions 
In contrast with the KLA, the LTTE mentioned conventions or treaties only a 
handful of times during the period under examination (1993 to 2007). Of those, the most 
frequent reference was not to human rights law or humanitarian law, but to the right of 
self-determination. For example, the one mention of the UN Charter references the right 
of self-determination:  “The objective of our struggle is based on the concept of self-
determination as articulated in the UN Charter and other instruments” (Hero’s Day 
Speech, November 2002). 
On Hero’s Day in 2000, Prabhakaran gives his only reference to international 
humanitarian law in a speech in which he attempts to refute the characterization of the 
LTTE as a terrorist organization, by presenting the group as a group legitimately 
struggling for self-determination:  “As a nation entitled to the right to self-determination, 
our people reserve the right to defend themselves by armed struggle against State 




the norms of international humanitarian law pertaining to armed conflict” (Hero’s Day 
Speech, 2000). 
While it is possible to see a development in the sophistication of the KLA’s use of 
conventions in their speech, this is not the case with the LTTE. This may be for a number 
of reasons. First, that the KLA was interacting with outside actors on a frequent basis 
from October 1998 onwards, and recognized that these outside actors saw the use of 
conventions in discourse as a marker of legitimacy. The LTTE’s interaction with outside 
actors waxed and waned and it may be that there was no consistent pressure to 
incorporate these conventions into the discourse; second, the KLA was undergoing 
structural changes, becoming increasingly hierarchical, which may have led to increases 
in the knowledge base of individuals engaged in public statements. The LTTE did not 
undergo significant changes in its structural hierarchy, and all the speeches were made by 
the same individual. Finally, the normative environment of the KLA demonstrated higher 
levels of congruity with international norms than the LTTE, which may have made the 
KLA more eager to demonstrate their knowledge of the conventions articulating those 
norms.  
Which human rights and humanitarian law norms? 
The discourse can be analyzed by types of references to international humanitarian law 
and human rights law to further parse exactly what the groups were talking about when they use 




The KLA by types of reference 
Turning first to the KLA, the table below (Table 4.3: Humanitarian law norm references, 
by issue) shows the references to different specific norms within international humanitarian law 
from June 1995 until June 1999.  
Table 4.3: Humanitarian law norm references by the KLA, by issue 
Humanitarian law issue Number of references Percentage of total 
Serbs harming civilians 130 45% 
Humanitarian law conventions 69 24% 
KLA harming civilians 42 15% 
Protection of civilians 21 7% 
KLA treatment of prisoners of war 19 7% 
Serbian treatment of prisoners of war 7 2% 
Total Humanitarian law references 288 100% 
Source: Data were extracted from the KLA documents listed in Appendix 2. 
The majority of the references (45%) accuse the Serbs of harming civilians during the 
conflict. By comparison, the references to the KLA abiding by the laws of war comprise only 
14% of the total references (including the two issues of protection of civilians and the treatment 
of prisoners of war by the KLA). Thus, the KLA spent far more energy on depicting the Serbs as 
violators of the Geneva Conventions than they did claiming they were adhering to them. Indeed, 
an additional 42 references (or 15% of the total, approximately the same number of references as 




taking credit for assassinations of Albanian individuals seen as collaborating with the other side, 
or for the death of Serbian policemen, of whom the KLA hoped to make an example.  
As noted above, the amount of attention given to the protection of civilians is relatively 
small, only 7% of the total. This is surprising given the amount of attention paid to the issue of 
Serbs harming civilians.  
Some attention is given to the treatment of prisoners of war. A total of 9% of the 
references are to this issue, with the number of references to how the KLA was treating its 
Serbian POWs being significantly larger than references to how the Serbian army was treating 
KLA POWs. The majority of these references are to one incident of prisoner-taking by the KLA 
in January 1999, when eight Serbian soldiers were taken prisoner, and subsequently released 
after negotiations facilitated by KVM. The KLA emphasized how this incident showed that the 
KLA was a legitimate fighting force, ready to shoulder a political role at the end of the conflict. 
The Albanian people and the KLA more than once have given pragmatic examples that 
they stand for a political solution to Kosovo’s problem. Is there a better example than to 
set free eight soldiers of the most criminal army of Europe? Is there a greater generosity? 
Is there better evidence that the Albanian people and the KLA do not want to take 
people’s lives even when they are soldiers of the invading army? (Political Declaration of 
the KLA, Number 23, January 17, 1999)  
The chart below (Chart 4.3: KLA references to international humanitarian law, by issue) 




Chart 4.3: KLA references to international humanitarian law, by issue  
 
Source: Data were extracted from the KLA documents listed in Appendix 2. 
Turning to human rights categories, the majority of the references to human rights are to 
the right to life, with 131 out of the total 253 references, or 51% of the total, in this category (see 
Table 4.4: Human rights references by the KLA, by issue, and Chart 4.4: KLA references to 























Table 4.4: Human rights references by the KLA, by issue 




Right to Life 131 51% 
Arbitrary arrest and detention 56 22% 
General human rights 42 17% 
Genocide 14 6% 
Torture 5 2% 
Economic, social and cultural 
rights 
4 2% 
Human rights conventions 1 0% 
Total Human rights mentions 253 100% 
Source: Data were extracted from the KLA documents listed in Appendix 2. 
The other large, single category is arbitrary arrest and detention, which received 56 
mentions, or 22% of the total human rights references.  Torture, a powerful human rights norm to 
reference, gets surprisingly little attention, with only five mentions or less than 2% of all 
references.  This is despite accusations that the government of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia tortured individuals in detention, particularly military aged-men, but also boys, 
throughout the conflict (see, for example, Amnesty International 1998; Amnesty International 
1999a). The lack of mentions may be because some victims of torture were not released from 
prisons until after the conflict, while in other cases, those who suffered violence at the hands of 
the Serbian military or police but were not killed were considered somewhat fortunate. The 
smallest category, even smaller than references to economic, social, and cultural rights (four 




Chart 4.4: KLA references to human rights issues as a percentage of total human rights 
references 
 Source: Data were extracted from the KLA documents listed in Appendix 2. 
The prominence of the right to life in the discourse is comparable to the attention paid to 
the Serbian forces harming civilians under humanitarian law. Essentially, these two groups of 
references describe the same types of events, namely the killing of individual Albanian 
Kosovars. They also make up approximately the same proportion of both humanitarian law 
references and human rights references. The right to life and the prohibition against killing 
civilians are the two cores of both bodies of law, and are the most shocking events to which the 
KLA could draw the public’s attention. These areas of the international norms are precisely the 
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area with which the local norms on the prohibition of taking the lives of women, children, and 
the elderly as articulated in the Kanun have the most overlap. 
On the ground, particularly during low level conflict, the distinction between these two 
bodies of law and these two types of events can be hard to make. It may also rely on legal 
technicalities that those involved in the day-to-day aspects of the conflict may not be best able to 
determine, such as whether the overall level of fighting has reached the threshold for conflict at 
which point international humanitarian law applies. In addition, in this conflict, as in others, 
exactly who committed the killing may be difficult to determine, and may alter which body of 
law applies. In the Kosovo conflict, for example, Serbian army troops, police forces, security 
forces under the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP), and loosely integrated paramilitary 
forces all participated in the attacks on civilians, sometimes together. Moreover, they sometimes 
wore different uniforms or switched them, making the determination of whether these where 
combat troops or regular Serbian policemen difficult, unless the participants were known to the 
victims themselves (Human Rights Watch 2001). This determination also has direct bearing on 
which body of law the death of a civilian falls under. For example, the death of a civilian at the 
hands of the military falls under international humanitarian law, while it falls under human rights 
law when at the hands of the police.  
The LTTE by types of reference 
Turning to the LTTE, the table below (Table 4.5: International humanitarian law 
references by the LTTE, by issue) shows a pattern of references similar to that seen earlier with 
the KLA: the majority of references to international humanitarian law are to the harming of 
civilians by the Sri Lankan army. Nearly half of the references (48%) fall in this category. Again, 




reference each to the protection of civilians and to the treatment of prisoners of war by the 
LTTE.  
Table 4.5: International humanitarian law by the LTTE, by issue 
Humanitarian law issue Number of references Percentage of total 
Sri Lankan army harming civilians 12 48% 
Treatment by occupying army 7 28% 
Humanitarian law conventions 4 16% 
Protection of civilians 1 4% 
LTTE treatment of prisoners of war 1 4% 
LTTE harming civilians 0 0% 
Sri Lankan treatment of prisoners of 
war 
0 0% 
Total Humanitarian law references 25 100% 
Source: Data were extracted from the LTTE documents listed in Appendix 4. 
One significant difference between these data and the data from the KLA is that the 
LTTE refer to treatment of civilians by an occupying army seven times, while the KLA never 
once refer to this aspect of international humanitarian law.  The Geneva Conventions apply 
whenever territory comes under the effective control of hostile foreign armed forces and outline 
what the behavior of the occupying troops should be in that case.
133
 The use of this language by 
the LTTE served to express their belief that the north-east territories of Sri Lanka were already a 
separate state and to affirm that the Sri Lankan troops should be considered a foreign occupying 
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army.  An example of this type of reference describes the Sri Lankan military presence in 
northern Sri Lanka as follows: “The military occupation is suffocating the civilian masses and 
causing tensions…The occupying forces are using the civilians as their protective shields” 
(Hero’s Day Speech, 2002). 
In terms of human rights and the LTTE, the following table shows the distribution of 
references by human rights issue (Table 4.6: International human rights references by the LTTE, 
by issue). Three issues are most dominant in the discourse: the right to life (29% of total 
references), genocide (29%), and general references to human rights (26%).  Taken together, 
these three account for 84% of the total references to human rights.  References to the right to 
life, as in the case with the KLA, are to Tamils being killed by the state. The focus on right to life 
by the LTTE is a reflection of the dire human rights situation in Sri Lanka during the course of 
the conflict.  A UN report from December 1998 showed that Sri Lanka led the world in the 
number of disappearances, with 77 in 1997 alone, and over 12,000 registered at that time, many 
of which were later confirmed as deaths.
134
   
 
                                                          
134 
See Report of the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances of 28 
December 1998 (UN Document E/CN.4/1999/62). “Disappearances” are defined in the UN Convention Against 
Torture as “the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by 
persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a 
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared 





Table 4.6: International human rights references by the LTTE, by issue 




Right to Life 19 29% 
Genocide 19 29% 
General human rights 17 26% 
Economic, social and cultural 
rights 
5 8% 
Torture 3 5% 
Arbitrary arrest and detention 2 3% 
Human rights conventions 0 0% 
Total Human rights mentions 65 100% 
Source: Data were extracted from the LTTE documents listed in Appendix 4. 
Frequently, these references are made in conjunction with accusations of genocide 
against the Sri Lankan government.  For example, in 1996, the LTTE accused the Sri 
Lankan government of pursuing a policy of genocide alongside accusations of numerous 
human rights violations, including murder (a right to life violation): “The incidents of 
arrests, detention, torture, rape, murder, disappearances and the discovery of the 
disappeared in mass-graves reveal that a covert genocidal policy is practiced in the army 
controlled areas” (Hero’s Day Speech, November 1996). 
The relative lack of references to torture (5%) is surprising given that torture was 
allegedly one of the most common human rights violations in Sri Lanka during the conflict 




likewise be because torture typically occurs in private settings (within prisons or detention), and 
as a result may be less visible and less known to the public than other human rights violations. 
One human rights issue in Sri Lanka to which Prabhakaran makes no reference in his 
annual speeches is the issue of child soldiers. Children had been actively recruited and used in 
the LTTE battalions since the earliest days of the conflict (Gunaratna 1998). As a result, the 
LTTE was under significant pressure to curb this practice from international groups, such as 
HRW, and from international organizations, such as the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF). The LTTE made repeated public pronouncements about ending recruitment and use 
of child soldiers in May 1998, February 2001, and January 2003.
135
 Finally, a commitment by 
both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, the Action Plan for Children Affected by War, 
was signed in 2003. This agreement was negotiated by UNICEF. It provided for ways for 
children to be released from duty as soldiers (Human Rights Watch 2004).  In the annual 
speeches, no mention is made of child soldiers—an indication that this human rights issue had no 
or little resonance with his intended audience. As demonstrated by the continued use of child 
soldiers up until the end of the conflict in 2008, there was no congruence with this norm and 
local norms. 
To sum up, both the KLA and the LTTE focused on the most extreme form of violations, 
namely deaths of civilians at the hands of the state during the conflicts. References to events 
described by each group can be seen as references to both human rights violations and violations 
of international humanitarian law.  On the whole and with regard to humanitarian law issues, 
both groups focused on showing how the state was violating this body of law, rather than on how 
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they themselves were abiding by the body of law.  Protection of civilians was mentioned 
relatively infrequently by either party, as was the treatment of prisoners of war. After the right to 
life, the other human rights issue frequently mentioned was genocide, particularly by the LTTE, 
who tried to paint the Sri Lankan government as having a genocidal policy towards Tamils in Sri 
Lanka. Two human rights issues, torture and arbitrary arrest and detention, are not appealed to 
very much by either group, despite being well documented during both conflicts.  This may 
indicate a preference by the groups to draw attention to the most shocking and visible types of 
violations. 
4.3 Conclusions 
Overall, it seems that rebel groups are making use of the international norms of human 
rights and international humanitarian law in their discourse. There are similarities in the patterns 
of usage of these norms between the two rebel groups under analysis, as well as significant 
differences.  The similarities include the types of human rights violations and international 
humanitarian law issues cited: in both cases, the groups referred to the loss of human life and the 
death of civilians most frequently.  Another similarity was that human rights references were on 
the whole more prevalent than international humanitarian law references, despite the apparent 
convergence on a common issue—namely the loss of civilian lives.   
In terms of the arc of norms usage for the KLA, there was a lag before the KLA began 
using either human rights norms or international humanitarian law to frame their conflict, but 
once they did, the usage of these international norms increased to become a significant part of 
their discourse. At the beginning of the period under consideration, the Underground Period, the 
KLA made no references to human rights or international humanitarian law, and demonstrated 




rights abuses and war crimes, indicating a failure to see these norms as relevant to their struggle.  
By the Emergent Period, the KLA had begun using human rights language. This period also saw 
a swing towards improved public perception of the KLA. In the Mature Period, the KLA began 
to use these international norms with dual purpose, both in a critique of Serbian troops and to 
bolster their legitimacy.  An important theme to notice in the discourse of the KLA at this time is 
the emergence of the frame which presented the KLA as a group which did not attack civilians. 
This frame developed during the Emergent Period and grew to be part of the essential identity 
that the KLA presented to the public. 
The arc of norm usage for the LTTE is less straightforward. The LTTE had three 
different peaks in the number of references of human rights norms and international 
humanitarian law norms, in 1998, 2001, and 2007. One of these occurred in 1998, and coincides 
with the increase in the references of these norms by the KLA. It is possible that both groups 
were responding in the same way to changes at the international level, such as the increase of 
enforceability measures, and were presenting their struggles in the most favorable way they 
could by incorporating human rights language and international humanitarian law norms.  
The LTTE referred to international humanitarian law norms with much less frequency 
than to human rights norms, and their use does not appear to be connected to human rights norms 
in the same way that they are with the KLA. It is likely that the LTTE felt less need than the 
KLA to be taken seriously as a fighting force by referencing international humanitarian law, 
given the size and structure of the force that the LTTE had established. The KLA, on the other 
hand, struggled to be seen as more than a diffuse, unstructured group of untrained fighters, and 
their adoption of international humanitarian law into their language was a way to signal that they 




LTTE’s local norms regarding the protection of civilians than seen in the case of Kosovo, where 
local norms reinforce the idea of protecting certain categories of civilians.  
Demonstrated knowledge of conventions and use of specific norms 
The analysis of the use of conventions in the discourse provides a closer look at how firm 
a grasp the leaders of the groups have on the specifics of human rights norms and humanitarian 
law.  On this issue there is a significant difference between the KLA and the LTTE. The KLA 
mentioned conventions fairly frequently, while the LTTE hardly do so at all. The KLA referred 
to the Geneva conventions (or the laws of war) the most, but only made one reference to a 
human rights convention. The increase in the use of the international humanitarian law 
conventions occurs during the period when the KLA was struggling to be seen as a legitimate 
political actor and knowledge of the Geneva Conventions might be a tool to demonstrate this 
legitimacy with international actors with whom they were interacting. The LTTE only referenced 
conventions four times during the 15 years under analysis, and showed little change over this 
time.  
The analysis of which specific norms or violations drew the most attention from the rebel 
groups revealed that both groups focused on violations by the government forces, rather than on 
depicting themselves as abiding by the same laws. Regarding international humanitarian law, the 
focus was on the protection of civilians, primarily on the government forces’ violation of this 
norm. The KLA pointed to Serb forces harming civilians seven times more frequently than they 
mentioned the efforts of the KLA to protect civilians.  The human rights references were 
overwhelmingly to the loss of life, but mentions of arbitrary arrest and detention made up a 
significant percentage of the references.  The LTTE similarly focused on the Sri Lankan 




surprisingly few mentions of torture, a relatively strong international norm, which may be a 
result of how torture is a hidden phenomenon, the full extent of which may not be known during 
the heat of a conflict.  The focus on the state was part of an overall strategy to delegitimize the 
state and its actions; however, the timing of the peaks in the discourse also indicate the 
international norms were used at points when it was vital for the group to be seen as legitimate 
by outside actors. 
The similarities between which specific norms are used most frequently in the discourse 
and the situations that they describe does suggest, however, that there might be an additional 
complication:  confusion on the part of the speaker over the differences between human rights 
law and international humanitarian law.  In the example of the KLA, both human rights norms 
and international humanitarian law were drawn on frequently to describe the same incident, 
indicating that either the distinction between the bodies of law was not clear to the speaker or 
that there were strategic reasons for using both at the same time.  The use of humanitarian law 
language appeals to one type of audience, and offers certain types of benefits, while the use of 
human rights language matters to a different audience and offers alternate benefits. Humanitarian 
law language supports the perception that a group was of equal status as an adversary to the 
government forces, while the use of human rights language emphasizes the identity of the dead 
as victims. As Donnelly contends, “human rights is the language of the victims and the 
dispossessed” (Donnelly 2006: 20).   
Both of these frames would be useful at different times, from a strategic point of view.  In 
addition, while pointing out that humanitarian law violations were occurring might help with the 
status of a group as a political challenger, a fighting force, no outside state will intervene 




humanitarian intervention, that is, military intervention to halt human rights abuses in another 
state, was emerging during the 1990s, and was ultimately used to provide legitimacy for 
intervening in one of the cases at hand, Kosovo.  
One possible explanation for the use of human rights discourse by these rebel groups 
might be that they started to use human rights language at a time when human rights discourse 
itself was introduced to the country. However, the evidence presented in this chapter indicates 
that this is not a particularly strong explanation. For example, human rights language in Kosovo 
was present in the discourse of groups in the early 1990s, significantly prior to when the KLA 
began incorporating this language into its discourse.  In addition, a number of KLA soldiers had 
been involved in human rights activism in Kosovo from the early 1990s onwards, before joining 
the KLA, but the use of human rights language by the KLA as a whole comes much later.  
Another possible explanation is in the connection of these norms in the discourse to local 
events, such as particularly egregious actions by the government troops or police force. In the 
case of the KLA, there is fluctuation in the use of the norm with local events: there is an increase 
in human rights and international humanitarian law language at or around the time of specific 
massacres, such as the Recak massacre in January 1999. However, the connection is not always 
as close. For example, there are also other massacres, such as the attack on the Jashari family in 
Prekaz in March 1998, which did not provoke spikes in human rights or humanitarian law 
language. This would suggest that the other variables, such as the importance of the presence of 
outside actors, and the importance of the resonance of the international norm locally, are also 
important in determining how and when international norms are incorporated into the rebel 




A third explanation, emphasizing the influence of outside actors, would suggest that 
increases in human rights and humanitarian law norms would follow after periods of significant 
interaction between rebel groups and international actors. In the case of Kosovo, there is a 
significant increase in the use of these norms, particularly international humanitarian law norms, 
in November 1998, the same time as there is a large jump in the numbers of international actors 
on the ground dealing directly with the KLA. This was the period in which the KLA was 
engaged in negotiating a ceasefire and was having repeated interactions with diplomats, OSCE 
monitors, and international human rights advocates (e.g., HRW). However, as mentioned above, 
the increase in the use of these norms first begins in the fall of 1997, predating much of the 









Chapter 5: “We were fighting a clean war”: Rebel groups and the 
norm against the practice of terrorism  
 
Rebel groups, insurgencies, and armed opposition groups are frequently labeled terrorists 
by the states they oppose. While there is no agreed upon definition of what constitutes acts of 
terrorism and states and academics alike struggle to define the concept, it is clear that being 
labeled a terrorist group has consequences for that group, both politically and financially. The 
label undermines its legitimacy at home and abroad, and as a result, groups find the need to 
contest that label and do so in a variety of ways.  
This chapter examines the use of the norm against terrorism in the discourse of two 
groups: the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 
and analyzes the pattern of usage in the context of the events on the ground during each group’s 
struggle. It analyzes to what extent the evidence for the use of the term terrorism in the discourse 
of the two groups helps answer the central questions of this work: whether the groups use the 
international norm strategically to boost their legitimacy; whether the norms against terrorism are 
reinforced by the presence of outside actors; whether the degree of hierarchical structure alters 
how the discourse is used; and, finally, whether differences in local normative culture can 
explain differences in the use of norms between groups.  
 In this chapter, the evidence presented shows that both the KLA and the LTTE expend 
energy to avoid defining themselves as terrorists or being defined by others as terrorists.  Both 
groups are, therefore, aware of the negative implications of being labeled a terrorist group—and 
demonstrate an awareness of what the ensuing loss of legitimacy might mean for the group. In 




both cases, close to three quarters of the references to terrorism are to the state as a terrorist).  
The portrayal of the state as a terrorist state is one way the groups hope to delegitimize the state 
and call into question its right to continue to govern.   
The analysis in this chapter further demonstrates that armed groups follow the changes in 
the hegemonic discourse, and match their discourse to changes at the international level.  Major 
changes in discourse at the state level are reflected in changes in discourse at the non-state level.  
The change in discourse of the LTTE regarding terrorism was significant in 2001 after the Al-
Qaeda terror attacks of September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington D.C., events which 
precipitated a major shift in discourse and behavior on the part of states towards terrorism. In 
addition, the KLA, which began its operations in the mid-1990s, at a time when there was an 
increasing move on the part of states away from supporting terrorist activities, took great pains to 
point out their operations were not those of a terrorist group.  
The question of why certain norms are adopted by these non-state actors and not others is 
partially answered by this examination of the language of terrorism: the evidence indicates that 
norm resonance does explain why the norm against terrorism is adopted into the discourse of 
rebel groups. Those groups with internal normative cultures (either adopted or created) which 
prohibit or condone certain activities are more likely to adopt international norms or the language 
of those norms, which also prohibit or condone those activities. The different ways the KLA and 
the LTTE engage with the norm against terrorism is reflective of differences in internal 
normative cultures.  
At a more detailed level of analysis, the changes in the discourse of these groups do 
indicate that they were responding to the presence of outside actors and increased their efforts to 




of the conflict were present. In the case of the KLA, the increases in the denial of terrorist 
activities occurred at turning points for the KLA’s legitimacy: first when it was making its case 
to the Kosovar people, and second, when it was imperative for the KLA to appear to be 
legitimate to outside actors on the ground on two occasions: the first during the monitoring of the 
ceasefire at the end of 1998, and the second, during the run up to and during the peace 
negotiations in Rambouillet, France.  
The analysis in this chapter does not, however, support the hypothesis that changes in the 
internal structure of rebel groups toward a more hierarchical structure influences the discourse in 
a positive manner. The analysis does not show a clear connection between changes in the internal 
structure of the groups and the increased or diminished use of the language of terrorism in the 
two groups.  
This chapter will begin with an examination of what terrorism might be and the evolution 
of the concept of terrorism. It then considers the changes in the norm over recent decades. The 
sections which follow present data from two cases, the KLA and the LTTE, and provide a 
detailed discourse analysis of how the norm against terror is used by the two groups. The chapter 
concludes with a brief comparison of the two groups and the overall conclusions. 
 
5.1 Terrorism: The evolution of the concept 
 
Since the definition of what exactly constitutes terrorism cannot be broadly agreed upon, 
the labeling of acts as terrorism, or a group as a terrorist group is not a neutral exercise of 
semantics. Rather, terrorism is a political label: it is “an organizing concept that offers a moral 
judgment” (Crawford 1993):  9). States typically accuse any group using violence within their 
borders as a terrorist group, particularly those groups which threaten the state and state security 




terrorist threat in order to disguise any ethno-nationalist causes of the conflict (Pokalova 2010). 
The use of the terrorist label often has a prescriptive policy relevance as well as moral 
connotation. For example, if a group is placed on a Terrorism Watch List it may be subject to 
sanctions and suffer loss of material support.  The use of the word terrorism is a political 
language and it has an effect on the perceptions of the audience, and their expectations of how a 
problem described as terrorism will be treated. For example, Richard Jackson’s analysis of the 
discourse surrounding the so-called “war on terror” explains how the language of terror and the 
use of the word terrorism have affected its American audience and policy in areas as diverse as 
banking, finance, and the treatment of prisoners (Jackson 2005). 
Governments have increasingly been officially designating certain groups as terrorists, a 
designation which typically carries significant costs for the groups including a possible reduction 
in funding, restrictions in movement of those associated with the group, and loss of legitimacy. 
The US Government was the first to do so in 1997, with its Foreign Terrorist Organization list. 
Other countries have followed. For example, the United Kingdom (UK) has maintained a list, the 
Terrorism Act, since 2000. The European Union (EU) maintains two lists, one for groups 
associated with Al-Qaeda and one for other groups. Each of these lists, while similar, do have 
significant differences from the others. Beck and Miner argue that the variation in the 
designation lists is more a result of social construction than a reflection of differences in the 
actions by the groups themselves (Beck and Miner 2013). Comparing the lists compiled by the 
US, EU and UK, Beck and Miner find only one quarter of groups designated as terrorist groups 
are common to all lists, despite increasing standardization in mechanisms for the designations,  
leading them to conclude that these legal classifications of terror derive more from local symbols 




The notion that states can commit terrorism has been largely rejected by states 
themselves, a position supported by the United Nations. The UN Secretary-General, in his 2005 
report “In Larger Freedom,” stated: “It is time to set aside debates on so-called ‘state terrorism.’” 
And he went on to argue that “the use of force by states is already thoroughly regulated under 
international law” (United Nations 2005).
136
  Some scholars have agreed. For example, historian 
Michael Hor states that “even when definitions of terrorism allow for state terrorism, state 
actions in this area tend to be seen through the prism of war or national self-defense, not terror” 
(Hor 2005: 20).  For some academics focused on the field of terrorism, however, the agreement 
of academics with states on this issue is a troubling development and has led to a myopic state-
centric view of terrorism and violence within the field (Jackson 2008).  Despite this resistance, 
terrorism is a term now largely used for non-state actors, and these actors must engage with this 
terminology and contest it in order to avoid the negative consequences of being labeled a 
terrorist or being placed on one or more states’ terrorist lists.  
Part of the confusion over the definition of terrorism stems from the constantly evolving 
nature of the definition. Initially used during the French Revolution to refer to violence used as 
an instrument of control to consolidate the power of the new revolutionary state, terrorism 
evolved to refer to acts by non-state actors against the state, such as Gavrilo Princip’s 
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in June 1914. In the 1930’s it evolved 
again to refer to the systems of repression developed by states against their own people, and was 
applied to the Nazi regime in Germany, and Stalin’s regime in the Soviet Union (Hoffman 1998: 
23).  
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After the end of World War II, it again took on revolutionary connotations, and was 
applied to groups fighting colonialism.  The term “freedom fighters” also gained currency during 
the 40s and 50s, as members of these groups and their supporters argued that those fighting 
colonial oppression were not terrorists, but fighting for their freedom. Thus, a subjective 
distinction was drawn between terrorists and freedom fighters: terrorists were those who were 
fighting oppression with violence, and labeled terrorists by some states, while freedom fighters 
were those fighting for independence from colonialism, and labeled thusly by other states. A 
number of states, particularly newly independent states, continued to offer support for those 
labeled terrorists. In fact, those states considered the use of the term terrorist to be part of the 
oppression exerted by stronger parties in a struggle which was, in fact, legitimate. This debate 
over the use of the terms “freedom fighters” or “terrorists” continued and was at the heart of why 
international organizations such as the UN were unable to address terrorism head on until the 
attacks on September 11, 2001, when the debate took a back seat (Boulden and Weiss 2004). 
Many struggles against colonialism (for example, in Algeria, Vietnam, and India) 
justified the use of terror in the fight for self-determination. More recent examples of groups 
justifying the use of terrorism as a strategy include Hamas in Israel and Palestine, and the Tamil 
Tigers in Sri Lanka. Since the 1950s, however, most groups that take up violence to support their 
cause try very hard to avoid being labeled as terrorists.   Groups taking up violence, however, did 
use and continue to use the terms terrorism and terrorist to describe the state with whom they 
were fighting.  
Primarily as a result of Cold War politics, the UN Security Council was unwilling to 
regard terrorist acts, regardless of their severity, as a threat to peace and security until the end of 






 This was followed by resolutions in 1988 and 1989, which treated all 
acts of hostage taking and abduction as manifestations of terrorism, indicating that it was the 
acts, rather than the motivations behind the acts, which the Security Council considered to be 
terrorism.  
During the 1990s, states began slowly developing a consensus about the illegitimate 
nature of terrorism, marking the emergence of a norm at the state level prohibiting terrorism, and 
which we now see occurring more vigorously in the post-September 11 world. The changes 
included more engagement by the UN Security Council as it began issuing the first sanctions for 
the support of terrorism against Libya in March 1992, followed by Sudan, in 1996, and the 
Taliban, in 1999. Sanctions stigmatized terrorism as an illegal activity that needed international 
attention and response (De Jonge Oudraat 2004: 153). Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
the public delegitimation of terrorism has increased. States’ support of activities which can be 
labeled terrorism has come under more criticism than before that date.  
In sum, while there continues to be no overall consensus about the definition of terrorism, 
there was a gradual change at the state level in the norm against terrorism over the course of the 
1990s with increasing steps taken by states to stigmatize non-state actors using terrorism and 
states supporting those actors. This change was not dramatic, but several steps, such as the 
increasing use of official terrorist designation lists by states after 1997, put groups using violence 
under additional pressure to avoid the label of terrorist. The pressure to do so increased 
dramatically after the September 11 attacks.  At the same time, states continued an effort to limit 
the use of the term terrorist to apply only to non-state actors rather than to states themselves. For 
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their part, non-state groups continued to try to use the same labels as states, and continue to try to 
frame the states as terrorists, which became increasingly difficult as the anti-colonial period 
waned.  
5.2 Terrorism and the KLA 
 
Overview 
The KLA was accused of being a terrorist group by the Serbian government from its very 
beginnings.  As a group, the KLA struggled against this label and behaved as if being seen as a 
terrorist group would undermine its legitimacy, both at home and abroad. The KLA came to see 
themselves as a group which was fighting a clean fight, and was very conscious of the 
importance of communicating that perception to outside actors. Beyond public perception, 
however, being seen as a group that eschewed terrorism and terror tactics became a core identity 
for the members of the KLA themselves. It is in the formation of this core identity that we can 
see congruence between local norms and the norm against terrorism. Their identity as a group 
that was not a terrorist group was seen as key to the legitimization process by the KLA members. 
In addition, members of the KLA were very clear that they believed the actions of the group 
helped shift international public opinion towards the group away from seeing it as a terrorist 
organization, and that that change was central to their success.   
When events occurred that could be considered the use of terrorist tactics, the KLA 
would frequently deny their involvement.  The denial of the events is significant because it 
points to an awareness of the norm and the violation of the norm. This was true from the 
beginning of the violent activities of the organization in 1995. This would indicate that the KLA 
had already internalized the norm of terrorism and what it meant to be a terrorist and was trying 




At the same time, during their active period, from mid-1995 to June 1999, in addition to 
attacks on the military, the KLA’s actions led to accusations of attacking policemen and police 
stations, placing explosive devices in public areas, assassinating Serbian and Albanian officials 
and citizens, abducting or taking hostages, and downing an aircraft.  All of these accusations 
could be and were framed as terrorist activities. The Serbian government and officials from other 
states (including the United States in the spring of 1998, a position from which they later 
withdrew) dubbed the group a terrorist group. Typically, the KLA response was either to deny 
that they, as a group, were involved in the incident, or to explain their activities as not being 
terroristic in nature.  The KLA often explained that their conflict was with the Serbian 
government, and not with the Serbian Kosovars living and working in Kosovo.  
KLA discourse analysis 
The KLA made use of the concepts of terrorism and terror in their discourse throughout 
the period under examination. While the frequency of use varies, the KLA introduced terrorism 
into their discourse with their very first communiqué in June 1995.
138
  Their use of the term 
terrorism in their language continues throughout the period under observation until the last days 
of the open conflict in May and June 1999, when references to terror or terrorism were made in 
the KLA-sponsored radio broadcasts on Radio Free Kosova (RKL).  As with the analysis in the 
preceding chapter, the focus of this analysis is on the changes in the use of the language of 
terrorism by the KLA, not on whether, or by whom, specific acts were considered terrorism. 
There are two distinct ways the concept of terrorism was used: the first was an attempt to 
label the Serbian state as a terrorist regime, as part of an effort to delegitimize it; and the second 
was an attempt to deny the activities of the KLA could make it a terrorist organization.  By 
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framing the conflict as one of a group of liberation fighters or freedom fighters fighting a 
terrorist regime, the KLA was attempting to control the framing of the struggle and thereby 
increase support for their cause. At the same time, it was important for the KLA to refute the 
label of “terrorists,” both for their standing with the home audience and the international 
audience they hoped to sway in favor of their cause. The Serbian state and media had dubbed the 
KLA a terrorist organization from its inception, and was thereby coloring its own actions against 
the group as legitimate counter-insurgency activities.  Even before the first official communiqué 
had been issued by the KLA in June 1995, their activities in Kosovo had been dubbed terrorist 
activities by the Serbian press. For example, the assassination of the High Inspector of the 
Serbian police in Gllogovc, Lutfi Ajazi, on November 9, 1994, was condemned as an attack by a 
terrorist group in the Serbian language paper, Večernje Novosti, as reported by the Kosovo 
Information Center on November 12, 1994 (Rilindja 1994). By June 1996, the Serbian political 
parties had begun condemning the attacks by the KLA as terrorist attacks (Tanjug 1996). 
The chart below (Chart 5.1: Terrorism in the discourse of the KLA) shows the frequency 
of the use of the terms “terrorism,” “terrorist,” and “terror” in the discourse of the KLA over 
time, broken down into the two opposing ways the terms were used: against the Serbian state 
(“Serbian state as terrorist”) and to bolster the position of the KLA as liberation or freedom 















































































Chart 5.1:  Terrorism in the discourse of the KLA 
Total references to terrorism
Serbian state as terrorist





Source: Data were extracted from the KLA documents listed in Appendix 2. The documents were coded for the use of the terms “terror,” 




Overall, of the total 81 references to terrorism, approximately three quarters of these, or 
62 references, are in relation to acts committed by the Serbian regime, and dubbed state 
terrorism. One quarter of the total, or 19 references, refer to the activities of the KLA. Thus, the 
KLA found it far more important to paint the Serbian regime as terrorists (and therefore, by 
implication, illegitimate), than to deny that their own activities were terrorist in nature. Indeed, 
members of the KLA say their best defense was not to fight the label of terrorist with words of 
their own, but with behavior.
139
 They claimed that not adopting terrorist behaviors was the best 
defense against being termed terrorists, rather than attempting to deny it. Fighting “a clean 
fight,” argued Rexhep Selimi, a member of the KLA General Staff and key battleground 
commander, would allow the KLA to refute such charges by demonstrating the claimed 
honorable nature of not only their cause, but their actions, as well.
140
 That said, the KLA did 
expend some energy in denying in their public statements and speeches that they themselves 
were a terrorist group.   
A second chart (Chart 5.2: Saturation of terrorism in the discourse of the KLA) shows the 
use of the term in the media items, controlling for the number of media items. The frequency of 
media items varied considerably over time, increasing by many multiples by the end of the 
conflict. In order to control for this variation, a calculation of how frequently the term was used 
per media item (termed “saturation”) was used. This chart throws into greater relief the effort the 
KLA spent in different periods using the term terror or terrorist.  
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Chart 5.2: Saturation of terrorism in the discourse of the KLA 





Source: Data were extracted from the KLA documents listed in Appendix 2. The documents were coded for the use of the terms “terror,” “terrorism,” 
and “terrorist” and categorized into two groups: references to the Serbian state and to the KLA. Saturation measures how many references are made to 




Denial of KLA as terrorists 
The attempts to deny that the KLA were terrorists appear to occur in two waves. These 
waves are first from April 1996 to March 1997, and then from October 1998 to March 1999. 
They were critical periods for the KLA to present their case to a larger audience and during 
which it was essential that they not appear as terrorists. The first was at the beginning when the 
KLA was emerging from the shadows (during the Underground Period from June 1995 to 
October 1997) and was making its case to the local population, the Kosovar community in exile, 
and more broadly, international organizations and other states.
141
 This period shows the highest 
saturation of the use of the term terrorism in the discourse.  A key question is why it was so 
important for this group to establish this identity so early on, when the earliest audiences were 
mainly local. Although the KLA hoped that outside governments were paying attention to their 
faxed press releases, during the Underground Period the KLA went largely unnoticed. 
The second wave occurs when the struggle had already attracted foreign attention and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Kosovo Verification Mission (OSCE-
KVM) was on the ground in Kosovo from October 1998 to March 1999. It was the period when 
the KLA were meeting with and interacting with outside observers on a regular basis, and 
making their case as law-abiding freedom fighters in the run up to the conference in Rambouillet 
in February 1999.  
Why the KLA focused on denying that they were a terrorist group during the first wave is 
arguably connected to how their actions would be perceived through the prism of local norms. In 
the case of the KLA, such local norms are embodied and understood through the laws of the 
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Kanun of LekDukagjin, which articulated rules for legitimate targeting during violent 
interactions.   One foot soldier in the KLA, from the Dukagjini region said: “The Kanun was 
behind all our actions. We all know it, and it is part of us.”
142
  The laws in the Kanun governing 
blood feuds, which were prevalent in Kosovo until a public campaign led by Anton Cetta to end 
the feuds, culminated in a public gathering of forgiveness in 1991 and resurfaced again after the 
end of the conflict, prescribe with a particular degree of specificity who may be targeted with 
violence.
143
 If followed, these laws would prohibit indiscriminate killing of individuals not 
directly involved in a feud. The types of violence associated with terrorism—for example, 
attacks of ordinary people in public places—would be seen as a violation of these laws.  As 
recently as 2005, a lawyer from Pristina, Tome Gashi, said: “in some places in Kosovo these 
customs are applied much more than the law” (Musliu and Lani 2005). 
More directly, a commander from the Dukagjini region in western Kosovo said of the 
Kanun during and after the conflict: 
Kosovar Albanian society stands between the Kanun of LekDukagjin and the state-based 
rule of law. We have never had our own state; Kosovo had autonomy, had its own 
judicial system, but Albanians never accepted that as their own, and so they had to follow 
their own law. It was law within the law, state within the state; although the court might 
have sentenced someone to 15 years in prison on a murder charge, the Kanun was much 
more powerful than the court (Mangalakova 2004: 11).  
 
A second source to provide understanding of the local normative environment are the 
historical ballads, or Kenge Kreshnikesh. A major theme in these ballads is the resistance to an 
unjust external government by a small band of heroic warriors.  In these ballads the armies or 
their representatives are attacked (and often defeated), but local populations are for the most part 
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untouched. These battles are just battles, with the heroes winning through a combination of wit, 
cleverness, and behaving in the right manner. Some tactics, favored by terrorist groups, would 
not conform to these heroic ideals.  Thus, taking into account the local normative environment, 
the emphasis from the beginning in the KLA press releases on framing their activities as not 
terrorism suggests that the KLA was attempting to frame their activities as acceptable behavior 
and continuing in the Albanian tradition of local resistance. 
In May 1996, the KLA resisted this label of terrorist, and characterized the war in 
Kosovo as one of liberation (a term which brings to mind freedom fighters, a theme of the 
ballads): “The Albanian people’s armed war does not have a terrorist nature, or an interethnic 
war character or a religious one. It is a war for the liberation of Kosovo” (Communiqué 19, May 
1, 1996).  And more explicitly, in August 1996, the KLA issued a press release with the 
following message: “The decision-making centers should be aware that we are not terrorists, as 
the Serbs are trying to call us, but that we are freedom fighters” (Communiqué 22, August 10, 
1996).  
The mention of the intended audience of the Communiqué , “the decision-making 
centers,” gives an indication of whom the KLA hoped to sway with these words. They are clearly 
reaching beyond the local communities, and, even, beyond potential donors in the exile 
community with this wording. It indicates that the KLA hoped or expected outside governments 
and government organizations to be listening and to be shaping their opinions accordingly.  The 
interplay between the terms terrorist and freedom fighters is a familiar one, and underlines the 
difference the KLA wanted to emphasize—one group is not legitimate, while the other is. 
Two months later, in October 1996, the KLA framed their struggle using terrorism 




religious or chauvinist character” (Communiqué 26, October 10, 1996).  With the distinction, the 
KLA is contrasting their goals (liberation), with other goals they could deem as illegitimate 
(terror or anarchy). Again, in the following reference, the KLA frame their struggle as one of 
liberation, eschewing the terrorist label: 
The invaders can threaten to eliminate the KLA and our guerrilla units as much as they 
want through their spokesmen in Belgrade or the violent ones in power in Kosovo, but we 
are not afraid because our roots and support are with our people, who know very well that 
our war is not a war of terrorism, but one of liberation (Communiqué 27, October 27, 
1996). 
 
Significantly, in the above communiqué, the KLA was also engaged in distinguishing 
between the image of a terrorist and that of a guerrilla, guerrillas being considered as an army 
fighting oppression, in contrast to terrorists. 
For members of the KLA interviewed recently, the importance of the language of 
terrorism continued to be apparent: “The important thing was that the KLA was not a terrorist 
organization. We were fighting a clean war.”
144
   
The second period when the KLA wanted to shape their image so as not to appear as 
terrorists was from October 1998 until March 1999.  This period coincides with the arrival of the 
OSCE observers and the gearing up for military intervention by international actors. At this point 
in their struggle, the introduction of outside observers who were present in the field and tasked 
with monitoring the behavior of the parties to the conflict appears to have had a significant effect 
on how the KLA portrayed its actions at this time.   
The KLA responded strategically to the presence of these actors, with an attempt to 
control how their actions were perceived. During this period, they emphasized that their actions 
were not random attacks on civilians, but the actions of a legitimate group, using legitimate 
tactics in their armed struggle. The efforts to frame the discourse during this period are 
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connected with specific references to tactics which suggest the KLA were at pains to point out 
were not those of a terrorist group. For example, in November and December 1998, the KLA 
disavowed kidnapping, a tactic popular with some terrorist groups: “The KLA expresses concern 
at and disassociates itself from the kidnapping of people of whatever nationality” (Communiqué 
62, November 1998).
145,146
  This theme was repeated a month later, in December: “The KLA is 
not behind the kidnapping and later killing of Zvonko Bojaniqi, who was kidnapped and killed in 
territories well in control of Serbian forces. Behind these killings must be the Serbian secret 
police or any other force that wishes to compromise our war of liberation” (Communiqué 65, 
December 18, 1998). 
In addition, the Spokesman for the KLA Headquarters, Jakup Krasniqi, mentioned that 
the portrayal of the KLA as committing terrorist acts was a significant consideration in the push 
to reshape the image of the KLA over the course of 1998:  
Especially during 1998, there were two factors that obliged us to improve and present the 
very aim of KLA to the national and international audiences.  These had an important 
role as well as an internal and an external factor. The internal factor, because at the 
beginning, especially after February and March 1998, the media and different people 
[within the KLA] started giving out different opinions on KLA, without being ordered to 
do so…but also for the fact that externally, segments of the KLA were being seen as a 
group of armed people whose intention is to commit terrorist acts.
147
   
 
The KLA was very concerned about their image, and a significant part of that image was 
presenting themselves as a group which was not terrorists. It appears that the KLA was aware 
that this struggle was one of framing and appearances (and therefore perceived legitimacy), not 
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The audience for this portrayal of the KLA as not terrorists was international as well as 
local. To be perceived as a terrorist group by other states would have limited the KLA’s ability to 
be in contact with outside governments and to garner their support. For example, the KLA 
representative in London, Pleurat Sediju, in describing his efforts to meet with British 




As early as 1995, Sediju, then a member of the LPK before joining the KLA and 
becoming their London-based spokesman, was tasked with studying terrorist groups to determine 
when and why they became known as terrorists in an effort not to follow the same path:  
In 1994 or 1995 I received an assignment from the LPK to study the IRA [Irish 
Republican Army]. We were looking for the point at which it shifted from being a 
liberation movement to a terrorist group. It helped a lot in our strategy, and with our 




The KLA considered that states and international organizations were a key group to 
convince of their non-terrorist intentions, but they were not always successful in doing so. As 
early as 1996 key external observers were characterizing the activities of the KLA in Kosovo in 
ways which colored the KLA as a terrorist group. One of these carried particular weight: in 
February 1998, the US Special Envoy for Kosovo, Richard Gelbard said: “We condemn very 
strongly terrorist actions in Kosovo. The UCK [KLA] is, without any question, a terrorist group” 
(AFP 1998).
151
  He was later quoted as saying: “I know a terrorist when I see one and these men 
are terrorists” (BBC 1998).  The February pronouncement indicated that the United States did 
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not consider the KLA to be a legitimate actor. This labeling of the KLA as a terrorist group went 
beyond a political statement and had consequences on the ground. Within three days, the Serbian 
government had launched a counter-insurgency campaign against the KLA and had targeted 
specific villages considered to be at the heart of the KLA organization. The results were 
massacres in three villages, Likoshan, Qirez, and Prekaz, in March, 1998. Some members of the 
KLA have suggested that there was a connection between the announcement by Gelbard and the 
subsequent offensive by the Serbian government, as, in their view, the announcement indicated 
that the US had withdrawn the appearance of their support for the KLA, and attacks on the KLA 
would now not be condemned.
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 Gelbard soon appeared to be backing away from his 
classification of the KLA as a terrorist group. On March 13, 1998 in his appearance before the 
House International Relations Committee in Washington D.C., Gelbard said that the KLA had 
“committed terrorist acts,” but had “not been classified legally by the US Government as a 
terrorist organization” (NYT 1998, 10).  By June, the US State Department spokesman, James 
Rubin, announced that the US did not regard the KLA as a terrorist organization, even though 
members of the KLA might have engaged in acts of terrorism (Lungescu 1998).  In June, when 
Richard Holbrooke first met with the KLA, the local KLA commander for Junik, Gani Shehu 
said: “we’re going to fight to the end, we had no choice.” He later recounted that “I told him we 
were fighting for freedom. We were countering Serbia’s propaganda that we were a terrorist 
organization. Serbia had said we were a fundamentalist organization. After this meeting, this 
propaganda didn’t make any sense anymore.”
153
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During this period, from the early part of 1998 through the summer of 1998, the KLA’s 
efforts to avoid being seen as a terrorist group waned somewhat. They did, however, begin 
ramping up the accusations that the Serbian state was a terrorist state. 
Accusation of Serbian state as terrorist state 
The second and more prevalent way the KLA used the language of terror and terrorism 
was in an effort to portray the Serbian government as illegitimate by painting them as terrorists. 
This effort becomes more pronounced in the Emergent and Mature Periods (from November 
1997 to June 1999). These are the periods during which the Serbian government escalated its 
counter-insurgency activities from arresting and imprisoning individuals suspected of 
involvement with the emerging KLA (such as the arrest and trial of 15 Albanians accused of 
terrorist acts in July 1997), or the targeted killing of suspected KLA members (such as the death 
of senior KLA member Zahir Pajaziti on January 31, 1997), to sending troops into Kosovo to 
attack KLA positions and villages suspected of harboring KLA sympathizers.   
While accusations by the KLA that the Serbian government was a terrorist government 
increased during the Emergent and Mature periods, this effort was evident from the very 
beginning of the KLA’s public pronouncements. The first communiqué of the KLA, published in 
June 1995, indicated how the KLA wanted to characterize the actions of Serbian government 
with regard to the Albanian population: “We call to attention the civilian population of Serbia 
and Montenegro to think about their future in Kosovo and not to be part of the terror committed 
by the invading military and police troops against Albanians” (Communiqué 13, June 1995).  
 As shown in Chart 5.2, there are two notable spikes in the number of times the KLA used 
terrorist language to describe the Serbian regime: the first between October and December 1997, 




the KLA emerged from the shadows and began appearing in public. The communiqués from this 
period are longer, more detailed, and more expressive than the communiqués from the previous 
Underground Period, which tended to be terse missives of one or two paragraphs. During this 
period, the KLA was becoming more conscious of its image and beginning to try to control the 
narrative of the conflict in Kosovo, presenting their view of the enemy.  Whenever the Serbian 
government is mentioned during this period, it is often with the word “terrorist” or “terroristic” 
attached to it.  
On November 20, 1997, the KLA described their struggle: “The foreign occupation and 
the dismembering of our national body are unfair and illegal, so our war is of self-defense; [it is] 
just, liberating and legitimate. The invader’s war is terroristic; the defender’s war is liberation” 
(Communiqué 39, November 20, 1997).  
On December 8, 1997, a communiqué self-consciously addressed the international 
community, painting the Serbian regime as the terrorists: 
We repeat to the international centers that are interested in this peninsula that our struggle 
is a just struggle of liberation. It is the occupier who is waging a war of terrorism. We 
think that the time of resolutions that you vote for, but which put no obligation on the 
Serbian terrorists, is now over (Communiqué 40, December 5, 1997). 
 
The second spike occurs between January and March 1999, as NATO and foreign powers 
put increasing pressure on Serbia and Milosevic. During this period, the KLA appear to be intent 
on tarring the Serbian regime using the language of terrorism and thereby offering confirmation 
to the outside world that an attack against the Serbs would be justified. Many of the references 
from this period also refer to massacres as a manifestation of terror, mentioning specifically the 
massacre in the village of Recak on January 15.
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  On January 17, 1999, the KLA depicted the 
Serbian government thus: 
                                                          
154




The state terror and systematic repression of Belgrade has not stopped in Kosovo. The 
offensives and the terroristic campaigns of the Serbian regime forces have become our 
harsh daily routine….The Serbian regime does not want a political solution for Kosovo. 
It wants Kosovo, not only as an occupied colony, but also depopulated by Albanians. It is 
going to realize this goal by terror, massacre, and genocide (Koha Ditore 1999a).  
 
The focus of the KLA on the events of Recak is notable as the events were publicized 
widely internationally and allowed for a more aggressive stance by the United States:  “The 
terrible images of Racak—flashed across television screens and front pages around the world—
had the effect of galvanizing the Clinton administration into action” (Dobbs 2000: 414). 
President Bill Clinton said at the time that “this was a deliberate and indiscriminate act of murder 
designed to sow fear among the people of Kosovo” (James 1999). 
Drawing attention to the actions of the Serbian military and paramilitary at this time, and 
labeling their actions as terroristic, allowed the KLA to continue to delegitimize the Serbian 
regime.  The massacre at Recak was also a breach of the ceasefire agreement of October 1998, 
which had held shakily, at best, with both the KLA and the Serbian authorities violating the 
terms of the ceasefire at multiple points.  
In their political declarations of the period, the KLA also compares its behavior with that 
of the Serbian government: “The noble spirit of the KLA is the biggest moral, political and 
diplomatic victory of the KLA, compared to the terror of the Serbian state.  [T]he criminals in 
Belgrade have lost their reasoning and commit massacres of civilians” (Political Declaration 23, 
January 17, 1999). 
They also condemn actions which they paint as terroristic: “The KLA condemns 
yesterday’s act of bomb throwing in which three people were killed. …this is an act of the 





In their strategy of accusing the Serbian state of being a terrorist state, the KLA is acting 
as a witness to the actions of the Serbian government, similar to the way that other non-state 
actors such as Human Rights Watch might when witnessing human rights abuse, albeit as a non-
state actor with a specific interest in seeing the government tarred with this brush. While the 
KLA’s motivation is different from the motivation of non-governmental organizations, in terms 
of the pattern of the use of the discourse, the KLA appears to be acting more like these non-state 
actors, drawing attention to norm violations of states and trying to alert outside actors, such as 
states and international organizations, to these abuses. This drawing attention to the Serbian 
state’s behavior was part of the KLA’s strategy to delegitimize the state in Kosovo, and it did so 
at important points in the conflict, such as the period between January and March 1999, when 
outside states were weighing intervention in the conflict. 
KLA summary 
Overall, there are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from the references to the 
norm of terrorism in the language of the KLA.  First, the discourse does offer support to the 
hypothesis that these non-state actors are norm echoers. The norm against the use of terrorism 
was building over the course of the 1990s and support for organizations that used tactics which 
could be described as terroristic was dwindling. The KLA made a significant effort from their 
first public pronouncement in 1995 to portray themselves as not being terrorists, and continued 
to do so throughout the period under examination, from the middle of 1995 until June 1999.  
Based on the interviews with KLA members, this effort was part of a conscious decision to 
portray the KLA as fighting a just war against oppression using legitimate tactics. 
Second, looking more closely at the peaks of the usage of the language of terror indicates 




critical: during their initial outreach to the public, and then in the presence of outside actors 
during the ceasefire and the build up to the peace negotiations. Two points in time at which 
outside actors were influential were between October and December 1998, when the OSCE 
mission was ramping up its presence in Kosovo, and again between January and March 1999. In 
the former period, the KLA’s discourse focused on claiming the KLA was not a terrorist group. 
In the latter period, the KLA focused on denouncing the Serbian government as a terrorist state 
during a time of increasing international attention to Kosovo immediately prior to and during the 
Rambouillet conference.  During these two periods, the KLA strategically increased the 
frequency of the use of the norm against terrorism in their discourse.  
The issue of legitimacy is a significant factor in both the KLA’s denying that it was a 
terrorist group and in its accusations that the Serbian state was a terrorist state. The denial of 
terrorist activities occurred at turning points for the KLA’s legitimacy: first when it was 
emerging from the shadows and making its case to the Kosovar people, and second, when it was 
imperative for the KLA to appear to be legitimate to outside actors on the ground. The portrayal 
of the Serbian state as a terrorist state was related to the KLA’s need to delegitimize the state 
with which it was fighting—continuously pointing to the Serbian state as a terrorist was an 
attempt to further separate the Albanian population from the authority of the state—a state that 
terrorizes those in its protection is not a legitimate state. 
Third, norm concurrence had a role in the adoption of the norm against terrorism. The 
emphasis placed on not being a terrorist group appeared to go deeper than simply a framing 
issue, to become part of the KLA’s internal identity.  Such an internalization of norms is more 




appear to have been the case for the KLA in Kosovo at the time. The adoption of the image of a 
group that does not use terrorism was essential to the development of the KLA’s identity.  
One hypothesis which does not receive support from the analysis of the norm against 
terrorism is that the pattern of usage of international norms is partially dependent on the 
evolution of the structure of the group itself. The data demonstrate no significant link between 
the emergence of a more structured hierarchy within the KLA in the summer of 1998 and the 
peaks in the usage of the norm against terrorism in their discourse.  Indeed, the use of the 
language of terrorism appeared to be more prevalent during the period when the KLA was less 
hierarchical. This lack of connection between the hierarchical structure of a rebel group and the 
use of the words terror or terrorism in the discourse of the group appears to be an exception, 
when compared to the use of other international norms, such as human rights and international 
humanitarian law in the discourse, under review in this work. Evidence presented in earlier 
chapters suggested that the internal structure of the KLA had an effect on the use of some 
international norms through the mechanism of specialized knowledge—greater levels of 
hierarchy allowed for the development of specialized knowledge within the ranks of the KLA, or 
the recruitment of more specialized individuals into the ranks of the KLA. The pattern observed 
in the use of terrorism in the discourse does not follow this pattern, and this variation may be due 
to the way the label terrorism and terrorist is applied by states and other actors to groups, 
regardless of their size and structure, requiring those groups to engage with the norm early on in 




5.3 Terrorism and the LTTE 
 
Overview 
The pattern of discourse and behavior of the LTTE with regards to the norm against 
terrorism is quite different from the patterns displayed by the KLA. Overall, in their discourse, 
the LTTE did not respond directly to accusations of terrorism, and references to terror and 
terrorism are at a low level, apart from in one year, 2001. In addition, the pattern of attacks on 
civilian targets was also significantly different.  
The LTTE was accused of being terrorists from their inception in 1977 by the 
government of Sri Lanka. From the very beginning of its struggle, the members and leadership of 
the LTTE chose tactics which included assassinations and attacks on soft, or civilian, targets that 
are typically classified as terroristic. These civilian targets included bus stations (Colombo 
1987), temples (Temple of the Tooth, Kandy 1998), villages (Palliyagodeela 1991, among 
others), and banks (Central Bank bombing 1996). In addition, the LTTE was also known for their 
targeted assassinations of political figures, both in Sri Lanka (for example, Prime Minister 
Ranasinghe Premadasa in Colombo 1993 and up to 25 members of parliament throughout the 
conflict) and abroad (for example, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in India in 1991).  
One particular tactic that was very different from the KLA was the use of suicide 
bombers, a tactic the LTTE pioneered. The first suicide attack was early in the conflict, on July 
5, 1989, when an LTTE soldier, known as “Captain Miller,” drove a truck into the army camp in 
Nelliady in Jaffna.
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 After that time, suicide attacks were used recurrently, assassinating 
political as well as military targets. The total number of these attacks vary according to the 
source, and may be as many as 316, although the LTTE only claim 273 (de Mel 2007).  
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In terms of the perception of the LTTE by states other than Sri Lanka, by the mid-1990s, 
when the norm against terrorism was gaining more traction at the state level, other states began 
taking concrete steps to condemn the LTTE as a terrorist organization. For example, the US 
placed the LTTE on its list of terrorist groups in 1997. The UK followed suit in 2001. One LTTE 
officer admitted that being on the international terrorist lists hurt the reputation of the group 
(O'Duffy 2007: 281). However, others argued that the effect of the proscription following 
September 11 was limited, and any curtailment in the LTTE’s ability to fundraise was temporary 
(Chalk 2000). In May 2006, the EU officially labeled the LTTE a terrorist organization (Council 
of the European Union 2006, 1-3), which had the direct effect of freezing the funds and financial 
assets of the LTTE in Europe. By 2008, during the final military push by the Sri Lankan 
government, the LTTE was increasingly isolated from outside support. The FBI called the LTTE 
“the most dangerous and deadly extremists in the world, […] because its ruthless tactics have 
inspired terrorist networks worldwide, including the Al-Qaeda in Iraq” (FBI 2008).  
LTTE discourse analysis 
Overall, in the discourse of the LTTE there is a different pattern than that seen with the 
KLA—the speeches mainly ignore the norm against the use of terrorism until the massive 
changes to the political landscape wrought by the events of September 11, 2001. A contributing 
factor to this absence is likely to be that the LTTE began their operations in the late 1970s (with 
their first major attack not until 1983 with an ambush on a military patrol), a time at which there 
was no international consensus whatsoever about the definition of terrorism, and followed the 
period in which groups fighting colonial powers were supported as freedom fighters.  There is no 
significant change in the LTTE’s discourse over the 1990s even as states began inching towards 




New York and Washington D.C. in 2001. In November 2001, the LTTE launched a massive 
effort to question the label of terrorist, and even the definition of what a terrorist is (see Chart 
5.3: References to terrorism by the LTTE, below).  Much of the speech given in November 2001 
is dedicated to maintaining the distinction between a freedom fighter (which is labeled 
legitimate) and a terrorist (which is not).  The number of mentions of terrorism in the speeches 
prior to 2001 is few, and on the whole, they mainly discuss the characterization of the LTTE as a 
terrorist group as propaganda, but very little effort is exerted in challenging that characterization.  
There was a second smaller peak in 2005 when the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) of 2002 had 


























Chart 5.3 : References to terrorism by the LTTE 





Source: Data were extracted from documents listed in Appendix 4. The documents were coded for the use of the terms “terror,” “terrorism,” and 





In 2001, after the attacks in New York and Washington, and following the robust 
response of states to the attacks and to terrorism in general, the LTTE began contesting the 
definition of terror in earnest.  In July of that year, the LTTE had carried out a suicide attack on 
Bandaranaike International Airport, destroying eight of the air force's planes and four Sri Lankan 
Airlines planes, and critically wounding the Sri Lankan economy that year. Rather than argue 
simply that the LTTE itself was not a terrorist organization, Prabhakaran argued that the 
definition as put forth by states was too narrow: 
The use of violence in all modes of struggles to attain specific goals is defined as 
terrorism by international governments. This narrow definition has erased the distinctions 
between genuine struggles for political independence and terrorist violence. This 
conception of terrorism has posed a challenge to the moral foundation of armed struggles 
waged by liberation movements for basic political rights and for the right to self-
determination (Hero’s Day Speech, November 2001). 
 
In this speech, we see the LTTE engaged in a real effort to challenge how the states, 
particularly Western states, appeared to be coming to a consensus on what terrorism really was.  
This contestation over the definition was crucial because it appeared that, following the attacks 
of September 11, states had moved beyond the debate over the definition of terrorism that had 
led to deadlock at the United Nations for many years and into a period of action. Without this 
contestation, the LTTE risked being labeled a terrorist group at a time when that label would 
have real practical implications for the functioning of the LTTE itself.  Prabhakaran appears to 
be clinging to the old divide between freedom fighter and terrorist: “It is crucial that Western 
democratic nations should provide a clear and comprehensive definition of the concept of 
terrorism that would distinguish between freedom struggles based on the right to self-
determination and blind terrorist acts based on fanaticism” (Hero’s Day Speech, November 





have failed in their efforts to crush our freedom movement for the last two decades, branded our 
liberation struggle as terrorism” (Hero’s Day Speech, November 2001). 
Prabhakaran further attempts to align the LTTE on the side of anti-terrorism, in an effort 
to distinguish the LTTE from “real terrorists,” who would be, presumably, illegitimate: “We 
welcome the counter-terrorist campaign of the international community to identify and punish 
real terrorists” (Hero’s Day Speech, November 2001). 
In 2001, the LTTE were engaged in peace talks with the Sri Lankan government. The 
Norwegian government had played an important intermediary role in those talks from February 
2000 onwards. In November 2001 it would have been of utmost importance to appear to be a 
legitimate actor in the negotiations and thus the efforts to dispute both the label of terrorist, and 
the definition of what makes a terrorist, were crucial.  Within a month of this speech, in 
December 2001, the LTTE announced a ceasefire, to which the government responded 
favorably, lifting the economic embargo of the LTTE territories and announcing a ceasefire of its 
own. The full CFA was signed on February 22, 2002. Following the CFA, a multinational 
monitoring force, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), was established, with 
approximately 75 personnel from Scandinavian countries based in Sri Lanka, tasked with 
monitoring and recording violations to the CFA by either party.  After 2001, references to 
terrorism tail off again until a second peak in 2005.  
What is of particular interest in these references to terrorism in this speech is that  taken 
as a whole, they are more concerned with contesting the definition of terrorism, not in attempting 
to change the perception of what the LTTE was actually doing and the tactics it was actually 





motivation of the actor, not his deeds. This is in sharp contrast to the KLA discourse, where 
specific deeds were disputed.  
In 2005, there is a second peak in references to terror—both denying that the LTTE was a 
terrorist organization, and in attempting to paint the government of Sri Lanka as a terrorist state.  
Again, we see Prabhakaran questioning the definition of terror: “there is no clear, coherent, 
globally acceptable definition of the concept of terrorism” (Hero’s Day Speech, November 
2005), and arguing that the lack of clarity in the definition has led to the LTTE being branded a 
terrorist group erroneously. 
Just and reasonable political struggles fought for righteous causes are also branded as 
terrorism. Even authentic liberation movements struggling against racist oppression are 
denounced as terrorist outfits. In the current global campaign against terror, state 
terrorism always finds its escape route and those who fight against state terror are 
condemned as terrorists. Our liberation organization is also facing a similar plight 
(Hero’s Day Speech, November 2005).  
 
Once again, in 2007, Prabhakaran tries to separate out terrorists, who in his framing are 
racists or fanatics, from an armed group with a political objective. With this framing, 
Prabhakaran acknowledges that there are groups whose acts are not acceptable, but it is because 
they lack a legitimate political goal. Therefore, by implication, actors with legitimate goals 
cannot commit acts of terrorism, because the ends justify the means: “We are not terrorists, 
committing blind acts of violence impelled by racist or religious fanaticism. Our struggle has a 
concrete, legitimate, political objective” (Hero’s Day Speech, November, 2007).  This 
characterization of what terrorism is was contrary to the defintions being discussed at the state 
level during this period. By contesting the definintion of terrorism, Prabharkaran was attempting 
to reframe the struggle in Sri Lanka away from the discussions of terrorism. 
One final point of analysis is the examination of the possibility of changes in internal 





beginning of the period under examination(1992—2007),  the LTTE had already established an 
extremely hierarchical command structure, with both the military wing and subordinate political 
wing under the supervision of the Central Governing Committee, headed by the supreme leader, 
Velupillai Prabhakaran. There were no significant changes in the structure of the organization in 
2001 which would account for the changes observed in the discourse. Further, the split in the 
ranks of the LTTE in 2004, with the departure of Colonel Karuna and subsequent internal strife, 
does not appear to have had any impact on the use of the term terrorism in the discourse.  It 
would seem that the hypothesis that a growing internal hierarchical structure would lead a group 
to increase its use of international norms would not hold true in the case of the LTTE and the 
norm against terror. 
LTTE summary  
Overall, two significant findings are derived from the analysis of the LTTE. The first is 
that armed resistance groups do respond to sudden significant changes in international norms at 
the state level: after the changes in the international norm against terror, following September 11, 
2001, we see the LTTE engaging with the norm and with international actors in contesting that 
norm and its application to the group aggressively. The second finding is that which norms are 
adopted into the discourse, and ultimately the behavior of armed resistance groups, is influenced 
by the congruence of that norm with local norms and culture.  
In the discourse of the LTTE and their response to the norm against terror, the LTTE was 
not demonstrably concerned with the label of a terrorist group until September 11, 2001, at 
which point the engagement with the norm was to contest the definition of terrorism, rather than 
to directly contest the perception that the group was a terrorist group. From our understanding of 





significantly less overlap than in the KLA case between the norm against terrorism and the 
behavior it proscribes and the local norms within the LTTE. This indicates that the lower degree 
of congruence between the international norm and the local norms made it less likely that the 
norm against terrorism would be accepted by the LTTE.  
5.4 A comparison of the KLA and the LTTE 
A comparison of the discourse of these two groups over the duration of each group’s 
conflict reveals significant differences in the discourse and in each group’s interaction with one 
international norm: the norm against terrorism. There are some patterns of discourse which are 
similar between the two groups—each group does attempt to portray itself as not being a terrorist 
group, while attempting to delegitimize the state they are fighting by labeling them terrorist 
states.  
There are, however, significant differences in the use of the language of terrorism in the 
discourse of these two groups when examined more closely. The KLA makes frequent mention 
of specific tactics, refuting ones which are frequently termed terroristic, such as kidnapping and 
bombing civilian buildings. This indicates that there was a translation of what the norm means 
into a recognition of the implications of the behavior of the KLA troops.  This is borne out by the 
interviews with KLA members who emphasized that the behavior of the KLA troops was of 
utmost importance—they could not be seen to be attacking Serb civilians or engaging in 
traditionally terroristic actions. In addition, from the few numbers of direct attacks on Serb 
civilians during the war, it can be seen that the norm against terror was translated into action, 
albeit imperfectly.
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 The LTTE, on the other hand, engaged primarily with the norm 
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immediately after September 11, 2001, and did so in order to contest the definition of terrorism, 
rather than to refute any specific actions. The contestation does show an awareness of the 
growing importance of the norm; however, the discourse does not show that the LTTE 
considered a strong connection between the norm and legitimacy, and the LTTE continued to 
engage in acts such as assassination and killings of civilians throughout the life of the 
organization.  
The examination of the local norms shows how differences in these contributed to the 
difference we see in the discourse. The KLA turned to traditional norms, laws, and culture, such 
as the Kanun of LekDukagjin, within which there existed norms against the targeting of certain 
groups of individuals, such as women, children, and the elderly, during periods of inter-
communal or interfamilial violence. The resonance between these traditional norms and the 
norms against the use of terror contributed to the KLA seeking strongly to portray themselves 
through word and action as a group not engaging in terror. It is also significant that the KLA 
included in their refutations of terrorism specific acts that overlap with the prohibitions in the 
Kanun and other traditional codes of conduct. The LTTE, on the other hand, created a new social 
order, and a culture in which each Tamil, young and old, male and female, had a duty to give of 
themselves to the struggle for Tamil Eelam. The celebration of death which grew up as a result 
of the struggle would not have resonated with the norm against terror according to which certain 
groups are considered illegitimate targets.  Again, it is significant that the discourse on terror and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of violence after the conclusion of formal conflict have been documented, with reasons being revenge, reprisals and 
lack of security enforcement (Boyle 2006).  The documented levels of violence in Kosovo after the end of the war, 
which included attacks on Serbs, Roma, and Albanian Kosovars in which former members of the KLA were 
implicated (as well as returning refugees and criminal gangs from Albania), indicates that there might be a different 
logic at work when rebel groups transition into different forms as post-conflict organizations (see, for example, 
Human Rights Watch 1999; and Human Rights Watch World Report 2000). The study of such groups as they 





terrorism is centered on the concept of terrorism itself, rather than specific acts attributed to the 
LTTE, which are rarely refuted in the LTTE discourse. 
5.5 Conclusions 
Overall, the analysis demonstrates that rebel groups engage vigorously with the norm 
against terror. They may refute the labeling of terrorist in multiple ways: deny involvement in 
specific activities; deny use of specific tactics; argue that their cause justifies their use of force; 
argue that their choice of target was legitimate; contest the definition of terrorism; and argue that 
they are freedom fighters, not terrorists. At no point do the groups embrace the term terrorist, 
despite their often questionable choice of tactics. The analysis also shows that the use of the 
norm is not static over time: there are distinct patterns in the use of the norm, which, it has been 
argued, is linked to the need for legitimacy at specific points and the presence of outside actors.  
The examination of the discourse of these two groups has shown that with respect to the 
norm against terrorism, rebel groups are norm echoers. The KLA, becoming active during a 
decade in which the norm against terrorism was strengthening at an international level, strongly 
contested the label of terrorist, and considered the moment when they received the label of 
terrorist by a powerful outside actor as a nadir in the pubic presentation of their cause.  The 
LTTE began their operations during a period when the sanctions against terrorism were more 
muted, which is reflected in their lack of engagement with the label terrorist. There is a dramatic 
change in the discourse of the LTTE, however, following the events of September 2001 and 
subsequent forceful actions by states, when the LTTE began vehemently to contest the label of 
terrorist. 
This analysis further shows that non-state actors behave in a similar fashion to states 





the norms most likely to be adopted are those which resonate with local norms and practices. In 
the case of the KLA, which drew from traditional cultural norms in order to establish itself as a 
legitimate force fighting for the rights of Kosovar Albanians, international norms which 
resonated with some parts of those traditional cultural norms, such as those against the use of 
terror tactics, were likely to be incorporated into the discourse.  The KLA refuted specific actions 
condemned as terror tactics. By contrast, the LTTE, which broke from traditional culture and 
created a new social structure in which there was little resonance with norms against terror, the 
contestation of the label of terrorist took the form of contesting the definition of terrorism as a 
concept (and that only after a sea change in states’ engagement with the issue).  
Both groups demonstrate that a need for legitimacy underlies the engagement with the 
norm against terrorism. The KLA expressly defined its internal identity as a legitimate actor to 
include the identity of a group eschewing terrorism. It also demonstrated its ability to act 
strategically, and adopt language eschewing terrorism at critical junctions: during its public 
establishment within Kosovo, and when its legitimacy was under scrutiny by outside actors. The 
LTTE, on the other hand, engaged with the norm in a different manner: it was only when their 
legitimacy was threatened by the changes in the international environment with regard to the 





Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This dissertation examined changes in the discourse of rebel groups and analyzed the 
patterns of usage of a number of international norms in the groups’ discourse to answer the 
questions of why rebel groups use these norms, and why groups are more likely to refer to some 
norms than to others. The focus of the research was on human rights norms, international 
humanitarian law, and the norms against terror: three areas of norms which seek to modify 
behavior of participants in violent conflict.  
Overall, there is evidence to suggest that rebel groups echo the broad pattern of change in 
discourse and behavior exhibited by states: as states increasingly turned to human rights 
discourse and focused on the protection of civilians in conflict during the 1990s, rebel groups 
largely echoed that pattern.  Both groups under examination, the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), increase their use of human rights 
language over time, although only the KLA pairs this increase with a rise in humanitarian law 
language and discussion of the protection of civilians.  Both groups show an increase in 1998, at 
a time when human rights and international humanitarian law issues were much discussed at the 
state level, and when international events such as the creation of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) in July 1998 and the increase of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) over Kosovo were highlighting the importance of those norms 
for non-state actors. The KLA began to adopt human rights language and international 
humanitarian law in its discourse while reducing the relative frequency of its use of references to 
terror and terrorism. While labeling its host state as a human rights violator or a state terrorist 
served a similar purpose of delegitimizing the state, the KLA’s increasing preference for using 





describe the actions of the state, is an indicator of which norms were in ascendancy.  With the 
changes in the discourse on terror, the LTTE offers a clear example of how a sudden shift in a 
norm at the international level following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 can be 
immediately reflected at the non-state level.   
These groups, however, are not merely echoing the discourse from the international level 
as passive recipients: they are adopting international norms into their discourse for strategic 
reasons, namely to increase their legitimacy with local and international audiences.  By tracing 
the patterns of norm adoption throughout the course of the conflict and matching peaks of 
fluctuation with events on the ground, this research has shown that rebel groups increase the 
frequency of their use of international norms at key turning points in the conflict, such as during 
negotiations for ceasefire or peace agreements. This indicates that the rebel groups are using 
these norms strategically to boost their legitimacy at those key points.  
For both the KLA and the LTTE, their use of international norms in discourse changed 
during periods of negotiation with outside actors. In Kosovo, the fall of 1998 saw intensive 
negotiations with outside actors for a cease-fire.  During this period, and again in the early days 
of 1999 with the run-up to the multinational Conference on Kosovo at Rambouillet, the KLA 
was striving to appear to be legitimate to outside actors. To do so, it began adopting language 
and discourse familiar to these actors and framing its struggle in terms which would resonate 
with them in order to bolster its claims. For the LTTE, the peace-talks led by the Norwegians in 
2002 provided an opportunity to appear as a legitimate and reasonable opponent to the Sri 
Lankan government. With the LTTE’s practice of using terror tactics and the delegitimation of 
such tactics in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, the LTTE searched for a discourse to 





The analysis of the use of conventions in the discourse provides a closer look at how firm 
a grasp the leaders of the groups have on the specifics of human rights norms and humanitarian 
law.  On this issue there is a significant difference between the KLA and the LTTE. The KLA 
mentioned conventions fairly frequently, with their usage increasing over time, while the LTTE 
hardly did so at all. Most of the references made by the KLA were to the Geneva conventions, 
and most of those references were in conjunction with references to the harm of civilians. The 
significant increase observed in the KLA’s use of the international humanitarian law conventions 
occurs during the period when the group was struggling to be seen as a legitimate political actor 
and knowledge of the Geneva Conventions might be a tool to demonstrate this legitimacy with 
international actors with whom it was interacting. The increase was also occurring during the 
time the KLA was laying the groundwork for transitioning from a fighting rebel group into a 
group ready to govern. The LTTE only referenced conventions four times during the 15 years 
under analysis, and showed little change over this time, indicating that for the LTTE the 
demonstration of this knowledge was not considered to be essential.  
The analysis of which specific norms or violations drew the most attention from the rebel 
groups revealed that both groups focused on violations by the government forces, rather than on 
depicting themselves as abiding by the same laws. Thus, their focus was primarily on 
delegitimizing their host states. Regarding international humanitarian law, the focus was on the 
protection of civilians, drawing attention to the government forces’ violation of this norm.  The 
human rights references were overwhelmingly to the loss of life, but mentions of arbitrary arrest 
and detention made up a significant percentage of the references.  The LTTE similarly focused 
on the Sri Lankan government forces harming civilians, the loss of life, and genocide.  In both 





Incidents of torture during conflict, however, may be less public and widely known than, for 
example, deadly attacks on civilians, and for that reason, may not have drawn as much attention 
from the rebel groups.  The focus on the behavior of the state was part of an overall strategy to 
delegitimize the state and its actions; however, the timing of the peaks in the discourse also 
indicate the international norms were used at points when it was vital for the group to be seen as 
legitimate by outside actors, perhaps particularly in contrast with a delegitimized state.  
Looking more closely at the norm against terror, the analysis demonstrates that rebel 
groups engaged vigorously with this norm. They refuted the labeling of terrorist in multiple 
ways: denying involvement in specific activities and use of specific tactics; arguing that their 
cause justified their use of force; contending that their choice of target was legitimate; contesting 
the definition of terrorism; and claiming that they were freedom fighters, not terrorists. At no 
point do the groups embrace the term terrorist, despite their often questionable choice of tactics. 
The analysis also shows that the use of the norm is not static over time: there are distinct patterns 
in the use of the norm which are linked to the need for legitimacy at specific points and the 
presence of outside actors.  Both groups demonstrate that a need for legitimacy underlies the 
engagement with the norm against terrorism. The KLA expressly defined its internal identity as a 
legitimate actor to include the identity of a group eschewing terrorism. It also demonstrated its 
ability to act strategically and adopt language denouncing terrorism at critical junctions: during 
its public establishment within Kosovo and when its legitimacy was under scrutiny by outside 
actors. The LTTE, on the other hand, engaged with the norm in a different manner: it was only 
when their legitimacy was threatened by the changes in the international environment with 





The research shows, however, that the patterns of norm usage are complex at a micro-
level and indicates that rebel groups respond to local events on the ground and these events 
influence the micro-fluctuations in their usage accounting for some of the week-to-week 
variation observed.  The KLA’s discourse in 1998 and 1999 shows it responded to events on the 
ground and changed its discourse as a result of troop movement, significant attacks, or major 
events such as massacres.  
The research demonstrates that rebel groups do appropriate international norms for their 
own use and do so in patterns consistent with their need to boost their own legitimacy, but how 
does it address the question of which norms rebel groups favor? The evidence presented supports 
the hypothesis that rebel groups are more likely to adopt international norms which demonstrate 
congruence with their own local normative environment.  This analysis shows that non-state 
actors behave in a similar fashion to states when it comes to determining which international 
norms to adopt in their discourse and actions: the norms most likely to be adopted are those 
which resonate with local norms and practices.  
The examination of the local norms shows how differences among them contributed to 
the difference we see between the discourse of the KLA and the LTTE. The KLA drew on 
traditional norms, laws, and culture, such as the Kanun of Leke Dukagjin, within which there 
existed norms against the targeting of certain groups of individuals, such as women, children, 
and the elderly, during periods of inter-communal or interfamilial violence. The resonance 
between these traditional norms and the international norms of human rights, the protection of 
civilians, and the norms against the use of terror contributed to the KLA seeking strongly to 
portray themselves through word and deed as a group not engaging in attacking civilians.  The 





and old, male and female, had a duty to give of themselves to the struggle for Tamil Eelam. The 
celebration of death which grew up as a result of the struggle would not have resonated as 
strongly with the international norms of human rights (particularly right to life), the protection of 
civilians, or norm against terror, all of which consider certain groups illegitimate targets.  This 
difference can be traced to the discourse and the more subdued pattern of engagement with these 
norms shown by the LTTE.  
Examining the norm against terrorism through this lens, the research reveals differences 
in the discourse of these two groups.  When using the language of terror, the KLA made frequent 
mention of specific tactics refuting ones which are frequently termed terroristic, such as 
kidnapping and bombing civilian buildings. This indicates that there was a translation of what 
the norm means into recognition of the implications for the behavior of the KLA troops.  This is 
borne out by the interviews with KLA members who emphasized that the behavior of the KLA 
troops was of utmost importance—they could not be seen to be attacking Serb civilians or 
engaging in traditionally terroristic actions and to do so would be detrimental to their cause. The 
LTTE, on the other hand, engaged primarily with the norm only after September 11, 2001, and 
did so in order to contest the definition of terrorism, rather than to refute any specific actions. 
The contestation does show an awareness of the growing importance of the norm; however, the 
language used does not indicate that LTTE considered there to be a strong connection between 
the norm and legitimacy, and the LTTE continued to engage in acts such as assassination and 
killings of civilians throughout the life of the organization.  
Finally, the research provides some support for the hypothesis which suggests that rebel 
groups require a certain level of internal structure or hierarchy before they can begin to 





case of the KLA suggests that as the group became increasingly hierarchical, it allowed for the 
both the specialization of certain roles within the organization and the recruitment of individuals 
who brought with them more expert knowledge of international norms. 
To conclude, this dissertation demonstrates that rebel groups echo patterns in the 
discourse of states, and do so to promote their own legitimacy at key turning points in the 
conflict.  Which international norms rebel groups use most frequently is partially determined by 
the congruence of those norms with their local norms and beliefs. Finally, a group is more likely 
to adopt international norms into its discourse when its internal structure has become more 
hierarchical and specialized.   
Contribution to the literature 
 This dissertation contributes to the literature on both international norms and rebel 
groups—it engages directly with the literature on norms and adds to the understanding of norm 
diffusion among actors by challenging existing models of norm diffusion, it extends the field of 
norm research to a new actor, and it adds to the literature on rebel groups by deepening our 
understanding of rebel groups’ discourse and struggles for legitimacy during conflict.  
In arguing that rebel groups are acting strategically at key points in the conflict by 
echoing international norms in their discourse and in emphasizing the agency of the rebel groups, 
this study challenges the constructivist models of norm diffusion and the cascade of norms across 
populations of actors both of which are largely structural. The emphasis in this dissertation on 
the agency of the local actors and their choice of which international norms to use and when, 
questions both the applicability of the models developed to explain norm diffusion among states 





the growing literature in international relations which opens up the study of the relationships 
between states to include non-state and transnational actors.  
The research also extends the understanding of the effect international norms have to a 
new set of actors. By considering how and why rebel groups echo international norms in their 
discourse, this study extends the discussion of norm diffusion and transmission to a new, 
previously under-researched actor, the rebel group. Previous work on non-state actors and norms 
has focused primarily on non-governmental groups as norm entrepreneurs engaging with states 
and changing state-level dynamics. This study focuses on a different process—how non-state 
actors engage with the normative language developed by states and how and why they choose to 
echo those norms back to the states themselves.  By focusing on rebel groups, critical but under-
studied actors in conflicts throughout the world, this study illuminates how these groups make 
use of the international language of norms to frame their own struggles and in their quest for 
legitimacy.  
Finally, this study adds to the small but growing literature on non-state actors’ 
engagement with international norms. By moving between the local and the international level, 
this research connects the rich and thick anthropological work on particular groups or regions 
with theories about international norms. The study of rebel groups as they negotiate the complex 
territory between international and local normative spheres sheds new light on theories of 
congruence and salience.  
This research is also useful for policy makers, as it provides additional ways for those 
engaged in negotiations with rebel groups to understand why groups may echo international 
norms and what it might mean when they do. It further provides insight into which turning points 





and the behaviors they encompass, such as protection of civilians, and provides insight into 
which groups are most likely to be willing to engage fruitfully in these discussions. 
Areas of future research 
 The research begun in this dissertation, with its focus on non-state actors, discourse, and 
international norms, can be extended in a number of different ways: to new rebel groups; to 
different types of actors; to different time periods; to explorations of potential connections 
between discourse and behavior; and finally, to different norms.  The hypotheses regarding the 
strategic use of norms, the structure of the rebel groups, and the salience of international norms 
at a local level developed in this research can be further tested by investigating the use of the 
same norms explored in this work, namely, human rights, international humanitarian law, and 
terrorism, in the discourse of other rebel groups.   
 The research can also be furthered by examining the discourse of rebel groups after the 
end of the conflict as they transition from being rebel groups into other institutions. Of particular 
interest would be the examination of groups, like the KLA, which transition from rebel group 
into political parties or protostates over the course of the post-conflict period. Conceptually 
different from rebel groups, these transitional organizations may follow different patterns of 
norm adoption.  
 In terms of different time periods, this research focused on the 1990s, the post-Cold War 
era, a period which saw a significant shift in some international norms, such as human rights, at 
the international level. One other historical period which would add greatly to our understanding 
of how rebel groups might echo changes on the international level is the post-World War II era, 





Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (adopted in 1948) and other conventions, such as the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 shifted the international normative landscape radically. 
 Another area of fruitful research is the exploration of the relationship between the 
discourse of rebel groups and their behavior. This avenue of research could examine the 
connections between the rebel groups, their discourse, and their likelihood of signing on to 
international instruments governing behavior, such as the Mine Ban Treaty. It could also explore 
whether changes in the discourse are followed in any way by changes in behavior, by mapping 
patterns of accusations of human rights violations or abuses alongside patterns in discourse.  
 Finally, another meaningful exploration would be the comparison between the use of 
secular norms discussed in this work, and religious norms, such as those enshrined in sharia law.  
In addition, the study of the patterns of usage of norms in the discourse other than the so-called 
“good norms,” (such as human rights), to include “bad norms,” such as rape during conflict, 
mutilation of civilians or opposing forces, or ethnic segregation, would provide an alternative 





Appendix 1: Code book 
 
Code Description   
International Norms Specific mention of international 
conventions 
 CONV 
1. Human Rights All human rights (sum of 1a 
through 1f) 
 HR 
 Specific mention of HR 
conventions 
1a HR CONV 
 Right to life (any mention of death, 
killing, by the state, or members of 
state organs, such as policemen) 
1b HR LIFE 
 Torture  (any mention of torture by 
the state) 
1c HR TORT 
 Arbitrary arrest & detention (any 
mentions of arbitrary arrest, 
detention or imprisonment by the 
state) 
1d HR AAD 
 Economic, Social, Cultural rights          
(includes right to education, 
language, right to work, etc.) 
1e HR ESC 
 Any specific mention of genocide 1f GENO 
2. Self-determination Any reference to self-determination  SD 
3. Terrorism  Acts of terror committed by 
Serbian troops or Serbian state 
 S TERROR 
 Denial of acts of terror committed 
by KLA 
 NOT K 
TERROR 
4. Humanitarian law All humanitarian law (sum of 4a 
through 4 cy) 
 IHL 
 Protection of civilians 4a IHL PROT 
 Harm of civilians by Serb forces  IHL S 
HARM 
 Harm of civilians by the KLA 4bx IHL k 
HARM 
 Harm of civilians labeled 
collaborators by the KLA 
4by IHL HARM 
K COL CIV 
 Treatment of POWs by Serbian 
forces 
4cx IHL S 
PRISON 




Any reference to humanitarian 
intervention n the conflict by 
outside actors 





    
6. Behavior of troops How troops are characterized 6 B TROOP 
7. Goals    
 Secession (mention of wanting 
independence for a separate state) 
7a G SEC 
 Unification of all subgroups 7b G UNI 
 Overthrow of central government 7c G OVER 
8. Internal Structure Description of the internal structure 
of the KLA 
8 INTERN 
9. Outside actors’ 
influence 
Any mention of outside actor’s 
influence (positive or negative) 
9 OA INF 
10. appeal to outside 
actors 
Any appeal by the KLA to outside 
actors to engage in the situation in 
Kosovo 
10 AOA 
11. Other dominant 
discourse 
References to other specific words 
used in the discourse 
  
 Marxist / Communist  11a MC 
 Colonialism / occupation 11b COL 
 Democracy 11c DEMO 
 Freedom 11d FREE 







Appendix 2: KLA documents 
“Amerikani nga Detrioti erdhi ta cliroje Kosoven.” Kosova Sot, January 5, 1999. 
“Armiku ka per qellim eskalimin e nje lufte te pergjitshme.” Koha Ditore, March 4, 1999. 
“Asnje vendim politik pa pelqimin e Adem Demacit.”  February 23, 1999. 
“Bardhyl Mahmuti: Kyeshte konflikt ndermjet dy ushtrive, ushtaret e zene jane rober lufte.” 
Kosova Sot, January 12, 1999. 
“Bardhyl Mahmuti: Pritet te lirohen disa ushtare te zene rober.” Kosova Sot, January 12, 1999. 
“Bisedimet I japin perspective pavaresise.” Koha Ditore, February 26, 1999. 
“Bshota: Po shfrytezohet vija vertikale e UCK-se.” Koha Ditore, March 4, 1999. 
“Buja: Kemi treguar se nuk jemi ata qe marrin jete njerezish.” Koha Ditore, January 16, 1999. 
“Cdo kush e ka te qarte se UCK-ja tashme paraqet formacion te regullt ushtarak.” Koha Ditore, 
February 14, 1999. 
“Cdo urdher I Shtabit te Pergjithshem do te respektohet.” Koha Ditore, February 14, 1999. 
“Cfaredo marreveshje, pa SHBA-ne dhe NATO-n-nuk ka vlere.” Kosova Sot, February 18, 1999. 
“Communiqué  13.”  June 1, 1995. 
“Communiqué  16 [sic, but should be 61].” Arta, October 31, 1998. 
“Communiqué  18.” Zeri I Kosoves, February 22, 1996. 
“Communiqué  19.” Zeri I Kosoves, May 1, 1996. 
“Communiqué  20.” Zeri I Kosoves, June 27, 1996. 
“Communiqué  21.”  July 14, 1996. 
“Communiqué  22.” Bota Sot, August 10, 1996. 
“Communiqué  24.” Zeri I Kosoves, August 30, 1996. 
“Communiqué  26.” Zeri I Kosoves, October 10, 1996. 
“Communiqué  27.” Zeri I Kosoves, October 27, 1996. 
“Communiqué  28.” Zeri I Kosoves, January 16, 1997. 
“Communiqué  29.” Zeri I Kosoves, January 23, 1997. 
“Communiqué  30.” Zeri I Kosoves, February 6, 1997. 
“Communiqué  32.” Zeri I Kosoves, April 3, 1997. 
“Communiqué  33.”  Kosovo Daily Report, May 20, 1997. 
“Communiqué  35.” Koha Ditore, August 8, 1997. 
“Communiqué  36.” Zeri I Kosoves, September 18, 1997. 
“Communiqué  37.” Zeri I Kosoves, October 23, 1997. 
“Communiqué  38.” Kosovo Daily Report, October 20, 1997. 
“Communiqué  38.” Zeri I Kosoves, November 7, 1997. 
“Communiqué  39.” Zeri I Kosoves, November 20, 1997. 
“Communiqué  40.” Bujku, December 3, 1997. 
“Communiqué  40.” Zeri I Kosoves, December 11, 1997. 
“Communiqué  41.” Bujku, January 8, 1998. 
“Communiqué  42.” Zeri I Kosoves, March 5, 1998. 
“Communiqué  43.” Bujku, March 4, 1998. 
“Communiqué  44.” Zeri I Kosoves, March 12, 1998. 
“Communiqué  45.” Bujku, March 11, 1998. 
“Communiqué  46.” Zeri I Kosoves, March 26, 1998. 
“Communiqué  47.” Koha Ditore, May 13, 1998. 





“Communiqué  51.” Albanian TV Tirana, August 26, 1998. 
“Communiqué  53 from KLA HQ.”  September 18, 1998. 
“Communiqué  55.” Koha Ditore, September 24, 1998. 
“Communiqué  56.” Koha Ditore, September 29, 1998. 
“Communiqué  57.” Arta, October 1, 1998. 
“Communiqué  60.” Albanian TV Tirana, October 18, 1998. 
“Communiqué  62.” Albanian TV Tirana, November 14, 1998. 
“Communiqué  65 from KLA HQ.”  December 18, 1998. 
“Communiqué  66 from KLA HQ.”  December 24, 1998. 
“Communiqué  67.” Albanian TV Tirana, December 26, 1998. 
“Communiqué  68: Fillojne punen agjencia informative "Kosova Press" dhe radiostacioni " 
Kosova e lire.” Koha Ditore, January 3, 1999. 
“Communiqué  69 / 70.” Albanian TV Tirana, January 16, 1999. 
“Communiqué  71 e UCK-se.” Koha Ditore, January 26, 1999. 
“Communiqué  75: Shtabi I Pergjithshem I UCK-se caktoi Kryeministrin e Qeverise se 
perkohshme te Kosoves.” Koha Ditore, February 28, 1999. 
“Communiqué  76.” Kosovapress, March 11, 1999. 
“Communiqué  77.” Kosovapress, March 20, 1999. 
“Communiqué  78.” Kosovapress, May 16, 1999. 
“Communiqué  79.” Kosovapress, May 26, 1999. 
“Communiqué: Shtabi I pergjithshem nuk eshte konsultuar per formimin e qeverise.”  February 
24, 1999. 
“Declaration of Jakup Krasniqi.” RFK, February 3, 1999. 
“Deklarate Politike nr. 4.”  March 22, 1998. 
“Deklarate Politike nr. 7.”  August 13, 1998. 
“Deklarate Politike nr. 23.”  January 17, 1999. 
“Deklarate nr. 26: Beogradi edhe nje here deshmoi se nuk eshte per zgjidhje paqesore.” 
Kosovapress, February 6, 1999. 
“Deklarate Politike nr. 29 Asnje marreveshje ne dem te pavaresise se Kosoves.” Kosova Sot, 
February 7, 1998. 
“Deklarate Politike nr. 30:  UCK-ja nuk e ka nderruar kerkesen per pavaresi.” Koha Ditore, 
February 8, 1999. 
“Deklarate Politike nr. 31: Te kemi besim te paluhatshem te delegacioni I UCK-se ne Rambuje.” 
Kosova Sot, February 21, 1999. 
“Delegacioni I Kosoves ne Rambouillet ka mandatin dhe mbeshtetjen e tere popullit shqiptar.” 
Koha Ditore, February 18, 1999. 
“Demaci eshte dakorduar me shkuarjen e perfaqesuesve te UCK-se ne Rambuje.” Kosova Sot, 
February 10, 1999. 
“Demaci: "Me nuk jam perfaqesues politik I UCK-se.” Koha Ditore, March 2, 1999. 
“Demaci: Presidenti duhet te bashkoje popullin e jo ta percaje.” Koha Ditore, January 7, 1999. 
“Demaci: UCK-ja nuk ja durrfare illuzionesh.”  January 5, 1999. 
“Demaci: Une nuk do te shkoje ne France.” Koha Ditore, February 3, 1999. 
“Deri me 10 shkurt do te behen konsultimet reth krijimit te Asamblese qytetare (Communiqué  
71 (?)).” Koha Ditore, January 28, 1999. 
“Derisa ne bisejojme, serbet vrasin shqiptare.”  February 21, 1999. 





“Drjtesia ngadhenjen kur kriminelet denohen si e meritojne.” Kosova Sot, January 27, 1999. 
“Edhe ne Kosove te ndiqet shembulli i shqiperise, Communiqué  70.” Koha Ditore, January 22, 
1999. 
“Emeroj.”  November 23, 1998. 
“Eshte e paprenueshme qe te kerkohet cfaredo ndihme prej atyre qe vrasin gra, pleq e femije.” 
Koha Ditore, February 5, 1999. 
“Fjala e ushtarve te uck-se ne varrimin e mesuesit Halit Geci ne llaushe.” Zeri I Kosoves, 
December 11, 1997. 
“Forcat e armikut perdoren metoda perfide e qyqare.” Koha Ditore, January 23, 1999. 
“Hashim Thaçi caktohet mandatar per formimin e qeverise se perkohshme te Kosoves.” 
kosovasot, March 2, 1999. 
“Hashim Thaçi udheheqes I delegacionit shqiptar I shruan leter tre Abasadoreve ndermjetesuse.”  
February 25, 1999. 
“Human rights are equal for all.” RFK arc, vol 1, January 13, 1999. 
“Interview with LDK.” Koha Jone Tirana, August 6, 1996. 
“Interview with Sokol Dobrunen, Chief of Judicial System, KLA HQ.” RFK arc, vol 1, February 
17, 1999. 
“Jakup Krasniqi: Do te disedojme me ata qe jane gati te luftojne.” Kosova Sot, January 30, 1999. 
“Jakup Krasniqi: NATO-ja te merre pjese ne zbatimin e cfardo marreveshjeje.” Kosova Sot, 
February 21, 1999. 
“James Huper: The absence of NATO is a weakness of the Rambouillet conference.” RFK arc, 
vol 1, February 7, 1999. 
“Kam qene I pakenaqur me imitimin e shtetit te paqene.” Koha Ditore, January 4, 1999. 
“Kicmari: UCK-ja eshte ushtri e rregullt.” Koha Ditore, February 21, 1999. 
“KLA Free "Yugoslav" Soldiers in Kosovo.” Kosova Sot, January 14, 1999. 
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Appendix 3: Timeline for the Kosovo case 
March and April 1981 Student demonstrations in Pristina turn violent. 
November 1988 
Autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina within Serbia have 
their autonomy curtailed. 
 
March 28, 1989 
The Assembly of Serbia met to revoke the autonomy granted to 




Referendum in Kosovo results in a 99.8 % vote by the population in 
favor of independence. 
 
October 1991 Kosovo parliament declares independence. 
Winter 1993 




UN Human Rights Rapporteur notes the human rights situation in 
Kosovo is deteriorating. 
 
June 1995 The KLA issues its first press release, or communiqué. 
November 1995 
 
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 










Unrest in neighboring Albania and associated looting of military 
stores floods black market with cheap guns. 
 
September 1, 1997 
 
Agreement reached between Ibrahim Rugova and Slobodan 
Milosevic on education matters in Kosovo. 
 
October 1997 Student demonstrations on the streets of Pristina. 
February 1998 
 







First public appearance of KLA members at a funeral for a local 








Serbian forces attack three villages in the Drenica region, a KLA 




Richard Holbrooke becomes the US Special Envoy to the Region, 
and travels to Belgrade, and Kosovo. 
 
June – August 1998 
 
Fighting in Kosovo worsens as a large summer offensive conducted 
throughout Kosovo by both the Serbian military, providing artillery 
and tank support, and Serbian special police forces, which went 




13 NATO countries participate in Operation Determined Falcon, 












UN Security Council Resolution 1199 issued. Acting under Chapter 
VII of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council members demand that 
all parties cease hostilities immediately and take steps to improve 




NATO issues an ACTWARN (Activation Warning) for phased air 




Both parties agree to a cease-fire and the OSCE launches a cease-








The North Atlantic Council (NAC) of NATO issues activation 
orders, known as ACTORDs, for both limited air strikes and a 




The KLA undergoes further reorganization and stratification, with 













Discussions between Serbian officials and the Albanian delegation, 





The Kosovo Albanian delegation signs the Interim Agreement on 
March 18 in Paris, and, following a final warning visit of Richard 





Milosevic accepts NATO’s terms for settlement, and KFOR troops 








Appendix 4: LTTE documents list 
November 27, 1992 Velupillai Prabhakaran’s  Hero's Day Speech 
 
November 27, 1993 Velupillai Prabhakaran’s  Hero's Day Speech 
 
November 27, 1994 Velupillai Prabhakaran’s  Hero's Day Speech 
 
November 27, 1995 Velupillai Prabhakaran’s  Hero's Day Speech 
 
November 27, 1996 Velupillai Prabhakaran’s  Hero's Day Speech  
 
November 27, 1997 Velupillai Prabhakaran’s  Hero's Day Speech 
 
November 27, 1998 Velupillai Prabhakaran’s  Hero's Day Speech 
 
November 27, 1999 Velupillai Prabhakaran’s  Hero's Day Speech 
 
November 27, 2000 Velupillai Prabhakaran’s  Hero's Day Speech 
 
November 27, 2001 Velupillai Prabhakaran’s  Hero's Day Speech 
 
November 27, 2002 Velupillai Prabhakaran’s  Hero's Day Speech 
 
November 27, 2003 Velupillai Prabhakaran’s  Hero's Day Speech 
 
November 27, 2004 Velupillai Prabhakaran’s  Hero's Day Speech 
 
November 27, 2005 Velupillai Prabhakaran’s  Hero's Day Speech 
 
November 27, 2006 Velupillai Prabhakaran’s  Hero's Day Speech 
 















In the general election, the Tamil political party, the Tamil United 
Liberation Front (TULF) sweeps elections in Tamil areas and wins 
eighteen seats in the legislature, including all fourteen seats contested in 








Passage of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which gives Sri Lankan  




In an escalation of the violence, the LTTE ambushes and kills 13 
government soldiers in in Jaffna. Immediately following the ambush, 




Peace talks held in Thimpu, Bhutan between the Sri Lankan government 




Rajiv Gandhi elected Prime Minister of India, and signs the Indo-Sri 
Lankan accords on July 29, 1987, which include provisions for included 
the establishment and deployment of the Indian Peacekeeping force 




Forty Sri Lankan soldiers die in the first LTTE suicide bomb attack on 
July 5, when a soldier from the Black Tiger unit, known as “Captain 





Peace talks resume. 
 







LTTE resumes fighting, ending 14 months of peace talks, and the Second 














Chandrika Kumaratunga elected president in Sri Lanka, and, pledging an 








The LTTE sink a Sri Lankan naval war ship, ending the peace talks, and 

















LTTE attack one of Sri Lanka’s holiest Buddhist shrine, the Temple of 






















Norwegian government plays an important intermediary role in the 




The LTTE attacked the Katunayake air base destroyed eight military 
aircraft and damaged 10 others on the tarmac, before attacking adjacent 
international airport, Bandaranaike, where they were able to destroy or 




The Sri Lankan government and the LTTE sign a Norwegian-mediated 
ceasefire Cease Fire Agreement (CFA). Its monitoring body is known as 




Split within the ranks of the LTTE. Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan (alias 
Colonel Karuna), an LTTE commander, breaks away from the group’s 













Mahinda Rajapaksa, prime minister at the time, wins presidential 
elections. Rajapaksa oversees a shift towards a military strategy from the 
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